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In contribution to recent challenges made by animal studies regarding humanist approaches in 
empirical science, this thesis offers a critical analysis of contemporary literary fiction and its 
representations of the non-human animal and the human and non-human animal encounters and 
relations engendered within the scientific setting. This is achieved through a focusing in on four 
different scientific situations: cognitive ethological field research, long-term cognitive behavioural 
studies, short-term comparative psychology experimentations, and invasive surgical practices. Sub-
divisions of scientific investigation selected for their different methodological procedures which 
directly dictate the situational circumstance and experience of non-human animals involved to 
produce particular kinds of knowledges on them.  
 
The thesis is divided into four chapters, organised into the four sub-divisions of contemporary 
scientific modes of producing knowledge on non-human animal life and the distinct empirical 
methodologies they employ. The first chapter provides an extended analysis of William Boyd’s 
Brazzaville Beach (1990), using Donna Haraway’s conceptualisations of the empirical sciences as 
socially constructed to examine how the novel offers a reconsideration of field-based scientific 
practices and the interspecies encounters engendered there. The second chapter moves to the 
laboratory setting as reconstructed in both Colin McAdam’s A Beautiful Truth (2013) and Karen Joy 
Fowler’s We Are All Completely Beside Ourselves (2014), employing Bruno Latour’s theoretical 
deconstructions of the physical and conceptualised laboratory setting to reconsider how fictional 
instances can explore human and non-human encounters whilst navigating the situational 
circumstances of the space. The third chapter offers an analysis of Lydia Millet’s ‘Love in Infant 
Monkeys’ (2009), Karen Joy Fowler’s ‘Us’ (2013), and Ursula Le Guin’s ‘Mazes’ (1975), three texts 
exploring conceptual oppositions apparent within experimental cognition studies, read against 
Vinciane Despret’s considerations of the experimental situation as influential over human and non-
human animal encounters. Finally, the fourth chapter reads Sylvia Torti’s Cages (2017) and Allegra 
Goodman’s Intuition (2010) as fictional examples of invasive scientific practices reliant on the non-
human animal body as biomaterial, using Jane Bennett’s equalising vital materiality theory to re-
balance these interspecies encounters in order to inform an effective evaluation of the 
epistemological logics at play against those fictionally represented. 
 
Taken together, these chapters enable the thesis to look across different scientific settings and attend 
to the specificities of each empirical situation, thereby contributing to the store of literary animal 
studies accounts regarding the empirical sciences and human and non-human animal relation in fiction 
by adding complexity and comparative understanding. Rather than survey many instances in 
contemporary literary fiction to achieve its goals, the thesis focuses on important texts in detail 
because of the depth and focus of their interest in alternative scientific settings. The chapters 
showcase different literary strategies by which to navigate subtle nuances and variances between 
epistemological logics and empirical methodologies, opening up the scientific setting to consider the 
non-human animal experiential situation and the human and non-human animal encounters and 
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Man may be excused for feeling some pride at having risen, though not through his 
own exertions, to the very summit of the organic scale; and the fact of his having thus 
risen, instead of having been aboriginally placed there, may give him hopes for still a 
higher destiny in the distant future. But we are not here concerned with hopes or 
fears, only with the truth as far as our reason allows us to discover it. I have given 
evidence to the best of my ability; and we must acknowledge, as it seems to me, that 
man with all his noble qualities, with sympathy which feels for the most debased, with 
benevolence which extends not only to other men but to the humblest living creature, 
with his god-like intellect which has penetrated into the movements and constitution 
of the solar system – with all these exalted powers – Man still bears in his bodily frame 
the indelible stamp of his lowly origin.1 
 
The excerpt above is the final paragraph taken from Charles Darwin’s The Descent of Man, 
representative of the textual moment Darwin formally applied his theory of species evolution to 
humanity.2 First published in 1871, the behemothic work is a study of many correlations existent 
between the physical and psychological evolutionary development of humankind and other non-
human animal species, as well as a demonstration of evolutionary theory in human society as a 
civilized approach to natural selection. Darwin’s ending summation is both equally idealistic and 
optimistic in its proposed application of evolutionary theory, depicting a veritable utopia where 
humans and non-human animals coinhabit a world of discoverable universal truths. However, 
Darwin’s propitious epilogue was ultimately interpreted differently by those in the contemporary 
scientific community. Religious assuredness in man’s celestial favour was instead traded for a 
sense of evolutionary pride that justified resultant anthropocentric approaches that would 
 
1 Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex (Ware: Wordsworth Editions Limited, 
2013), pp. 646-647. 
2 A broad and valuable account of the philosophical nature and impact of Darwin’s evolutionary theory is 
provided in Michael Ruse’s Charles Darwin (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2008). 
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characterise the empirical sciences through into the next century and beyond.3 During the 
intermediary period, models of knowledge pertaining to human exceptionalism abounded to 
establish a species hierarchy, at the summit of which humanity assuredly placed itself. The 
intellectual powers of the empirical sciences were mobilized and turned to non-human animals 
to better understand human evolutionary history, to determine a range of possible futures, and 
most importantly, to reassure the higher destiny of man.  
 
The extract from The Descent of Man introduces main epistemological logics still at play 
within modern-day practices of scientific knowledge production, specifically those that use non-
human animals. Darwin’s allusion to there being a ‘truth as far as our reason allows us to discover 
it’, demarcates systems of self-appropriation and deliberate selectivity in empirical 
methodological design. The ‘exalted powers’ of man, particularly his exclusive intellectual 
prowess and linguistic capabilities, are benchmarks of sentience by which non-human animal 
species are measured, categorized, and qualified within a species hierarchy that additionally 
determines human ‘benevolence’, distinctions that include scientific attitudes and treatments 
toward non-human animals. Confidence in human exceptionalism continued to influence the 
direction of empirical sciences well into the twentieth century, invigorated by scientific and 
technological advances. However, fractures in the ideology began to emerge, as scientist Sir 
James Jeans demonstrates in 1933: ‘[n]ature no more models her behaviour on the muscles and 
sinews of our bodies than on the desires and caprices of our minds’.4 Gradually, scepticism toward 
human exceptionalism began to pervade the empirical sciences, influencing perceptions of the 
non-human animal used in its experimentations, prompting reconsiderations of its psychological 
and corporeal experience. However, the post-war era brought economic, scientific, and 
technological advances once again, increasing the quantity of non-human animals used in 
laboratories, facilities, and researches throughout the world, a self-governing space on the 
periphery of the public domain and legally protected.  
 
These cultural and economic shifts established a resident non-human animal population 
entirely dependent on its interspecies relationship with humans, creating a vast multiplication 
and multiplicity of human and non-human animal encounters in the empirical scientific setting 
 
3 A historical overview of philosophical movements in empirical science is provided in Steve Fuller’s Science 
(Buckingham: Open University Press, 1997).  
4 James Jean, The New Background of Science (London: Cambridge University Press, 1933), p. 43. 
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almost entirely invisible to the outside world. Recently, cross-disciplinary efforts by historians and 
sociologists of science with an interest specifically in non-human animals have sought to revisit 
and reconsider the empirical designs and methodologies used in contemporary empirical science 
that employ non-human animals, exposing and examining conceptual oppositions evident during 
human and non-human animal encounters occurrent there, to then question broader ethical and 
moral implications. In order to expand our understanding of the kinds of conceptual oppositions 
present in the epistemological logics of science and the influences of human exceptionalism that 
underpin all scientific empirical experimentations, it is beneficial to turn to the important work of 
Jacques Derrida.   
 
During an interview recorded in 1989, conducted by fellow philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy, 
Jacques Derrida considered the ‘question of the animal’ as an oppositional by-product of converse 
determinations of the human relation to self, idealised to be an entity capable of conscience, 
awareness, language, and having an understanding of death.5 Derrida’s later work The Animal 
That Therefore I Am, entitled after the extensive essay he wrote and delivered to the 1997 Cerisy 
Conference, is considered a significant event in the history of animal studies that worked to re-
complicate concepts of the non-human animal. Considering philosophical difficulties and queries 
relating to the non-human animal, Derrida examines humanist distinctions of what is deemed 
human and what is deemed non-human, and why their resultant misconceptions of ontological 
difference between them are so dogmatically maintained. Examining the limitations of these 
distinctions and the potentialities that are presented when one considers constructive interstices 
between them, Derrida uses the term “limitrophy” to define the method of his philosophical 
exploration into these lines of distinction: 
 
Limitrophy is therefore my subject. Not just because it will concern what sprouts or 
grows at the limit, around the limit, by maintaining the limit, but what feeds the limit, 
generates it, raises it, and complicates it […] not in effacing the limit, but in multiplying 
its figures, in complicating, thickening, delinearizing, folding, and dividing the line 
 
5 Jacques Derrida, ‘“Eating Well”, or the Calculation of the Subject: An interview with Jacques Derrida’, in Who 
Comes After the Subject?, ed. by E. Cadava and others (London: Routledge, 1991), pp. 96-119 (p. 105).  
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precisely by making it increase and multiply […] the limit between Man with a capital 
M and Animal with a capital A.6 
 
Derrida identifies several ontological points along the human and non-human animal limit that he 
works against in order to reconsider the artificiality of the human and non-human animal binary, 
including thought and language. He ascertains that distinctions between what is determined to 
be human and what is determined to be non-human are detrimentally reductive, incapable of 
encapsulating the diverse complexities of non-human animal species in their entirety. The Animal 
That Therefore I Am offered a conceptual framework by which to find interstices, inconsistencies, 
and spaces along the human and non-human animal border with the potential for constructive 
reconsideration of the non-human animal experience. By employing Derrida’s interrogative 
framework, it is possible to undermine and think beyond unquestioning anthropocentric systems 
and challenge humanist demarcations of the non-human animal to reconsider its role in literature, 
science, and other instances in human culture. However, before any such investigative 
contribution can be carried out it is important to briefly assess the history of the two cultures 
debate that has recently dominated the intellectual relationship and interactions between 
literature and empirical sciences.  
 
In May 1959, scientist and novelist C. P. Snow delivered his now infamous Rede Lecture 
at the University of Cambridge entitled ‘The Two Cultures’, published later in that same year 
under the same title. Snow outlined his fear that ‘the intellectual life of the whole of western 
society is increasingly being split into two polar groups’.7 He continued to describe the sciences 
and the humanities as becoming ‘two groups – comparable in intelligence, identical in race, not 
grossly different in social origin […] who had almost ceased to communicate at all, who in 
intellectual, moral and psychological climate had so little in common’.8 He asserted that ‘[t]his 
polarisation is sheer loss to us all. To us as people, and to our society […] practical and intellectual 
and creative loss’, claiming that the polarisation had been further exacerbated by 
‘incomprehension on both sides’.9 After sketching out the ideological and methodological 
 
6 Jacques Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I Am, ed. by Marie-Louise Mallet, trans. by David Wills (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2008), p. 29. 
7 C. P. Snow, The Two Cultures (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 3. 
8 Ibid., p. 2. 
9 Ibid., p. 11. 
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features of the sciences and the humanities disciplines, Snow suggested ways in which this 
divergence could be halted and bridge the chasm between two groups to the advantage of 
western society, including educational reform and the positive effect of new emergent mid-
century technologies. However, the ‘two cultures’ concept was seized upon and vehemently 
adopted by those who identified with their chosen intellectual faction, building on increasing 
tensions and debates regarding knowledge and cultural and human values that had arisen 
throughout the early twentieth century. Following Snow’s lecture, these conflicting positions 
were catalysed into the two cultures debate that ensued throughout the 1960s and eventually 
cemented the tribalism that defined, and continues to define, the relationship between the 
sciences and humanities today.  
 
Cultural historian Guy Ortolano observes that the ‘two cultures’ debate has proliferated 
from the moment of Snow’s 1959 lecture, and that its reverberations still resonate today ‘in 
accounts of popular science, public policy, the sociology of knowledge, postwar British history, 
intellectual story – and much else besides’.10 Crucially he proposes that, on both sides, there 
remains an ‘ability of commentators to adapt the “two cultures” to various ends [and so] many of 
these discussions tend to recycle their claims […] The recirculation of such clichés results from the 
multiplicity of conversations taking the “two cultures” are their touchstone: they may share a 
common point of departure, but they lack a common body of knowledge’.11 In his monograph The 
Two Cultures Controversy, Ortolano argues that, although the ‘two cultures’ debate is 
predominantly seen as a disciplinary dispute, it was in fact an ideological clash over key 
fundamental ideological stakes available during the period, mainly Britain’s past, present and 
potential postwar future.12 He summaries how Snow’s ‘two cultures’ demarcation has passed into 
the tribalist folklores of both disciplines, and is today a cliché about intellectual life that 
conceptually intrudes in on and unnecessarily complicates any crucial discussions concerning the 
relationship between the humanities and the sciences due to the intellectual history that the two 
cultures debate sustains. Patricia Waugh emphasises this point further and offers a commentary 
on the condition of the two cultures debate today, noting:  
 
10 Guy Ortolano, ‘The literature and the science of ‘two cultures’ historiography’, Studies in History and 
Philosophy of Science, 39 (2008), 143-150 (p. 144).  
11 Ibid., p. 149. 
12 Guy Ortolano, The Two Cultures Controversy: Science, Literature and Cultural Politics in Postwar Britain 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).  
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Academic interest in the relations between the sciences and the humanities has never 
been so high as now, enhanced and nourished by the rise of the new disciplines such 
as Science Studies and the growth in history and philosophy of science. But no major 
discussion of the relation between the arts, humanities and sciences has since 
proceeded without some positioning of itself in relation to the conceptual space up 
by Snow’s phrase.13 
 
Waugh goes on to recommend that any attempt to understand the two cultures debate should 
‘instead offer an opportunity for a “creative collaboration” between disciplines, in attempting to 
arrive at a properly complex and multi-perspectival understanding’, to prevent discussions that 
have ‘too often metamorphosed into further disciplinary skirmishes’.14 When considering the two 
cultures debate in regard to the state of human and non-human animal relations, discussions 
invariably become entrenched within the same ideological ruts as the broader discourse. 
Critically, there is no significant examination of how the two cultures debate has affected and 
continues to influence considerations of human and non-human relations more broadly or, 
specifically in relation to the purposes of this thesis, deliberations of human and non-human 
encounters within the scientific empirical environment. Therefore, it is beneficial to consider the 
state of the scholarship on science and literature to demonstrate this gap in the literary analysis 
to reiterate the potential value such investigations could bring.  
 
Scholarship on science and literature lacks any comprehensive focus on contemporary 
representations of human and non-human animals in empirical scientific settings. During his 
introduction to The Cambridge Companion to Literature and Science, Steven Meyer describes an 
anthology that provides ‘a rich portrayal of the interweaving of theory and practice in recent 
scholarship’.15 Meyer identifies Snow’s Rede Lecture as the moment of genesis for the current 
scholarship in science and literature and so introduces a ‘compelling account of how twenty-first-
century literary studies and science studies have come to be so richly integrated with literature 
 
13 Patricia Waugh, review of Guy Ortolano, The Two Cultures Controversy: Science, Literature and Cultural 
Politics in Postwar Britain (2009), Reviews in History, 849 (2009) <https://reviews.history.ac.uk/review/849> 
[accessed 3 February 2020] 
14 Ibid. 
15 Steven Meyer, ‘Introduction’, in The Cambridge Companion to Literature and Science, ed. by Steven Meyer 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), pp. 1-22 (p. 1). 
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and science, and may become still more so’.16 In the preface to The Routledge Companion to 
Literature and Science, edited by Bruce Clarke and Manuela Rossini, the anthology claims to 
highlight ‘specific specializations with regard to their literary connections’, and provide details 
regarding ‘the current range of disciplinary and theoretical approaches in and around literature 
and science scholarship’.17 Indeed, one review describes the anthology as ‘a defining moment in 
the consolidation of transdisciplinary convergences […] a postmodern text about literary cross-
disciplinary contact zones’.18 However, not one of the contributories in either companion address 
the potential to be found in contemporary representations of human and non-human animal 
encounters and relations within the modern empirical scientific setting. As such, the importance 
of an intervention that examines an area of valuable interdisciplinary crossover becomes all the 
more apparent when considering this critical omission. 
 
Until very recently, the majority of investigations regarding the relationship between 
literature, science and human and non-human animal encounters focus predominantly on either 
Darwin’s language and rhetoric, focusing on the formation of evolutionary theory and modern 
scientific practice. Those that do consider the non-human animal situation in the scientific 
environment specifically do so through instances taken from pre-modern fiction. Chris Danta 
examines how the metaphysical relations between vivisection and non-human animal life are 
presented throughout the works of both Darwin and Robert Lewis Stevenson.19 Manon Mathias 
considers thematics of reincarnation in literature by George Sand in the Victorian period.20 Sally 
Shuttleworth looks to uncover networks which operated within Victorian science and medicine, 
though omits the role played by non-human animals during this period of scientific genesis.21 
Angelique Richardson explores levels of interdisciplinarity brought on by Darwin’s research into 
 
16 Ibid. 
17 Bruce Clarke and Manuela Rossini, ‘Preface’, in The Routledge Companion to Literature and Science, ed. by 
Bruce Clarke and Manuela Rossini (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), pp. xv-xviii (p. xvii). 
18 Jonathan Zilberg, ‘Review: The Routledge Companion to Literature and Science by Bruce Clarke and Manuela 
Rossini’, Leonardo, 46 (2013), 300-302 (p. 301). 
19 Chris Danta, ‘The Metaphysical Cut: Darwin and Stevenson on Vivisection’, Victorian Review, 36 (2010), 51-
65. 
20 Manon Mathias, ‘Pre-Darwinian Species Change: Reincarnation and Transformism in George Sand’s Évenor 
et Leucippe’, Journal of Literature and Science, 11 (2018), 33-49.  
21 Sally Shuttleworth, ‘Life in the Zooniverse: Working with Citizen Science’, Journal of Literature and Science, 
10 (2017), 46-51.  
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emotions, focusing on how it challenged traditional epistemological distinctions between the 
human and non-human animal in Victorian culture.22 This brief cross section of traditional 
research into the relationship between literature and the sciences reiterates the importance of 
an analytical intervention that examines an area of such valuable interdisciplinary crossover in 
contemporary literary representations of human and non-human animal encounters in scientific 
spaces reemphasises the necessary intervention of this thesis.  
 
In contribution to recent challenges made by animal studies of the same humanist 
approaches outlined earlier, this thesis offers a critical analysis of representations of non-human 
animals and the human and non-human animal encounters and relations engendered within 
scientific settings as represented in contemporary literary fiction, achieved through a focusing in 
on four different scientific situations. These are: cognitive ethological field research, long-term 
cognitive behavioural studies, short-term comparative psychology experimentations, and 
invasive surgical practices. These sub-divisions have been chosen deliberately for their entirely 
different methodological procedures which directly dictate the situational circumstance and 
experience of the non-human animals involved. Additionally, each scientific setting works toward 
the promissory future of advancing either human biological health or understanding of human 
physiological or psychological evolutionary development. Therefore, these four settings 
represent a set of interspecies spaces existent on the human and non-human animal boundary 
where appropriations of human exceptionalism manifest themselves in four uniquely different 
ways. Each chapter spends time appropriately setting out the key scientific contexts of each 
scientific situation critiqued by the contemporary fictional instances, particularly through 
representations of each methodological practice and the non-human animals employed within 
them. Considerations will now turn to the works of Philip Armstrong, Cary Wolfe, and Susan 
McHugh, prominent literary critics whose systematic engagements with literature and non-




Philip Armstrong’s What Animals Mean in the Fiction of Modernity addresses issues 
regarding representation of the non-human animal in literature by interrogating modern 
 
22 Angelique Richardson, After Darwin: Animals, Emotions, and the Mind (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2013).  
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frameworks of humanist representations of non-human animal life. Throughout, he identifies 
textual instances of animal agency representative of dominant human cultural perspectives, 
arguing that fictional non-human animals began to permeate these human and non-human 
boundaries and question the distinctions between them. Armstrong identifies René Descartes’ 
philosophical outline of scientific methodology in Discourse on the Method, first published in 
1637, which proclaims the aptitude to think is the uniquely human precondition that conversely 
denies non-human animals intelligence, self-consciousness, and thought; rendering them 
automata or mechanomorphic.23 He argues that Descartes’ proclamation, accompanied by the 
scientific and technological advances, caught the human cultural and social imagination of the 
early modern era and set the standard by which non-human animals were perceived and 
therefore represented.24 Armstrong’s intention in What Animals Mean is to explore instances in 
literature that depict ‘the relationship between human-animal narratives and the social practices 
and conditions from which they emerge; the evidence of exchanges between human and non-
human forms of agency’25, his objective being to ‘facilitate a mode of analysis that does not reduce 
the animal to a blank screen for the projection of human meaning, and might offer productive 
new ways of accounting for the material influence of the non-human animal upon humans, and 
vice versa’.26 Importantly, Armstrong determines ‘novelists, scientists and scholars can never 
actually access, let alone reproduce, what other animals mean on their own terms […] only 
represent animals’ experience through the mediation of cultural encoding […] a reshaping 
according to our own intentions, attitudes and preconceptions’.27  
 
Critical approaches viewing empirical science as a social practice influenced by current 
human cultural situations are not new, especially within the field of critical animal studies. It is 
therefore surprising that there have not been any kind of substantial critical engagements with 
the ways in which contemporary literature represents these social processes of empirical science. 
Including how methodologies implicate and influence the experience of the non-human animal 
used within empirical practices, and how they are represented throughout. Armstrong’s 
 
23 René Descartes, A Discourse on the Method of Correctly Conducting One’s Reason and Seeking Truth in the 
Sciences (Oxford University Press, 2008). 
24 Philip Armstrong, What Animals Mean in the Fiction of Modernity (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008), p. 7.  
25 Ibid., p. 2. 
26 Ibid., p. 3. 
27 Ibid., pp. 2-3. 
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processes of cultural encoding, as well as the forms of human and non-human animal agency 
involved, represent a sequence of investigative potentialities that support the exploratory 
objectives of the thesis. Taking Armstrong’s considerations even further, this thesis explores the 
capability of contemporary literature to portray scientific experimental design, including the 
influence of the investigator’s own intentions, attitudes, and preconceptions, as indicative of a 
human social practice influenced by current human cultural inclinations. More specifically, how 
empirical practices are wholly humanist constructions that maintain species distinctions by 
observing, recording, exploiting, representing and misrepresenting the non-human animal in 
particular ways, creating specific kinds of knowledge on non-human animal life that are then 
considered to be universal truths.  
 
Cary Wolfe, a prominent figure in critical posthumanist approaches of animal 
representation, advocates the potential that comes into being when the non-human animal is 
taken seriously in readings of literature, science, and other human cultural practices: 
 
Once we understand that ‘the human’ and ‘the animal’ are relics of a philosophical 
humanism that flattens the actual complexity and multidimensionality of what are, in 
fact, many different ways of bring in the world that are shared in myriad particular 
ways across species lines, then the question of the animal – and of the animality of 
the human – cannot help but open onto fundamental issues that are best thought of 
not as problems of distinct and discreet ontological substances, but rather in terms of 
processes, dynamics and relations […] and the environments, technologies, 
prostheses, and practices in which they are embedded as beings both acting and acted 
upon.28 
 
Throughout his researches, Wolfe endeavours to deconstruct systems that maintain human 
subjectivity and reinforce boundaries built on species identity, arguing that scientific discoveries 
of non-human animal conscious awareness, social hierarchies, and behaviours actually destabilise 
distinctions between the human and non-human animal, drawing them closer together.29 He 
 
28 Cary Wolfe, ‘Moving forward, kicking back: The animal turn’, Postmedieval: A Journal of Medieval Cultural 
Studies, 2 (2011), 1-12 (p. 3).  
29 Florence Chiew, ‘Posthuman Ethics with Cary Wolfe and Karen Barad: Animal Compassion as Trans-Species 
Entanglement’, Theory, Culture and Society, 31 (2014), 51-69 (p. 54).  
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highlights the illogicality behind ethical care and treatment of non-human animals being totally 
determined by the same scientific systems of knowledge production that utilise them, proposing 
reviews of current legislative doctrine to accommodate ontological complexities.30 He outlines 
the difficulties of isolating and determining the non-human animal experience in the scientific 
setting, falling into a category of interspecies cohabitation that is dictated by the epistemological 
logics operational there. He stresses that although ‘some nonhuman animals have their own 
social relations of interdependency […] others live in relations of interdependency with human 
beings’.31 When considering the absolutism of empirical science to represent the non-human 
animal, he determines that a ‘disarticulation of reference and truth’ happens, as ‘science uses 
conceptual abstractions that do not do justice to the observed system’s concrete knowledge of 
its milieu or to its ongoing self-experience’.32  
 
Alternatively, Wolfe underlines that recent contemporary animal studies efforts have been 
encouraged by scientific discoveries into the richness of non-human animal emotional lives and 
complex cognitive abilities, made apparent through their various non-linguistical forms of 
communication and interaction between themselves, and even across species lines.33  
Throughout his book Animal Rites, Wolfe consistently employs references to scientific researches 
to support critical animal studies efforts that dissolve humanist lines of human and non-human 
animal distinction. For example, he contends that ‘any number of very prominent studies in field 
ecology, cognitive ethology, and linguistic production […] [have shown] the “defining” 
characteristics of the distinctly human – language, tool use, took making, social behaviour, 
altruism, and so on – have been found to be not so defining after all’.34 In doing so, Wolfe 
conversely implies that animal studies as a field has been enabled by taking the non-human 
animal in science seriously, including discoveries into their biological and cognitive abilities. If 
critical animals studies investigations are indeed initiated by scientific enquiry and its subsequent 
results, it is again a substantial gap in scholarship that there is no significant literary critical 
 
30 Cary Wolfe, Animal Rites: American Culture, the Discourse of Species, and Posthumanist Theory, (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2003), pp. 190-191.  
31 Cary Wolfe, Before the Law: Humans and Other Animals in a Biopolitical Frame (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 2013), p. 19. 
32 Cary Wolfe, What is Posthumanism? (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009), pp. 113-114. 
33 Cary Wolfe, ‘Human, All Too Human: “Animal Studies” and the Humanities’, PMLA, 128 (2009), 564-575 (p. 
567).  
34 Cary Wolfe, Animal Rites, p. 40.  
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engagement with the ways in which literary practices represent those same scientific systems of 
producing knowledge on non-human animals. Exploratory potentialities include how 
contemporary fiction explores the limitations of scientific investigation outlined by Wolfe, a 
touchstone of posthumanist animal studies investigations, through the portrayal of non-human 
animals and the empirical spaces they inhabit. Does contemporary literature portray empirical 
science as an epistemological system that dissolves human and non-human animal distinctions? 
And importantly, how does literature depict the non-human animal experience in the scientific 
setting and the ways in which empirical methodologies delineate the human and non-human 
animal encounters that occur there.  
 
Susan McHugh considers representations of non-human animals in literature, visual media, 
and scientific narratives, maintaining that literary animal studies can ‘realize an empirical 
potential to develop terms, methods, and concepts of species relations […] [and] address the 
looming epistemological crisis of disciplinary ways of knowing’.35 She contends that recent 
analyses of the literary non-human animal have undermined more scientific ways of knowing both 
non-human animals and the human and non-human animal relationship more broadly. In Animal 
Stories: Narrating Across Species Lines, McHugh examines how literature and literary narratives 
help in ‘mapping more permeable species boundaries […] locating narrative as a zone of 
integration’, and ‘how story forms operate centrally within shifting perceptions of species life’.36 
Animal Stories evidences literary novelistic instances that unsettle views of literary fiction as the 
embodiment of human subjectivity, instead encouraging a sense of reciprocal interspecies 
connectivity and social agency that influence considerations of the non-human animal across the 
humanities and science subjects. Similarly to Armstrong, McHugh contends that throughout 
animal studies today ‘animals are being reconceptualised as active participants in all sorts of 
cultural production’, including the empirical sciences, and ultimately benefit from an ‘[a]nalysis 
of the varied involvements of animals in the production of disciplinary and other knowledges’, 
including considerations of ‘animals as significant others in science studies’.37 This specific set of 
 
35 Susan McHugh, ‘One or Several Literary Animal Studies?’  
<https://networks.h-net.org/node/16560/pages/32231/one-or-several-literary-animal-studies-susan-mchugh> 
[accessed 26 August 2019] 
36 Susan McHugh, Animal Stories: Narrating Across Species Lines (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2011), p. 2. 
37 Susan McHugh, ‘Literary Animal Agents’, PLMA, 124 (2009), 487-495 (p. 490).  
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deliberations align closely with key sociology of science theories that reconsider science as a social 
activity and the knowledges produced influenced by the context in which it is created. Such 
analytical strategies are greatly influential throughout this thesis, opening up the empirical 
sciences in such a way as to offer opportunities to reconsider the role and experience of the non-
human animals used in the production of knowledge.    
 
Whilst she promotes ‘animal fictions as models enabling significant epistemological shifts 
within animal science’, McHugh also proclaims that these texts do so through ‘[o]bscuring the 
more mundane realities of data-driven science’.38 However, as she offers no comprehensive 
critical analyses of non-human animals in the scientific setting as represented in contemporary 
literature, this assertion cannot be considered true of all fictional literary strategies. This is 
another key investigative objective of the thesis: whether literary representations of non-human 
animals in the scientific setting initiate reconsideration through obscuring and concealment as 
McHugh suggests, or other strategies that also promote a sense of anthropological distance and 
estrangement from empirical practice. When they are found not to be, literary strategies are 
examined in terms of how they navigate the epistemological logics inherent to empirical 
methodological designs to ensure effective reconsideration of the non-human animal implicated 
within them. McHugh’s approaches additionally implicate a series of further questions regarding 
literary representations of non-human animal as participatory in the construction of scientific 
knowledge, how they potentially affect both the research and the researcher conducting the 
investigation to influence both the non-human animal encounter and the final results that are 
obtained.  
 
The following chapters investigate the ways in which contemporary literary fiction 
reconsiders the non-human animal in empirical scientific systems of knowledge production to 
suggest a far more multi-dimensional interspecies encounter than traditional perceptions of 
empirical science would otherwise suggest. Operating in between literature and historiographical 
or sociological and theoretical studies of science, the thesis takes literary non-human animals 
seriously as both a participatory contributor in the construction of scientific knowledge and the 
numerous human and non-human animal encounters created by and through empirical practices. 
While this approach necessarily opens up truth-claims of scientific epistemologies and practices 
for critical reflection, it is certainly not the objective of this thesis to determine the overall 
 
38 McHugh, Animal Stories, p. 212. 
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effectiveness of scientific empirical practice to produce knowledge on non-human animals. 
Rather, it is to evaluate how contemporary literature contributes to and commentates on 
reconsiderations of systems of knowledge production, always operating at the outer limits of 
scientific methodology. This allows the thesis to discover other valuable ways of thinking about 
non-human animals in the scientific empirical setting, rebalancing humanist organizations of 
agency, and consider how epistemological logics dictate their experiential existences.  
 
With the purpose of guaranteeing an efficient and systematic study, and to facilitate the 
interdisciplinary nature of such an investigation, all four chapters are built on an investigative 
framework that comprises of two methodological features. Firstly, and as outlined earlier, each 
chapter focuses on a particular sub-field of empirical science that employs non-human animals: 
field-based research, long-term cognitive behavioural and biomedical studies, short-term 
comparative behavioural psychology experimentations, and invasive surgical practices such as 
vivisection and dissection. The purpose is to identify the subtle methodological nuances that 
influence animals’ experience in a variety of scientific situations where epistemological logics 
perhaps seem similar but actually operate entirely differently. Secondly, each chapter is 
supplemented by the conceptual approaches of Donna Haraway, Bruno Latour, Vinciane Despret, 
and Jane Bennett, respectively. This selection of historical, philosophical, and sociological 
approaches to the non-human animal in the scientific environment are able to deconstruct and 
critique empirical methodologies and identify critical conceptual oppositions within them that can 
then be employed to identify correlative investigations of the same within the literary material. 
By establishing a dialogue between the contemporary literature and these secondary materials in 
this way a far more comprehensive investigation into the epistemological workings of empirical 
science can be carried out, an examination that is more inclusive of the various ways in which 
empirical science employs non-human animals to produce different kinds of knowledges, as well 
as re-complicating and accentuating non-human animal presences within empirical systems that 
are otherwise represented only in scientific terms.   
 
Accordingly, the remainder of this introduction is dedicated to identifying and outlining 
critical approaches of additional contemporary works that examine and reconsider the non-
human animal used in empirical systems of knowledge production, particularly those attending 
to conceptual oppositions apparent within empirical methodology. Considerations turn to 
theoretical approaches relating to the empirical sciences, particularly sociological and historical 
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reviews of science and its technologies, to find helpful deconstructive approaches that isolate the 
characteristics of scientific empiricism involving non-human animals to facilitate the ensuing 
analyses of literary fiction in the thesis. Finally, the introduction concludes with a brief summary 
of the fictional texts, including the mediatory theoretical approaches and the epistemological 
characteristics to be addressed within each of the thesis chapters. 
 
*** 
In addition to being an integral feature in the selected fictional literary materials of this 
thesis, empirical research plays an essential role in the production of knowledge pertaining to 
non-human animal life. These sequentially initiate and sustain the same discourses that influence 
cultural perceptions and understandings of non-human animals in return. For example, Jane 
Goodall’s discovery of tool use amongst chimpanzees in the Gombe Stream National Park in 1960 
directly challenged and displaced long-established beliefs that exclusively only humans could 
fashion and operate tools. Inversely, discoveries that mice were virtually genetically identical to 
humans in the twentieth century appropriated their vastly extensive use throughout the empirical 
sciences as a biological model and, after the development of cloning in 1998, encouraged 
perceptions of disposability and low ontological value. Critically, these same cultural perceptions 
infuse literary reconsiderations of non-human animals in the empirical sciences, and so it is worth 
turning to approaches that neutralise and rebalance preconceptions of non-human animals used 
in the scientific setting.  
 
During her landmark study Primate Visions, sociologist of science Donna Haraway précises 
the constructively sceptical potential of posthumanist approaches, taking non-human animals in 
empirical science seriously though specifically in primatological field narratives. Haraway aptly 
summarises the numerous potentialities extant in human and non-human animal encounters and 
interactions that occur within the scientific empirical environment and the systems of knowledge 
production that are operational there:  
 
The animals are active participants in the constitution of what may count as scientific 
knowledge […] the animals resist, enable, disrupt, engage, constrain, and display. They 
act and signify, and like all action and signification, theirs yield no unique, univocal, 
unconstructed “facts” waiting to be collected […] [they] are not transparent; they are 
dense. Like words, machines, equations, institutions, generic writing conventions, 
16 
 
people, and landscapes, the animals have specific kinds of solidity in the apparatus of 
bodily production.39 
 
Regarded by many as one of the foundational interdisciplinary work of animal studies, Haraway’s 
investigation purports scientific knowledge to be socially constructed and representations of non-
human animal lives within it accommodative of imperceptible political and cultural influences.40 
Resultantly, Haraway’s deconstructive approach illuminates the anthropocentric approaches of 
scientific empiricism, particularly how scientific movements are built upon particular social and 
political situations and therefore relevant only in the context of that particular epistemological 
episode. Later in When Species Meet, a posthumanist rethinking of the human and non-human 
animal relationship through an expansion of what constitutes ‘companion species’ and the 
ontological opening this subsequently offers, Haraway identifies what she terms as interspecies 
‘contact zones’.41 Defining science as a prominent contact zone, Haraway reconsiders the crucial 
role played by the non-human animal in empirical designs used for knowledge production, 
‘[t]aking animals seriously as workers without the comforts of humanist frameworks for people 
or animals’.42 During her investigation, Haraway explores instrumental relations, complicated 
even further by human systems of appropriation and self-justification.  
 
However, Primate Visions does not elaborate on the various epistemological modes of 
empirical investigations, as Haraway applies her conceptual approaches only to field-based 
primatology, encouraging a consideration of the constructive potentialities in applying her 
posthumanist approaches to other empirical methodologies using non-human animals. Though 
valuable for Chapter One, by elaborating Haraway’s approaches further the thesis ponders 
implications of an interspecies contact zone within other empirical settings, such as the 
laboratory, as well as participatory contributions made by non-human animals during the 
production of scientific knowledges. Such a strategy views the empirical practices of the 
laboratory as being socially constructed with the same anthropocentric leanings as any other 
 
39 Donna Haraway, Primate Visions: Gender, Race, and Nature in the World of Modern Science (London: 
Routledge, 1989), pp. 310-311.  
40 Anne Fausto-Sterling, ‘Essay Review: Primate Visions, A Model for Historians of Science?’, Journal of the 
History of Biology, 23 (1990), 329-333. 
41 Donna Haraway, When Species Meet (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2008), p. 2.  
42 Ibid., p. 73. 
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empirical science. Haraway’s reflections also rebalance systems of agency during productions of 
scientific knowledge to propose non-human animals are not simply objects with easily 
discoverable universal truths, but complex subjects that re-complicate an affective human and 
non-human animal encounter within scientific settings. When utilised to analyse instances in 
contemporary literature, such approaches can re-complicate the literary non-human animal to 
view it as an active contributor during the production of scientific knowledge and reconsider its 
role. 
 
Matthew Calarco expounds Haraway’s approach to deliberate on the situational settings of 
non-human animals in the modern world and the assortment of environments in which the 
human and non-human animal encounters occur: ‘when we view the world in terms of classical 
human/animal distinctions, we fail to see the complicated lines of mutual affect and relation that 
traverse human-animal interactions […] animal lives, individuals, species, and other affects are 
found throughout those many arenas of human life that are thought to be exclusively human’.43 
Inverting Derrida’s deconstruction of classical forms of human and non-human animal species 
distinction, Calarco contends that spaces that host interspecies encounters benefit from 
considerations of species indistinction. Nevertheless, Calarco suggests moving the definition of 
the human ‘downward from the magisterial heights of human superiority and outward toward an 
essentially nonhuman and inhuman zone’, through a process he calls ‘thinking from within the 
space of indistinction’.44 For Calarco, the value of harnessing this approach lies in bringing non-
human animals within the scope of ethical and political contemplations through means of species 
association.45  
 
Throughout his book Zoographies, Calarco questions the human and non-human animal 
binary because its upholding ontological features are being continuously disproved by the 
sciences and other animal studies efforts currently.46 It is therefore again remarkable that a 
comprehensive critical study has yet to examine contemporary literary representations of the 
 
43 Matthew Calarco, ‘Identify, Difference, Indistinction’, The New Centennial Review, 11 (2011), 41-60 (p. 51).  
44 Ibid., p. 56. 
45 Matthew Calarco, ‘Thinking through Animals: Reflections on the Ethical and Political Stakes of the Question 
of the Animal in Derrida’, Oxford Literary Review, 29 (2007), 1-15 (p. 4). 
46 Matthew Calarco, ‘Zoographies: The Question of the Animal from Heidegger to Derrida’ (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2008).  
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non-human animal within the scientific setting, especially as they can consider contrasting 
perceptions of it being the task of scientific endeavours to prove and therefore reinforce lines of 
distinction between the human and non-human animal. As with Haraway, the thesis builds on the 
theoretical approaches outlined here by Calarco and repurposes them to frame its examinations 
of contemporary literature’s aptitude to catalyse the same kinds of reconsideration of non-human 
animal agency in encounters within the scientific setting, particularly whether or not they choose 
strategies of distinction or indistinction to achieve re-evaluation of the non-human animal 
experience existent there.  
 
Any discussion concerning non-human animals becomes invariably a discussion on non-
human animal minds and stylistic strategies used to represent them throughout both the sciences 
and literature. Writing at the end of the twentieth century, zoologist Donald Griffin offered a 
reconsideration of non-human animal mental capacities.47 He proposed ‘an extension of scientific 
horizons in the study of animal behaviour and cognition to include conscious experiences […] 
animals are best appreciated as actors rather than passive objects’.48 Similarly to Haraway, Griffin 
propositions a rebalancing of agency that implicates human and non-human animal encounters 
both inside and outside of scientific settings, with the intention to ‘make sense of the thicket of 
scientific puzzles that have entangled the subject of animal consciousness’.49 Based on the 
supposition that ‘[i]f animals experience simple conscious thoughts and feelings, it seems likely 
that they are sometimes communicated to others’50, Griffin continues on and expands definitions 
of communication:  
 
We derive most of the information we use to infer what other people think and feel 
from their communicative behaviour. This includes not only spoken and written 
language but also the whole range of nonverbal communications, “body language”, 
intonation of voice, autonomic responses such as flushing of the skin, dilation of the 
pupils, and all the signs of mental states such as fear and affection. […] These 
 
47 Donald Griffin, Animal Minds (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992).  
48 Donald Griffin, ‘From cognition to consciousness’, Animal Cognition, 1 (1998), 3-16 (p. 3). 
49 Ibid., p. 5. 
50 Donald Griffin, ‘Windows on Animal Minds’, Consciousness and Cognition, 4 (1995), 194-204 (p. 194).  
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considerations suggest that the basic approach that works reasonably well for reading 
the minds of one species can be adapted and extended to others.51 
 
The potentialities of these different kinds of communication modes unlocks a series of stylistic 
opportunities for contemporary authors, through narrative and other literary strategies, to re-
examine non-human animal modes of communication that help to dissolve otherwise divisional 
human and non-human animal distinctions maintained by verbal forms. Griffin also highlights 
ontological promise in other cognitive facilities, as ‘[a]nimals are sometimes aware of objects and 
events, including social relationships, memories, and simple short-term anticipation of likely 
happenings in the near future, and they make choices of actions they believe are likely to get what 
they want or avoid what they dislike or fear’.52 Contemporary literary portrayals of these more 
expansive and encompassing cognitive abilities of non-human animals, together with non-verbal 
modes of communication, will be demonstrated throughout the thesis as aspects of non-human 
animal life harnessed by authors to explore the non-human animal experience within empirical 
systems of knowledge production.  
 
Turning to scientific literary representations of these same modes of non-human animal 
consciousness and communication specifically, Eileen Crist’s Images of Animals explores how 
linguistic choices in the scientific vernacular have traditionally portrayed the non-human animal 
mind as reactionary and insentient. Crist’s cynicism about scientific vernacular is apparent, 
arguing that ‘[t]he terms employed derive their meanings from the observer’s framework’, and, 
actually, ‘a diffuse background of subjectivity allows for the implicit or explicit emergence of 
animal mind’.53 Crist proposes that anthropomorphism plays both a meaningful and important 
translational role in human understandings of non-human animals, operating ‘at a deeper layer 
than a mere transposition of human attributes to animals’.54 Images of Animals concludes that 
different kinds of knowledges concerning non-human animal cognition surface when using more 
 
51 Ibid., p. 195. 
52 Donald Griffin, ‘New evidence of animal consciousness’, Animal Cognition, 7 (2004), 5-18 (p. 6). 
53 Eileen Crist, Images of Animals: Anthropomorphism and Animal Mind (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 
2000), p. 5.  
54 Ibid., p. 29. 
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anthropomorphic modes of recording their behaviours, such as the instances of anecdotal 
evidence Crist provides throughout the book.55  
 
Throughout her work, Crist criticises more mechanomorphic imitations of non-human 
animals featured throughout the behaviourist approaches of psychologists such as J. B. Watson 
and B. F. Skinner, as well as the founder of modern cognitive ethology Konrad Lorenz. Crist 
examines textual instances where the ‘technical language of description dominates the account, 
while the animals and their interactions recede from visibility’, refuting that more 
anthropomorphically indulgent description ‘affects the imagination of the reader very differently, 
tending to be more richly textured and nuanced for the purposes of accommodating specific 
episodes observed, in all their local idiosyncrasies and modulations of expressions and 
circumstance’.56 She continues to highlight a particular set of issues in the scientific 
representation of non-human animals by scientific empirical processes:  
 
A picture of animals as unaware and passive is created through the fragmentation of 
temporal continuity. On the other hand, when the unfolding unity of temporally 
contiguous actions is preserved, the resulting sequential coherence of actions reflects 
back on the actor. Animals are then understood as assembling and experiencing 
objects and events in the world in their temporal and spatial continuities.57 
 
These problems of non-human animal representation outlined by Crist, especially regarding the 
limitations of scientific vernacular and the issues of temporality, evidence a particular set of 
opportunities and challenges for contemporary authors. Examples of various fictional literary 
strategies are highlighted and examined in each of the chapters as ways to navigate the 
epistemological logics of empirical science to represent and reconsider the non-human animal 
existent there.   
 
As Crist demonstrates, inherent issues of temporality need to be navigated during empirical 
practices and scientific representations of the non-human animals under observation. Within 
 
55 Ibid., p. 41.  
56 Eileen Crist, ‘The Ethological Constitution of Animals as Natural Objects: The Technical Writings of Konrad 
Lorenz and Nikolaas Tinbergen’, Biology and Philosophy, 13 (1998), 61-102 (pp. 65-66). 
57 Ibid., p. 75. 
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empirical science, temporality is linear but also socially organized by the human researchers, 
experiments conducted, observations made, and results recorded in a way that distort both the 
linearity of time and the experience of the non-human animal within it. Logically, issues of 
temporality introduce a critical question addressed throughout the thesis; how contemporary 
literature and its narrative strategies, the ability to fictionally negotiate temporal restrictions, 
represent and reconsider the temporal logics active within empirical science as well as the non-
human animal experience both inside and outside epistemological systems of knowledge 
production. A specific challenge for contemporary authors is how to negotiate systems of 
temporality that increase or decrease the length of human and non-human animal encounters 
during investigations. For example, longitudinal cognitive behavioural studies initiate systematic 
periods of interaction between researcher and non-human animal subject over years, whereas 
short-term comparative psychology experimentations rely on designated test periods over far 
shorter periods of time often with little to no interspecies interaction or exchanges. The four sub-
divisions of scientific investigations selected in the thesis demonstrate how logics of temporality 
work differently from one scientific branch to another, hugely influential on the experiential 
existence of the non-human animal implicated within each empirical methodology, and how 
contemporary literature examples reconstruct the experimental situation in such a way that 
reconsiders the potential for affective encounters and interactions during and outside of empirical 
modes of temporal control.   
 
Literary strategies such as these form the main areas of inquiry throughout each chapter 
and the thesis more broadly. Whilst each chapter explores literary strategies employed to 
navigate the epistemological logics of the specific scientific setting featured in it, there are some 
overlapping points as some logics feature in all four scientific settings but operate entirely 
differently. The chapters comprise of literary strategies unique to their scientific setting, for 
example Chapter One explores the practice of interpretive flexibility in field-based observations 
and literary representation of those processes. Chapter Two focuses on strategies that negotiate 
the laboratory as a physically and conceptualised space in the empirical sciences, particularly 
those used in long-term non-human animal cognition and biomedical investigations. Chapter 
Three examines those literary strategies that tackle the separation and articulation of bodies 
during short-term comparative psychological experimentations, as well as logics of value and 
issues of autonomy also operational there. Lastly, Chapter Four looks at how literary fiction 
commentates on scientific ratifications of pain and the appropriation of death, in addition to 
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representations of the inanimate non-human animal utilised in invasive surgical procedures in 
order to reconsider their potential to still force affective human and non-human encounters. 
Importantly however, each chapter offers a consideration of strategies used to accommodate 
issues of temporality, as each of the four scientific settings implicate different temporal logics 
needed in order to offer an effective reconsideration of each different system of knowledge 
production without distorting the experiential perspectives of the non-human animal featuring 
within their empirical practices. A brief and broad overview of temporality in literature is 
therefore beneficial to establish a basic knowledge of its role in literary fiction to better 
extrapolate its use in the selected contemporary texts of the thesis.  
 
Time is a fundamental and inseparable feature of narrative as it synonymous with stories 
and the practice of storytelling. The use and nature of temporality in literary fiction changed 
drastically throughout the twentieth century, with writers continuing to push the boundaries of 
narrative time and constructions of temporality in contemporary fiction today. Brian Richardson 
attributes the original revolutionary developments to a select group of modern writers, noting 
‘[d]uring the first third of the twentieth century, several prominent novelists employed original 
temporal arrangements that broke radically with the Victorian convention of a largely 
chronological narrative’.58 He identifies one form of temporal construction in particular that 
‘attained considerable critical prominence’ during this period: ‘the presentation of the story in 
several non-chronological sections that could then be assembled into a consistent linear 
trajectory’.59 Jesse Matz highlights a sense of growing frustration preceding this literary 
movement regarding the long-established Victorian temporal traditions pertaining to narrative 
story that seemed far too restrictive and artificial for emergent modern writers. Matz succinctly 
outlines the exasperation experienced by these writers such as Conrad, Faulkner and Woolfe:   
 
For even if events happen in linear time, we tend not to experience that that way. At 
any moment, memories intervene, taking us back into the past even as we proceed 
into the future; or hopes project us forward, colouring the present with expectations 
 
58 Brian Richardson, ‘Making Time: Narrative Temporality in Twentieth-Century Literature and Theory’, 




of change; and other people’s time frames often collide with our own to produce all 
kinds of temporal confusion.60 
Similar reconsiderations regarding time and its effects on the experience of human existence 
presented a fascinating problem for modern writers and prompted numerous textual explorations 
into the potentialities of the narrative story structured by new forms of temporality. As Matz 
concludes, ‘[i]n recognition of these ways in which time is actually experienced, modern novelists 
often tried to break the sequence, to put things out of order, to work from the present back into 
the past, to dissolve linear time in the flux of memory and desire’.61  
 
The perception and representation of time in literary narrative has become a more 
increasingly important aspect of literary fiction, having been initially studied through narrative 
theory and narratology, sub-disciplinary fields that sought clarification regarding the mechanics 
of temporal structure within fictional literary narratives. The theoretical paradigms of fabula and 
sjužet, or the events of a story and the representation of those events by way of an imaginative 
story narrative, epitomize the two dominant theoretical distinctions that predominated the field 
for well over a century prior to recent re-examinations. According to the definition of these two 
conceptual approaches, the events of the fabula take place by way of cause and effect, in linear 
time and in chronological order. In the sjužet, those same events are reordered, elaborated, and 
employed to form the narrative story. However, today examples of more evolved and 
complicated fictional representations of time and human and non-human experiences of time 
have ensured that temporality in literature is now an extensively challenged topic throughout a 
diverse range of subfields. The ensuing investigations contribute toward a growing body of work 
that offers vital insight into the history and ideology of modern and contemporary life, including 
post-human examinations of temporal principles operational in the empirical sciences and 
scientific productions of knowledge.  
 
Richardson highlights that ‘the study of narrative temporality is currently undergoing a most 
productive reassessment’, due to the failure of more traditional theoretical paradigms ‘to do 
justice to the unexpectedly innovative play with time in contemporary fiction’.62 These 
 
60 Jesse Matz, The Modern Novel: A Short Introduction (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2004), pp. 61-62. 
61 Ibid., p. 62.  
62 Richardson, ‘Making Time’, p. 609. 
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reassessments include considerations by literary writers concerning the most effective way to 
realistically represent the temporal logics operational within the narrative settings featured in 
their novels, presenting a particular set of problems regarding the novels featured in this thesis: 
textual reimaginings of the scientific environment dictated by the laws of empirical investigation. 
Indeed, perceptions of time have been powerfully influenced by innovations throughout the 
natural and physical sciences, harnessed to become an externally imposed, socially, and 
scientifically regulated logic of contemporary life. Literary critic Joseph Hillis Miller outlines the 
two fundamentally different perceptions and uses of time utilized throughout the broad range of 
both scientific and literary practices:  
 
Though scientists and philosophers disagree about time, their goal is by scientific or 
logical methods to reach universal and universally accepted definitions of it. By 
contrast, representations of human time in literary works are singular, sui generis, 
different from all the others. They do not build on one another in a progressive 
clarification, as scientific theories of time at least aspire to do […] Each literary work 
has a different time sense – even those by the same author.63 
 
As the thesis will demonstrate, the progressive clarification of time featured in the practices of 
empirical science are subjected to the temporal manipulations and constructions of literature, 
and vice versa.  
 
Ultimately, the thesis intends to conduct its investigation differently from other recent 
literary critical animal studies investigations, evidenced by Crist’s analyses of literary stylistic 
strategies of representing the non-human animal mind. Whilst still valuable, the work signifies a 
conventional trend in recent critical studies of both scientific literature and contemporary literary 
fiction to represent non-human animal consciousness, often under the rubric of 
anthropomorphism.64 In literature, discussions revolve mainly around an author’s stylistic 
strategies, narrative, and use of language to characterise the non-human animal mind. This thesis 
 
63 Joseph Hillis Miller, ‘Time in Literature’, Daedalus, 132 (2003), 86-97 (p. 87). 
64 Examples include: Thinking with Animals: New Perspectives on Anthropomorphism, ed. by L. Daston and G. 
Mitman (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005); Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, ed. by R. 
W. Mitchell and others (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997); Catherine Parry, Other Animals in 
Twenty-First Century Fiction (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).  
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employs a different analytical approach that starts with the scientific experimentation being 
carried out and so does not excessively engage with representations of the non-human animal 
mind. The main reason being that large parts of contemporary empirical science are not 
interested in them at all. Instead, investigations remain focused on the four specific scientific 
settings, to consider how the ways non-human animal minds are represented in literary fiction is 
very much connected to the kind of empirical scientific investigation being conducted. This 
demonstrates how fictional literary representations of non-human animals utilised in empirical 
science follow the implications of the scientific setting, not simply because non-human animals 
have mental experiences. This approach is not intended to overlook the importance of literary 
representations of non-human animal minds, but to offer alternative strategies by which 
contemporary literature can contribute to reconsiderations of the non-human animal within the 
scientific setting. 
 
It is also crucial to outline the thesis’ position in regard to issues of morality, affect and 
suffering concerning contemporary literary representations of non-human animals within the 
scientific empirical environment. The study looks to examine how contemporary literature can 
demonstrate the messiness, complexities and limitations of how science and its scientific settings 
situate non-human animals and operate to produce knowledge in different ways. It does so by 
identifying the affective potential in moments during human and non-human animal encounters 
within the empirical scientific environment as depicted in contemporary literary representations. 
Whilst this focus naturally implicates moral reflection in taking non-human animals in scientific 
situations seriously, it does not make any assertions that in doing so readers of contemporary 
literature have to think morally about them. Indeed, the point of origin for the thesis was not to 
investigate what literature thinks about science, but rather to genuinely think about science and 
systems of knowledge production by way of contemporary literature. It intends to take the non-
human animal as an object of knowledge production and make sense of it in relation to how the 
empirical sciences think of themselves. In respect to representations of suffering specifically, the 
investigation includes demonstrations and outlines of legislative protocols used to protect 
experimental and invasive procedures and processes employed by the sciences to provide 
contextualisation of the non-human animals caught within various, specific scientific situations. 
However, the thesis deliberately sidesteps talking about the broader moral implications of such 
treatments directly to avoid discussions regarding non-human animal suffering in too vague or 
broad terms that would only offer insufficient and ineffective consideration. Instead, 
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examinations always remain focused on the particulars of empirical scientific situations and the 
experiential existences of non-human animals that the specific scientific practice engenders. To 
reiterate, this thesis is concerned with evidencing the complexities and differences of how non-
human animals are arranged in the social production of knowledge, that contemporary literature 
can effectively highlight these settings where knowledge is being produced, and that they are 
valuable in terms of considering the non-human animal situation and experience there.  
 
*** 
The thesis is divided into four chapters, organised into four key contemporary scientific 
modes of producing knowledge on non-human animal life and the distinct empirical 
methodologies they employ. The investigative aims of these chapters can be then divided into 
two sub-sections, with Chapter One and Chapter Two focusing on the broader epistemological 
logics that operate within field-based researches and the laboratory setting, respectively. This will 
provide the thesis with a foundational understanding that then permits Chapters Three and Four 
to concentrate on specialized scientific sub-divisions of laboratory investigations: experimental 
comparative psychology and invasive surgical practices of vivisection and dissection, respectively. 
The organisational purpose of these four chapters in this way is to demarcate and distinguish 
between the methodological and conceptual nuances existent within sub-fields of scientific 
enquiry, often mistakenly considered synonymous under the umbrella term “animal sciences”. 
Consequentially, these same differences influence the broader experience of the non-human 
animal located within each empirical situation and any comprehensive analyses into the abilities 
of literary fiction to effectively contribute to reconsiderations of these same implications benefit 
from such an investigative configuration.  
 
Chapter One focuses on field-based researches on non-human animals in nature, offering 
an introduction to scientific empirical methodologies through this particular mode of knowledge 
production. The chapter analyses William Boyd’s Brazzaville Beach (1990) and its fictional 
reconstruction of the field environment, explicitly the human and non-human animal encounters 
implicated by the epistemological logics that operate there. Boyd’s novel suits the investigative 
intentions of the thesis as it is a fictional reimagining of the research conducted by cognitive 
ethologist Jane Goodall, and draws heavily on a compendium of other female primatologists 
operating in field-based practices in the 1970s and 1980s. Then, using Donna Haraway’s 
conceptualisation of the empirical sciences as socially constructed, the chapter examines how the 
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novel offers a reconsideration of field-based empirical practices and its systems of knowledge 
production using non-human animals. The chapter is particularly interested in fictional 
representations of the formations of scientific paradigms and the ownership of and tensions 
between old and new knowledges produced on non-human animal life. Using Haraway’s 
theoretical framework, the chapter claims contemporary fictional representations of field-based 
practices can reconsider the non-human animal in relation to the scientific cultural climate they 
operate within and the different kinds of knowledges that these cultural influences produce. It 
also highlights the ability of literary strategy to promote the existence of other ways of knowing, 
a valuable consequence of the complexities of observing non-human animals in nature. Notably, 
the chapter includes a comparison of field and laboratory settings, as both are featured in the 
novel; the latter used to emphasize epistemological logics of the former.  
 
Chapter Two develops preliminary understandings of empirical practices of the laboratory 
to explore scientific idealisations of it as a physical and conceptualised space, reading the fictional 
reimaginings of the modern laboratory featured in Colin McAdam’s A Beautiful Truth (2013) and 
Karen Joy Fowler’s We Are All Completely Beside Ourselves (2014). Both novels involve fictional 
representations of the laboratory setting, drawing on the cognitive behavioural studies and 
biomedical experimentations conducted on primates during the second half of the twentieth 
century. Additionally, both texts examine the ways in which the laboratory operates as a 
hermetically sealed off and autonomous space, existent on the periphery of the social world. 
Implementing the constructive theoretical approaches of science sociologist Bruno Latour, the 
chapter outlines the ways in which fictional strategies represent the laboratory setting to view 
the non-human animal experience within them, similarly to investigations of Chapter One, as 
wholly dictated by the broader scientific culture. The chapter concentrates on broader, more 
general epistemological logics operating in the laboratory space, particularly those that influence 
the non-human animal experience. These include systems of autonomy, issues of temporality, 
and installations of visibility and invisibility, among others, providing a beneficial outline of 
epistemological logics active within the laboratory situation that facilitate ensuing examinations 
of specific sub-field empirical practices and the conceptual oppositions they implicate in the 
following chapters.  
 
Chapter Three draws on three fictional texts that explore conceptual oppositions apparent 
within experimental cognition studies: Lydia Millet’s ‘Love in Infant Monkeys’ (2009), Karen Joy 
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Fowler’s ‘Us’ (2013), and Ursula Le Guin’s ‘Mazes’ (1975). Millet’s story fictionally reconstructs 
the experiments into isolation and depression in infant macaques conducted by comparative 
psychologist Harry Harlow throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Fowler and Le Guin both offer 
alternative literary strategies by which to depict the multiplicity and multitude of non-human 
animals used in short-term psychological experimentations, a logistical challenge for authors 
attempting to depict an empirical space reliant on multisubject investigations. Though a science-
fiction author, Le Guin remains valuable as her dystopian vision of a non-human entity subjected 
to experimental practices is clearly a reinterpretation of human and non-human animal 
encounters within the laboratory space. Additionally, her strategies install a sense of cultural 
distance and alienation within its dystopian vision of the experimental setting, stylistic 
approaches heavily resonant with other instances of contemporary fictional representation. 
Whilst science fiction sometimes facilities fantastical applications of empirical science, it also 
maintains a cautionary scepticism regarding our absolute reliance on it as a form of knowledge 
production and technological advancement, valuable when considering the objectives of this 
thesis. Other key epistemological characteristics featured in this third chapter include issues of 
autonomy, installed systems of separation, and more refined temporal logics. These are 
accompanied by the conceptual approaches of Vinciane Despret, including investigations into the 
influence of the experimental situation, the potential value of anecdotal evidence, and how non-
human animals respond to questions other than those that investigators believe themselves to 
be asking. Using Despret’s approaches, the chapter maintains that contemporary literary 
strategies can rebalance the non-human animal presence within empirical methodologies to 
suggest other forms of encounter existent there and opportunities for valuable interspecies 
interaction.  
 
Chapter Four reads Sylvia Torti’s Cages (2017) and Allegra Goodman’s Intuition (2010) as 
fictional examples of invasive surgical practices, modes of knowledge production that depend on 
the non-human animal body as biomaterial. Whilst both novels feature non-human animals used 
as disposable biological resources in contemporary scientific practices, they are predominantly 
inanimate. These texts are chosen because they feature narratives that revolve around invasive 
surgical use of non-human animals, though the actual non-human animals used during these 
processes is not the main emphasis of either novel. Nevertheless encounters still occur, though 
inanimations of non-human animals greatly influence the nature of and opportunities for valuable 
human and non-human animal encounters. Therefore, Jane Bennett’s equalising vital materiality 
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theory is employed to re-balance these interspecies encounters in order to inform an effective 
evaluation of the epistemological logics at play and those fictionally represented. These logics 
include appropriations of death and ratifications of pain, articulations of human and non-human 
animal bodies, and scientific reasonings of value. 
 
Taken together, these four chapters constitute an extensive cross-section of the different 
sub-divisions of empirical sciences that use the non-human animal to produce scientific 
knowledges, each with different epistemological logics that influence the experiential existence 
of the non-human animal within them. The literary materials will be read against these scientific 
modes to provide a reconsideration of the different ways in which non-human animals are 
observed, recorded, exploited, represented and then misrepresented. All these converge to 
support the fundamental purpose of the thesis investigation, that is an analytical overview of the 












‘Short on scholarly apparatus, but very readable’:  
Scientific Fictions of the Field in Brazzaville Beach 
 
 
I was starting a study that would take ten years; I was young, and that seemed a 
lifetime. Now I realize that the first ten years were just a beginning. Certainly our 
picture of chimpanzee behaviour would be very different if the work had ended in 
1970. We had no notion then that chimpanzees might, deliberately and 
systematically, kill one another. 
                      – Jane Goodall, Life and Death at Gombe65 
 
 
In 1979, National Geographic published an article by cognitive ethologist Jane Goodall 
regarding observations of chimpanzee violence, cannibalism, and included what is now one of the 
most famous and graphic accounts of primate infanticide witnessed at the Gombe Stream 
Research Centre in Tanzania. Goodall’s article elaborated on a series of violent exchanges 
observed between two separate chimpanzee social groups from 1974 to 1978, later dubbed ‘the 
four-year war’ by Goodall and her research team.66 Goodall notably refused to jump to premature 
conclusions regarding deliberate cruelty on the part of the chimpanzees, whilst resultant 
observations made throughout the wider primatological community confirmed the same 
gruesome behavioural traits.67 Though hypotheses regarding the motivations for such behaviour 
 
65 Jane Goodall, ‘Life and death at Gombe’, National Geographic, May 1979, p. 616. 
66 Jane Goodall, Through a Window: 30 Years with the Chimpanzees of Gombe (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson 
Ltd, 1990), p. 87.  
67 Amanda Rees, The Infanticide Controversy: Primatology and the Art of Field Science (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2009), pp. 13-14. 
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were fiercely disputed in the period that followed, the revelations nonetheless changed the 
model of knowledge pertaining to chimpanzee behaviour forever.  
 
Goodall’s study at the Gombe National Park represents a mode of scientific investigation 
uniquely available to those within the animal life sciences, including primatology and other sub-
divisions of cognitive ethology: field-based research. Scientific field-based practices look to 
observe and document non-human animal life within its natural setting to produce models of 
knowledge pertaining to the true behaviours of the non-human animal species that is being 
monitored. As Goodall’s excerpt points out, field-based studies confront a particular set of 
challenges as a mode of producing knowledge on non-human animal life, including issues of 
temporality and the interpretive flexibility of the researcher. In field research, issues of 
temporality refer to the length of time observations of non-human animals in nature can take, 
spanning months or more often years of investigation, as the investigator must wait for the non-
human animal to display an original behavioural trait that does not fit into pre-existing 
behavioural models of knowledge. Therefore, scientific knowledges are very slow to form 
because of the necessarily longitudinal nature of field-based research. It presents a challenge for 
fictional authors, in terms of how to portray the longitudinal and linear temporal logics of field 
research accurately, capturing the experience of the non-human animals within it, and prompting 
constructive reconsideration through temporal strategies available to the novel form. 
Interpretive flexibility relates to both the ambiguousness of non-human animal behaviour and 
experiential influences of the individual researcher themselves, whose own personal partialities 
may affect the translation of behaviours under observation. This does not necessarily debunk the 
information collected but renders the knowledges obtained something different from scientific 
idealisations of what constitutes as original discoverable truth. Taken together, these two 
epistemological logics represent distinct features of field-based researches and its systems of 
knowledge production. In comparison to the laboratory setting, being constructed and 
customised specifically to shut out the natural world, field-based researchers conduct what 
Robert Kohler determines to be ‘practices of place’.68 Certainly, if laboratories are to be 
considered the ultimate controlled environment, eliminating all unwanted variables and 
operating wholly apart from the natural setting, then field-based research looks to capture the 
complexities and variabilities of nature in its entirety. Using Goodall’s researches at Gombe as a 
 
68 Robert E. Kohler, ‘Place and Practice in Field Biology’, History of Science, 40 (2002), 189-210 (p. 192).  
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case study, the empirical processes used to produce knowledges on non-human animal life in 
natural settings will form the scientific empirical situation investigated in this chapter.   
 
This chapter draws upon secondary theoretical approaches in order to critique the 
epistemological logics specific to field-based research with the aim to better analyse conceptual 
oppositions both within them and fictional explorations of the same. Donna Haraway’s 
sociological studies on the empirical sciences, focused particularly on primatology, represent 
some of the most influential theoretical approaches of recent years. Primate Visions, first 
published in 1990, offers an interpretational historiography of modern primatology, including an 
extensive analysis of the scientists and the subsequent narratives that look to represent non-
human animal life. The work contends that science and scientific narratives are entirely socially 
constructed, forever inclined to satisfy dominant social mythos concerning identity, race, and 
gender inherent in western culture. Primate Visions directly contests the scientific ideal of 
objectivism, proposing narratives to be determined by subjective interpretations, individual 
motivation, and personal agenda. Crucially, in terms of the purposes of the chapter, Haraway’s 
overview includes examinations of epistemological features particular to field-based researches 
conducted on non-human animals within her examinations of the narrative history of 
primatology. This facilitates analytical explorations of the featured fictional materials and its 
contribution to broader discussions on empirical scientific uses of non-human animals, further 
outlined in the following section.  
 
William Boyd’s Brazzaville Beach is an indirect fictional re-imagining of the inter-group 
violence observed by Goodall amongst chimpanzees groups at the Gombe National Park during 
the late-1970s, and forms the fictional material of the chapter. Blatant resonances between 
Boyd’s novel and Goodall’s own researches allow helpful parallels to be drawn between them, 
permitting contextualisation and insights into empirical practices of field research, its 
methodologies, and conceptual oppositions extant within them. The novel’s central thematic 
priorities are empirical systems of knowledge production, the formation of scientific paradigms, 
and arising issues of ownership and tensions between old and new knowledges. Boyd is interested 
in three particular methodological features used within field-based studies: issues of temporality, 
the interpretive flexibility of the individual researcher, and the translational capacities of human 
language to encapsulate the vast complexities of non-human animal behaviour. Indeed, these 
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thematics are established early in the novel, demonstrated by its human researcher protagonist, 
Hope, during her introductory observations of a male chimpanzee, Clovis:  
 
I never really warmed to Clovis, he was far too stupid to inspire real affection, but he 
always claimed a corner of my heart, largely – I suppose – because of the way he 
instinctively and unconsciously cupped his genitals whenever he was alarmed or 
nervous. It was rather endearing, I thought, and it showed a natural vulnerability, in 
strong contrast to his usual moods: raffish arrogance or total and single-minded self-
absorption […] Knowing Clovis as I did, I suspected he could maintain his inertia for 
ages. I looked at my watch […] I had been watching him for three hours, during which 
time he had done almost nothing singular or unusual – but then that too was worth 
recording, of course.69 
 
Boyd describes Hope out in the field, indulging her tendencies toward anthropomorphism in her 
personal reflections on Clovis, but maintaining scientific practices of both observation and 
documentation. Boyd draws attention to the fact that Hope has both scientific and other forms 
of knowing the non-human animal in this setting, a research approach explored frequently by 
sociologists interested in field-based sciences.70 It is the conceptual oppositions both within and 
between these different modes of knowing that drive events featured in the novel, implemented 
through Boyd’s broader literary strategy.  
 
In terms of how Brazzaville Beach affects how we understand the scientific methodology 
that shapes the chapter, Boyd suggests that the scientific field researches on chimpanzee life 
contained in the novel are shaped by Hope’s wider life experiences. He suggests more broadly 
that scientific investigation is not always idealistically objective but rather driven and influenced 
by the needs and emotional lives of the individuals that conduct it. The implication that the 
epistemological logics and methodological practices contained within the novel are already 
influenced by Hope’s own nature prompts a reconsideration of their effectiveness and objectivism 
in capturing non-human animal life. Firstly, Boyd draws attention to the specific epistemological 
logics and contestations in scientific fieldwork by placing them within the various dramatic 
 
69 William Boyd, Brazzaville Beach (London: Penguin Group, 1990), pp. 9-10.  
70 Amanda Rees, ‘Anthropomorphism, Anthropocentrism, and Anecdote: Primatologists on Primatology’, 
Science, Technology, and Human Values, 26 (2001), 227-247. 
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settings featured throughout the narrative. These same logics then influence dramatic events in 
the novel, highlighting inherent conceptual oppositions within them in to prompt broader 
reconsiderations of the ways in which knowledge on non-human animal life is produced. 
Considerations of empirical processes include observation, interpretation, and documentation, 
and how different kinds of knowledges are then transferred into the public domain as the 
definitive determination of that specific non-human animal behaviour. Therefore, the chapter 
concentrates on an examination of narrative strategies used by Boyd to highlight the conceptual 
oppositions apparent within these operational logics of field-based investigations, by having these 
same oppositions heavily influence and drive events throughout the novel. Instances of textual 
analyses are positioned within a broader study of how Boyd’s Brazzaville Beach intervenes in 
order to initiate a reconsideration of scientific empirical practices in field-based research to 
produce knowledge on non-human animals. Therefore, the following overview of the novel’s 
narrative structure, settings, characters, and events facilitate an explanation of how these 
epistemological features are presented.  
 
Published in 1990, Boyd’s novel consists of three distinct yet interlacing narratives relating 
to the personal and professional experiences of Hope Clearwater; each narrative takes place 
during a different point within a broader chronology of Hope’s life, and each with distinctly 
different narrative settings. Chronologically, the first narrative takes place in England during the 
developmental stages of Hope’s scientific career as she meets and marries John Clearwater, an 
eccentric but brilliant mathematician destined never to achieve the professional immortality he 
desires. The pressure of John’s unsuccess places tremendous strain on their relationship as he 
eventually sinks into a severe depression and develops hysterical behaviours, culminating in his 
suicide, and causes Hope to seek emotional refuge in central Africa observing chimpanzee social 
behaviour, the second narrative sequence. The third and temporally last narrative is based in the 
present and is where we first meet Hope, occupying a beach house situated on Brazzaville Beach 
in the Republic of Congo. Hope is absorbed by and contemplative of the two traumatic 
experiences that feature in the two prior narrative sequences, that now form her past. Whilst the 
sequence relating to Hope’s work as an ethologist studying primate behaviours in the African wild 
is to begin with of seemingly greater importance, especially considering the purposes of this 
chapter, the accompanying two other narratives complement Boyd’s broader fictional 
investigation into the workings of scientific empiricism. Indeed, each of the three distinct 
narratives coalesce to form the broader narrative of Hope’s life, a form of temporal logic that 
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situates her experience with the chimpanzee group inside a more extensive chronology of events 
and experiences, that include her scientific investigations, featured within the novel. By 
establishing the temporal logic of the novel in this way, Boyd is able to contrast, compare, and 
examine the distinct temporal logics of the scientific investigations featured, whilst 
simultaneously offering a form of detached commentary on them. This is in turn facilitated by 
Boyd’s choice of scientific setting, characters, and sequence of dramatic events during the second 
narrative where Hope works as a cognitive ethologist.  
 
Boyd’s fictional scientific institution in Brazzaville Beach is the Grosso Arvore Research 
Centre in the forests of the Republic of Congo. The research project at Grosso Arvore is led by 
Eugene Mallabar, a world-renowned cognitive ethologist whose research, collected over a 
twenty-five-year period, has determined the current model of chimpanzee behaviour. Mallabar’s 
publications, such as the aptly named The Peaceful Primate and Primate’s Progress, specifically 
emphasize the docility and social aptitude of the Grosso Arvore chimpanzee group, 
demonstrating the seemingly peaceable complexities of individual and inter-group relations. 
When Hope arrives, Mallabar is on the verge of publishing his chef-d’oeuvre, his final and 
definitive say on wild chimpanzee behaviour based on his assumptions of chimpanzee civility. 
Mallabar, along with his body of work, represents the dominant paradigm or old knowledge on 
chimpanzee behaviour that Hope will work to displace. Indeed, later in the narrative Hope 
observes unprecedented interterritorial acts of violence and cannibalism carried out by a 
northern-based group of chimpanzees on her allocated southern group. Hope’s discoveries 
represent the new knowledges that refute and thus threaten the epistemological foundation of 
Mallabar’s understanding of chimpanzee behaviour, the current dominant scientific paradigm 
that he then looks to fiercely guard. The narrative’s denouement sees Hope professionally 
shunned, denied ownership of her discovery and eventually exiled from the project altogether. 
At the last, she yields to her internal emotive conflict and deliberately, irreversibly breaches the 
boundaries between researcher and subject in order to intervene and lethally end the violent 
conflict between the two chimpanzee groups.  
 
Through the embodiment of new and old knowledges in Hope and Mallabar respectively, 
Boyd can dramatize the tensions between them to highlight epistemological incongruities in 
empirical science more broadly. The subsequent notions of territorial conflict and tribalism that 
surface throughout the novel, alluded to by intra-conflicts between both human and non-human 
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animal characters, indicate Boyd to be making a sociobiological point about how scientific 
empiricism operates, evolves, and progresses. The crucial implication is that Brazzaville Beach 
offers a fictional narrative strategy about the affective qualities and potential within scientific 
field-based researches portrayed within the novel, not simply a sociological overview of its 
empirical processes. Therefore, returning to the main investigative objective of the chapter, it is 
firstly important to understand the empirical mode or medium in which knowledge is recorded in 
field studies. This is doubly imperative as it is the primary form of knowledge production featured 
throughout Boyd’s Brazzaville Beach. The following section utilities the theoretical approaches of 
Haraway and Mary Sanders Pollock, and some historical context by Goodall, to evidence the 




Scientific Fictions: Construction of the Field Narrative 
 
Throughout Brazzaville Beach, Boyd offers a commentary on field narratives employed as 
the designated mode used to record and translate observations of non-human animal life situated 
in nature. Hope frequently considers the limitations of her own scientific method, that it ‘cannot 
cope with abrupt change, that other common feature of our lives and the world. Not everything 
moves by degree, not everything ascends and descends like lines on a graph’.71 She outlines the 
scientific idealisation of scientific empiricism aspiring to ‘reproduce the magical, infinite variety 
of the natural world. Extreme complexity would emerge from the simplest formula’, and that ‘the 
most profound joy for any scientist was when the abstract workings of the mind found a 
correspondence in nature, in the world we live in […] the most acute of all the intellectual 
pleasures available to man’.72 The field narratives that appear in the novel, represented by the 
notes and field journal that Hope herself maintains, only materialise at the end of a sequence of 
other translational processes. The first steps in this process are Hope’s own interpretations of her 
personal observations made in the field. For example, as Hope finishes one scientific article, she 
remarks ‘I worked hard that night. By the time I went to bed I had most of my article drafted out. 
I was pleased with my title too’.73 The articles represent a culmination of scientific processes, 
 
71 Boyd, p. 227. 
72 Ibid., p. 254.  
73 Ibid., p. 133.  
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including observation, recordation, translation, and publication, all linguistical modes reliant on 
deliberate choices being made by the field researcher in the selection of language used, with field 
narratives covering the initial observation and recording stages. Each stage therefore threatens 
further dilution from the discoverable truth that the investigator set out to uncover, evidenced 
by Hope’s later mention: ‘I typed the final draft of my article. It was twenty pages long, short on 
scholarly apparatus, but very readable’.74 Knowledges on non-human animal life are captured 
within these particular modes of empirical scientific documentation, but the field narrative itself 
becomes a complicated culmination of observation, interpretation, translation, and 
representation.  
 
Haraway’s Primate Visons offers an extensive analysis of the scientific field narrative, using 
primatology as a case study. She examines the interchangeable utilisation of fact and fiction in 
scientific narratives involving non-human animals more broadly, evidencing instances throughout 
primatology ‘where possible worlds are constantly reinvented in the contest for very real, present 
worlds’.75 Elaborating on her opinion that science is a social construction, she notes ‘[b]oth 
science and popular culture are intricately woven of fact and fiction. It seems natural, even 
morally obligatory, to oppose fact and fiction; but their similarities run deep in western culture 
and language’.76 Haraway reiterates initial aesthetic differences between the two, that ‘a fact 
seems done, unchangeable, fit only to be recorded; fiction seems always inventive, open to other 
possibilities, other fashionings of life’.77 However, she offers a potential benefit in implementing 
both concepts:  
 
Facts can be imagined as original, irreducible nodes from which a reliable 
understanding of the world can be constructed. Facts ought to be discovered, not 
made or constructed […] In that original sense, facts are what has actually happened 
[…] Fiction can be imagined as a derivative, fabricated version of the world and 
experience, as a kind of perverse double for the facts or as an escape through fantasy 
into a better world than “that which actually happened”. But tones of meaning in 
 
74 Ibid., p. 168. 
75 Haraway, Primate Visions, p. 5. 
76 Ibid., p. 4.  
77 Ibid.  
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fiction make us hear its origin in vision, inspiration, insight, genius […] That is, fiction 
can be true, known to be true by an appeal to nature.78 
 
Haraway proposes a middle ground somewhere between the existent event or phenomena of 
fact and the imaginative creativities of fiction, a situation where the two mediums can coalesce 
productively. Evidencing Goodall’s primatological narratives, Haraway purports the result is ‘a 
synthetic scientific reconstruction of primate reality […] these histories are stories about stories, 
narratives with a good ending […] stories with a particular aesthetic, realism, and a particular 
politics, commitment to progress’.79 Haraway suggests a re-complication of non-human animal 
behaviours that come into being during the construction of the field narrative. She proposes the 
opportunity for greater understanding through mutual points of reference that are anticipated 
during the creation of these narratives by the field researchers themselves, more than traditional 
idealisms of scientific empiricism would otherwise allow. Crucially, these narratives and the 
potentialities within them take time to form, and are susceptible to alteration pertaining to 
imperceptible influences.  
 
Mary Sanders Pollock provides a comprehensive overview of the characteristics specific to 
primatological field narratives in Storytelling Apes, a critical exploration into ‘the storyworld that 
comes into being when a primatologist writes a field narrative – a literary zone somewhere 
between scientific argument and prose fiction’.80 Pollock offers that the inability of technical 
scientific vernacular to capture the complexities of natural life facilitated a fusion of translational 
modes, catalysed by Goodall’s entry into primatology.81 Rees stresses how field researchers 
consciously construct narratives ‘[that] sorted chaotic and fragmentary observations into a 
coherent, logical narrative’.82 This is echoed by Haraway, who determines that this mode of 
scientific investigation depends on ‘devices for transcribing the immense complexity and chaos of 
competing interpretations into unambiguous traces, writings, which mark the emergence of fact, 
 
78 Ibid., pp. 3-4. 
79 Ibid., p. 4. 
80 Mary Sanders Pollock, Storytelling Apes: Primatology Narratives Past and Future (Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 2015), p. 8.  
81 Ibid., p. 13. 
82 Rees, The Infanticide Controversy, p. 82. 
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the case about reality’.83 Whilst initial impressions of narrative construction could potentially 
threaten to dilute genuine moments of behavioural insight in the literal and empirical sense, it 
permits researchers a degree of relative freedom to anticipate a variety of valuable non-human 
animal behaviours in such a way as to charge them with greater potential for meaning, a 
conceptual approach that will prove significant in interpreting further textual instances identified 
in Boyd’s Brazzaville Beach.  
 
Unsurprisingly, narrative constructions necessitate a narrative setting, one that is 
‘narratively satisfying and at the same time scientifically plausible’.84 In an empirical sense, field 
narratives must be convincing in their accuracy and ability to portray the environmental situation 
in which observations of non-human animal life are made, though without allowing the narrative 
form to moralize non-human animal realities.85 Therefore, the impossible complexities of the 
natural world compel the field researcher to settle on something in closer alignment with prose 
fiction, as Pollock aptly summarises:  
 
The “field” is a real place, but it is also, paradoxically, an expression of the human 
imagination. It is an area selected within the natural range of nonhuman species […] 
bounded artificially from the outside; individuals and collective entities within it are 
named and classified from an outside perspective. The field exists in linear human 
time, not earth time; it is mapped from a human perspective; and it is remade from 
the inside, the space invariably altered by technological presence, the camera flash of 
the human eye. The field is a special construction – a chronotope, or time-space.86  
 
Pollock demonstrates inherent contestations present within field narratives, including the 
misapplication of temporal logics and scientific determinations to the field setting and the non-
human animals within it. Pollock suggests that this mistranslation is not necessarily wrong, but 
different from what idealisations of scientific investigation would seek to expose, born from its 
insistence to qualify and quantify the natural world in accordance with predetermined empirical 
 
83 Haraway, Primate Visions, p. 6. 
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85 Amanda Rees, ‘The Undead Darwin: Iconic Narrative, Scientific Controversy and the History of Science’, 
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systems and epistemological constructs reliant on linear temporality. As non-human animal 
behaviours are observed and recorded, Pollock suggests a perceptual filling-in by the field 
researcher, a form of anticipation that completes what is regarded as missing information to 
produce something that satisfies the dualistic scientific and narrative requirements of field 
narratives, comparable to Haraway’s merging of fact and fiction. Consequently, observed non-
human animal behaviours are supplemented by these descriptive anticipatory inclusions during 
translation, the result being a scientific field narrative that consists not just of pure empirical 
information, but includes a variety of emotive and affective resonances included during 
interpretations made by the field researcher themselves.  
 
Historically, Goodall’s own fieldwork traditions at Gombe during the mid-twentieth century 
necessitated the development this new scientific vernacular, requiring a linguistic form able to 
encapsulate the complexities of non-human animal behaviours and the environment in which 
they were being observed. The impossible richness of non-human animal life presented Goodall 
with the problem of creating a mode of recording that could still be considered scientifically 
accurate and productively viable; as Haraway denotes, ‘[s]cientific practice is literary practice […] 
negotiation, strategic moves, inscription and translation’.87 Due to her unconventional training, 
Goodall continuously struggled to adhere to regimented scientific practice herself, as she ‘freely 
made use of all those forbidden terms and concepts’, which often led her to commit the ‘cardinal 
sin’ of anthropomorphism.88 She recalls having ‘no idea that it would have been more appropriate 
to assign each of the chimpanzees a number rather than a name’, and so her early publications 
were met with ‘a chill silence’ from the scientific community.89 This was further complicated by 
the fundamental nature of field research itself; its investigative aims are far more expansive and 
incorporative than the methodological specificity of laboratory-based experiments. Nevertheless, 
the unconventional scientific approaches of those in the field, like Goodall at Gombe, 
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89 Ibid., p. 12.  
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Haraway and Pollock demonstrate the interdisciplinary complexity of the field narrative, an 
epistemological feature of field-based research that sets it apart from other empirical modes of 
producing knowledge on non-human animal life. Constructions of the field narrative are 
inescapability linked to longitudinal temporal logics of field researches, periods of long-term 
exposure to the non-human animals under observation and their environmental circumstance, 
allowing greater opportunities for affective influence on the individual researcher away from the 
regimented processes and specificities of laboratory-based investigations. Subliminal resonances 
of these affective potentials are demonstrated in Pollock’s determinations of a storyworld that is 
created within field narratives, an amalgamation of observed non-human animal behaviour and 
human modes of understanding what they are observing. Having established the particular 
characteristics of the field narrative, the chapter now analyses textual instances within Brazzaville 
Beach that establish and elaborate on its role as medium of recording and producing knowledge 
on non-human animal life; starting with Boyd’s fictional strategy to compare the epistemological 
logics of the field and the laboratory settings.  
 
 
More Meaningful: Advantages of Field Practice 
 
It is worth noting that, whilst laboratory-based research forms the scientific focus of the 
three subsequent chapters of the thesis, it will feature intermittently throughout here due to its 
interconnected historical development alongside field practices.90 Kohler highlights their history 
of affiliation: 
 
Laboratory and the field are different cultural terrains, to be sure, but they are 
contiguous, and there is a steady traffic across the border; and field scientists regularly 
mix and match lab and field methods […] They are interdependent, even coevolved – 
parts of a common culture.91 
 
Rees highlights the sense of dissonance between advocates of the laboratory and field-based 
practices, historically two sites where ‘validating scientific knowledge moved aspects of 
 
90 This mutual developmental history is outlined up until the 1950s in Robert Kohler’s Landscapes and 
Labscapes: Exploring the Lab-Field Border in Biology (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2002).  
91 Kohler, ‘Place and Practice in Field Biology’, p. 189. 
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knowledge from the lab to the field and back again’.92 The blurring of demarcations between 
knowledges extracted from these two different environments has led to a generalisation 
regarding species behaviours and a rash application of behavioural characteristics. Resultantly, 
behaviours unique to either wild chimpanzees or those raised in captivity for experimentation 
were often misapplied as universal traits true of all chimpanzees everywhere. Rees summarises 
this historical incompatibility, noting that ‘though some researchers did cross from laboratory to 
field and back again, the chasm between the two yawned. The most important reason for this gulf 
was the imbalance in the authoritative status granted to knowledge thought to emerge from 
these different locations’.93 Each empirical environment, and the models of knowledge created 
within them relating to non-human animal behaviour, were originally unable to recognise the 
distinct advantages of the other that postponed the communication of mutual, correlative 
characteristics beneficial to progressing the overall understanding of the species. The tensions 
between these two settings, as well as the exchanges of knowledge between them, are something 
that Boyd looks to explore throughout the novel.  
 
Brazzaville Beach offers a dramatization of scientific idealisations of the laboratory, 
revisiting the tensions between epistemological logics operational within the laboratory and field 
settings, in order to highlight the abilities of those specific to field-based researches. This is 
implemented by Boyd’s inclusion of Anton Hauser’s laboratory in the Grosso Arvore Research 
Centre. Hauser’s laboratory is an effort to control nature within nature, an island of experimental 
control situated in amongst a wholly uncontrollable location as an epistemologically autonomous 
territory. Boyd describes how:  
 
The simple building, a rectangular, corrugated iron shack, contained a small but 
surprisingly efficient and well-equipped laboratory […] Hauser’s lab had a small 
generator to power his centrifuges and chill his refrigerators. In a corner a table fan 
turned its face this way and that, dispensing its breeze.94 
 
The laboratory’s subtropical setting remains palpable through Hauser’s use of the fan, a 
seemingly nondescript detail that faintly dilutes the authority of the space to expel environmental 
 
92 Rees, The Infanticide Controversy, p. 8.  
93 Ibid., p. 34.  
94 Boyd, p. 35.  
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influences entirely, and a reminder of the laboratory’s situation. Boyd’s depiction of Hauser is one 
of somewhat comic professionalism, wearing his ‘white coat and trousers, but with no shirt or 
vest under the coat […] Beneath the antiseptic smells of his chemicals and preserving spirits it 
was just possible to distinguish the thin vinegar reek of his body odour’.95 Hauser is Boyd’s satirical 
caricature of the stereotypical laboratory scientist. His white coat, symbolic of the exalted purity 
of experimental scientific empiricism, is parodied in contradiction with his underlying shoddy 
appearance and poor hygiene. Connotations of contamination are again underlined by Hope’s 
olfactory experience of Hauser’s musk, perceptible in amongst those emitted by scientific 
substances. Importantly, Hauser’s slackened appearance is the result of the environment outside 
the laboratory walls, again emphasising its intrusion on the procedures of scientific work. 
Nevertheless, the demarcated authority of Hauser’s laboratory space remains, as Hope ‘knocked 
and was admitted’.96 
 
Boyd highlights the exclusive epistemological abilities of the laboratory in terms of the 
types of knowledge produced there, conversely accentuating the limitations of Hope’s own 
systems of knowledge production, those specific to the field-based researcher. When Hope 
discovers the remains of what she suspects to be an infant chimpanzee, she looks to confirm her 
preliminary suspicions of intergroup cannibalism by testing the composition of the chimpanzee 
faecal matter which she collects. Boyd has Hope describe: ‘I examined the ground beneath the 
fig tree and collected samples of faeces in my specimen bottles. As I labelled them I tried to keep 
my thoughts calm and rational’.97 The potential knowledges contained within the materiality of 
the specimens are beyond Hope’s empirical ability to extract and utilise, such are the exclusive 
capabilities of those trained to operate the laboratory and its technologies. Hope therefore needs 
Hauser and the empirical modes of knowledge production available to him, in this case biological, 
in order to access these domains of information and recover evidence. Hauser’s exclusivity in 
obtaining and using these knowledges is underlined, as ‘[he] knew better than anyone what 
chimpanzees ate. He had identified dozens of plant and fruit types from faecal study alone’.98 
There is an obvious sardonic undertone implied here by Boyd, as Hauser’s exclusivities involve 
analysing samples of non-human animal excrement as opposed to the authentic living beings 
 
95 Ibid.  
96 Ibid., p. 40. 
97 Ibid., p. 34. 
98 Ibid., p. 36.  
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themselves. Nevertheless, Hauser thus dominates the intellectual domain pertaining to 
chimpanzee biology, granted access by his learned laboratory practices explicit to extracting data 
from biological material. 
 
Through the interactions between Hope and Hauser, Boyd implicates two models of 
knowledge production that produce different kinds of knowledge of the same non-human animal 
life and depending on translational approaches specific to their empirical environment. Indeed, 
materiality is another characteristic of the laboratory that Boyd looks to explore. In his description 
of Hauser’s laboratory, Boyd highlights a level of interdependence existent between the scientist, 
empirical apparatus, and nature, represented by the biological material. All contribute to the 
production of biological knowledge and, although dependent on one another, permit a level of 
control on the part of the scientist. For instance, following Mallabar’s interjection to disrupt 
Hope’s theory, she recalls ‘[Hauser] handed me my specimen bottles, rinsed clean’ and reveals 
the materials were incinerated.99 Regardless of his motives, the materiality of biological science 
allows Hauser to halt this particular avenue of investigation by simply disposing of the specimen 
samples. By removing the samples, Hauser’s mode of knowledge production cannot work, as 
biological material provides the critical contributor to the empirical process. This ensures Hope 
cannot utilise this knowledge and attribute it to her behavioural hypotheses of chimpanzee 
cannibalism, thus closing off an avenue of potential new knowledges. Therefore, the modes of 
knowledge production in the laboratory seem manufactured and mass-produced, especially as its 
investigative directions are decided by the scientist and chosen hypothesis being tested. 
 
Goodall recognised the special potential in studying chimpanzees in their natural habitat 
and even understood that a ‘natural, undisturbed, representative field site’ perhaps could not 
exist in the face of global human expansion: 
 
It is easier to study intellectual prowess in the lab where, through carefully devised 
tests and judicious use of rewards, the chimpanzees can be encouraged to exert 
themselves, to stretch their minds to the limit. It is more meaningful to study the 
subject in the wild, but much harder. It is more meaningful because we can better 
understand the environmental pressures that led to the evolution of intellectual skills 
in chimpanzee societies. It is harder because, in the wild, almost all behaviours are 
 
99 Ibid., p. 40.  
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confounded by countless variables; years of observing, recording and analysing that 
take the place of contrived testing; sample size can often be counted on the fingers of 
one hand; the only experiments are nature’s own, and only time – eventually – may 
replicate them.100 
 
Goodall is well aware of the obstacles of field research, and yet determinedly considers these to 
nevertheless render results more significant than those garnered in a laboratory. Instead, Goodall 
considers non-human animal actions in the wild to be more meaningful, any behavioural trait 
being a legitimate expression of a single or multiple behaviour of genuine consequence. Goodall’s 
application of the term meaningful is as ambiguous as it is equally richly suggestive, with the 
passage ending in acknowledgement of the impossibly multifaceted nature of wild non-human 
animal behaviour. Undoubtedly, Goodall believes that animal behaviour observed in the wild has 
more significance to forming a better understanding of truer non-human animal behaviour than 
those occurring within the laboratory. Perhaps most importantly, Goodall sees field studies as the 
fairest form of observational study with no expectations or preconceptions placed on the subject 
on the part of the human observer. 
 
Goodall highlights the implications of expectational performance that occur in laboratory-
based investigative designs and methodologies; that non-human animals are encouraged to 
behave in certain ways, determined by scientific hypotheses being tested. This particular 
conceptual consideration resonates particularly with the theoretical works of Vinciane Despret, 
whose approaches consider anthropocentric tendencies in empirical science. Her considerations 
of how particular kinds of scientific questions encourage particular kinds of responses of non-
human animals will feature as the primary theoretical approach in later chapters concerning 
fictional representations of the laboratory. Still, Despret contends that field practices should ‘find 
new methods to focus […] on those behaviours that are most meaningful to the animals 
themselves’101, rather than ‘make an inventory of what makes the animals act and react […] [and] 
infer what the animals perceive and what the perceived things mean for them’.102 Like Haraway, 
Despret’s considerations reinforce Goodall’s belief in the advantages of good field practice 
 
100 Goodall, Through a Window, p. 19. 
101 Vinciane Despret, ‘Responding Bodies and Partial Affinities in Human-Animal Worlds’, Theory, Culture & 
Society, 30 (2013), 51-76 (p. 54). 
102 Ibid., p.55.  
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undelimited by systems of strict scientific empiricism, stating that ‘understanding another being’s 
perspective requires the researcher to take into account the fact that some things are more 
meaningful than others; it requires the observer to give them some worth, some affective 
values’.103  
 
Goodall’s sarcastic vocabulary divulges a thinly veiled criticism of laboratory modes of 
empirical enquiry: that scientists conducting research in the laboratory environment are actually 
enhancing or even altering the chimpanzees in some way, attempting to ‘stretch their minds’ and 
lure them outside of what is considered the remits of normal behaviour. The teaching of 
chimpanzees to perform repetitive tasks is, to Goodall, a contamination of true cognitive 
behavioural study, whereas in the field or wild ‘a single observation may prove of utmost 
significance’.104 For Goodall, laboratory-designed experiments are detrimental to the processes 
of extracting pure knowledge through observation, as the concept of encouragement proposes 
that laboratory-based data is already compromised and therefore constructs biased results. 
Goodall concedes to a ‘solid core of data concerning chimpanzee intellect collected so carefully 
in the lab setting’105, but draws attention to the artificial modes of laboratory-based research, 
including ‘contrived testing’, ‘specific categories’, ‘given criterion’ and, particular to chimpanzees, 
being ‘language-trained’.106 In her overview of behavioural observations in the wild, Goodall 
additionally introduces a key conceptual opposition between laboratory and field-based studies: 
issues of temporality. The temporal nature of field-based research is unique, as ‘the only 
experiments are nature’s own, and only time – eventually – may replicate them’.107 The chapter 
will now examine Boyd’s literary strategy in Brazzaville Beach to depict the temporal logics of field 
researches, and whether fictions include the same impressions of meaningfulness in their 







104 Goodall, Through a Window, p. 19.  
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106 Ibid., p. 18.  
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Temporal Logics in the Field 
 
The following section will highlight how Boyd fictionally reconstructs and examines the 
conceptual oppositions within empirical temporal logics operational within field-based 
researches by placing them within the broader temporal logic of the narrative, Hope’s life 
chronology and the dramatic events that occur. In doing so, Boyd has events in the novel play out 
in accordance with the competing temporal logics of the scientific investigations conducted at 
Grosso Arvore, Hope’s investigative researches on the chimpanzees and the tensions that arise 
between her and Mallabar. Particularly, the longitudinal studies of field-based research present a 
challenge and opportunity for fictional representations looking to consider researches on non-
human animals in the wild. These longitudinal modes of temporality inherent to field-research 
push literary strategies to consider how best to negotiate what Goodall describes: ‘a sense of 
timelessness’.108 Brazzaville Beach presents various contending temporal logics in such a way so 
as to promote a reconsideration of their role as empirical constructs utilized in the production of 
particular kinds of knowledge pertaining to non-human animal life, and constitutes Boyd’s main 
literary strategy by which to intervene in on broader discussions concerning scientific methods of 
understanding.  
 
Generally, productions of scientific knowledge always operate in sequential order; 
observations are made, data is recorded, evidence is published, eventually establishing the active 
scientific paradigm pertaining to behavioural patterns, true in all forms of empirical scientific 
research. Paradigms can be challenged later through the scientific principles of refutation and 
conjecture, resulting in an active paradigm being replaced by another, fundamentally 
contradictory but equally substantiated by evidential proof. Craig Stanford highlights a particular 
characteristic of primatological research, as ‘models tend to be predictive for a time, but as new, 
contradictory data accumulate they become obsolete’.109 The fundamental principles of these 
displacement processes are indeed true of scientific empiricism as a whole, as it ensures endless 
progression and advancement under its own momentum and epistemological design. However, 
during field-based research the temporal logics of these processes are substantially lengthier than 
those of laboratory investigations. Once a paradigm has eventually been refuted and fresh data 
 
108 Ibid., p. 201.  
109 Craig Stanford, ‘The Social Behaviour of Chimpanzees and Bonobos: Empirical Evidence and Shifting 
Assumptions’, Current Anthropology, 39 (1998), 399-420 (p. 406).  
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collated to approve new hypotheses, the implications of the paradigm shifts mean the old data 
cannot be revisited. Again, the displacement of old knowledge is true within all empirical modes 
of investigation, whatever its operational temporal logic.  
 
The most blatant mode of temporal strategy concerning field sciences in Brazzaville Beach 
is its condensing of empirical chronologies: the time it takes to observe and document non-human 
animals in the wild. The research traditions of Grosso Arvore are framed at the beginning of the 
novel, as Boyd condenses twenty-five years of methodological study in order to instate the 
dominant paradigm against which to then challenge Hope’s discovery of chimpanzee violence 
later on. Boyd employs one significant paragraph for this, as he describes:  
 
The essence of the Mallabar approach to the study of chimpanzee society was 
painstaking and time-consuming. Its first and key requirement was that the observer 
habituate himself with the apes he was studying so that they accepted his presence 
in their world without fear or inhibition. Once that had been achieved (it had taken 
Mallabar almost two years) then the next stage was to observe and record. Over the 
years of the project this process had evolved into something highly organized and 
systematic and vast amounts of data were gathered and analysed. All observations 
were logged in a uniform way; chimps were identified, followed, and their biographies 
were steadily compiled and annotated over the years. The result was that, over two 
decades on from Mallabar’s initial studies, the Grosso Arvore project now represented 
the most exhaustive and thorough study of any animal society in the history of 
scientific investigation.110 
 
Hope’s arrival here is contextualised within the broader history of Grosso Arvore with its long-
standing empirical traditions following Mallabar’s publications focused on chimpanzee docility, 
the behavioural expectations of the research blatantly apparent here. Data accumulated within 
this period makes up Mallabar’s dominant paradigm that Hope’s discovery will eventually 
threaten to displace. Conversely, the temporal logics of Grosso Arvore, in terms of both its history 
and scientific methodologies, are placed within the larger chronology of Hope’s life and 
experiences, allowing Boyd to fictionally reconstruct and reconsider how temporal systems of 
knowledge production operate in comparison.  
 
110 Boyd, pp. 27-28. 
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The passage evidences Boyd’s novelistic structure that places two competing paradigms 
alongside one another on the same page, presenting the reader with the chance to compare, 
contrast, and consider the ways in which scientific inquiry operates sequentially to produce closed 
circuits of knowledge. This implicates that scientific knowledges are in a constant state of 
creation, displacement, and progression, limiting both validity and applicability. Boyd makes a 
conscious narrative choice to stretch and manipulate time in the novel in order to present 
conflicting paradigms, whether sequentially or simultaneously, creating narrative tensions and 
driving the dramatic events in the novel. Meanwhile, the chimpanzees of Grosso Arvore have also 
been historicised, moving from anecdotal observation, to collated data, and eventually passing 
into behavioural truth. The indication here is that processes of appropriation occur as new 
observed behaviours are resultantly deemed unusual against active empirical models of 
knowledge on non-human animal life, rather than having been simply unobserved up to the point 
in question. This causes Mallabar’s paradigm of chimpanzee docility in the novel to seem outdated 
and essentially flawed, fitting chimpanzee behaviour into predetermined models of knowledge 
rather than constructing another. As such, Mallabar consciously works against scientific idealisms 
of empirical objectivity.  
 
Hope’s existence at Grosso Avore is the direct result of one such new behavioural 
irregularity, a fissure in the societal structure of the chimpanzee group, representative of the new 
emergent knowledges that Boyd sets up against Mallabar’s dominant paradigm. The occurrence 
of such a variation in the chimpanzee’s behaviour and societal structure already signifies change 
and approaching tensions in the novel. However, being recent history, hypotheses remain ever 
speculative and Mallabar’s paradigm of chimpanzee docility is constantly being reassured and 
reinforced by established practices and systems of knowledge production at Grosso Arvore. This 
is certainly evident as Hope summarises her post:  
 
[T]here had been a mystifying schism in the chimpanzee tribe that Mallabar had 
documented so thoroughly […] a small group of chimpanzees had broken away from 
the main unit […] and had established themselves in an area of the forest not hitherto 
covered by the research project […] Why had they left? Was this important? […] A new 
job was funded to try and answer these questions. It fell to me to observe this small 




Boyd situates Hope’s southern group away from the main body of chimpanzees, figuratively 
separate from Mallabar’s models of behaviour collated over the last twenty-five years. The 
implications of Boyd’s narrative strategy here introduce a new temporal logic, as Hope becomes 
exclusively reliant on information revealing itself over time, as no prior evidence or behavioural 
models can be applied to the chimpanzees’ division. It is here that Boyd sets up the primary 
temporal logic of the novel, within the broader temporal chronology of Hope’s life experience.  
 
Interestingly, Hope’s investigative objective is born from an enquiry into the importance of 
the chimpanzee social division in relation to Mallabar’s dominant theory, rather than its own 
potential for unique behavioural observation. In terms of Boyd’s narrative strategy, the break is 
representative of a temporal separation from the historical chronology of the Grosso Arvore 
chimpanzees at the point of Hope’s arrival; with the creation of the “southerners” signifying the 
beginning of an entirely new non-human animal group history and subsequent field tradition 
prompted by their new environment. Indeed, Boyd’s placement of the chimpanzees into an 
unexplored area of the Grosso Arvore reserve emphasizes this sense of temporal alteration, away 
from established research traditions and allowing the ensuing narrative to consider what it is to 
construct an entirely new model of knowledge regarding non-human animal behaviour. Boyd 
explores this new temporal logic by fictionally moving into the more immediate logics of 
temporality operational within Hope’s own scientific methodological practice. 
 
 
Quotidian Experience and Other Ways of Knowing  
 
The quotidian experience of the field-based researcher makes up the hours, the days, the 
months and the years that allow for the slow formation of knowledge concerning non-human 
animal behaviour. Data collected is collated over time, patterns are identified, trends emerge, 
and are eventually recognised as behavioural truth. The longevity of field research is compulsory 
due to the nature of observing non-human animal subjects in the wild and researchers have no 
control over the environmental context in which observations are being made. This not only 
includes the immediate physical environment, but also political and economic circumstances as 
well as the psychological situation of the individual researcher that influence conduct, often 
imperceptibly. Additionally, researchers install human social constructions of time onto the 
natural world during observational periods. All these factors contribute to the construction of 
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field narratives created during that particular period of time observing non-human animals, 
affecting all relative subsequent data. The implication is, as Pollock highlights in Goodall’s work, 
that ‘the “field”, as it is constructed by primatologists, is located not only in space but also in 
time’.111  
 
Knowledge production cannot be produced on demand and researchers must be patient 
enough to wait for genuine moments of insight into animal cognitive behaviour. This is another 
issue of temporality that emphasizes the difficulty field-based research faces in terms of impactful 
evidence, simply because any empirical evidence takes such a long time to formulate. It also 
implicates that some periods of time are more significant than others and that vast amounts of 
less significant time become obsolete; never recorded as it is not prioritised by the hypotheses 
under investigation. When inverted, this concept opens up further potentialities regarding 
valuable encounters between researcher and non-human animal subjects: that other types of 
affectivity exist in these disregarded periods of time that are never recorded. These can include 
moments of accidental or deliberate interaction or acknowledgement between researcher and 
non-human animal subject, immediate environmental influences, personal interpretations of the 
non-human animals behaviour or situational circumstance in addition to or other than the 
empirical observations recorded. Essentially, any form of human and non-human encounter or 
interaction that is secondary to and consequent of the scientific observation at hand.  
 
The affective potentialities of such moments are the driving force behind many of Hope’s 
actions throughout Brazzaville Beach, existent within the temporal logics of the empirical science 
portrayed but excluded by its working observational methodology, the emotive culmination of 
which leads Hope to her eventual deadly intervention in the chimpanzee inter-group conflict. 
Certainly, these potentially affective moments are made clear from the very beginning and 
permeate the second narrative orientating around Hope’s time at Grosso Arvore, with Hope 
opening:  
 
I never really warmed to Clovis, he was far too stupid to inspire real affection, but he 
always claimed a corner of my heart, largely – I suppose – because of the way he 
 
111 Pollock, p. 72.  
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instinctively and unconsciously cupped his genitals whenever he was alarmed or 
nervous. It was rather endearing, I thought, and it showed a natural vulnerability.112  
 
This reminder of Hope’s recollection of Clovis, an older male chimpanzee, is to evidence the 
construction of a secondary model of knowledge pertaining to the non-human animals under 
observation, separate but in parallel to the scientific empirical knowledges being produced 
concurrently. This model of knowledge constitutes Hope’s intuitive interpretations of Clovis’s 
actions in accordance with her own methods of understanding, converging at points of relatability 
and thus meaningful to Hope. The difference here is that this a secondary, personalised model of 
knowledge is created by these other affective moments and encounters remains with the 
individual researchers. Whilst the scientific empirical model of knowledge produced alongside it 
is then processed, published, and circulated within scientific communities and outside them as 
they pass into the public domain. Boyd highlights the deliberate selectivity of empirical processes 
and their temporal logics applied to the non-human animal in the field in this way to conversely 
prompt a reconsideration of the entire period of observation. This includes moments that fall 
outside of the methodology implemented to include other secondary, but still valuable, human 
and non-human animal moments of interaction and encounter. When the longitudinal temporal 
logics of field-based research are considered and harnessed in terms of these potentials, fictional 
reconstructions are able to utilise and explore resultant possibilities. 
 
In Brazzaville Beach, Boyd summarises and then accentuates the methodological logics of 
temporality in field-based research by first contrasting them with those operational within the 
laboratory space, a comparison that also occurs early on in the novel. Indeed, Hauser is able to 
reproduce experiments at his leisure within the temporal logics of the laboratory and fully utilise 
his whole time to explore particular hypotheses and determine results. Boyd accentuates these 
capabilities at poignant points in the novel, particularly when Hope first realises her initial 
biological discoveries may be under scrutiny; she notes:  
 
I walked back to my tent, noticing that the lights in Hauser’s lab were still on. I realized 
I hadn’t seen him in the canteen that evening and I felt a seep of worry drip through 
me. Hauser was not known for working late.113 
 
112 Boyd, p. 9.  
113 Boyd, p. 38. 
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So proficient are laboratory systems of knowledge production at navigating issues of temporality, 
Hauser can choose to continue his work beyond the temporal limitations applicable to everyone 
else, being always restricted to daylight hours. Apparatus used to facilitate temporal control, such 
as the laboratory’s light fitting, ensure Hauser enjoys potentially infinite periods of productivity, 
and are so effective that Hauser even cautions Hope: ‘[d]on’t waste my time, Dr Clearwater’.114 
This is doubly potent when considered in contrast to Hope’s own ‘painstaking and time-
consuming’ research, that is then established as the dominant empirical mode Boyd seeks to 
examine throughout the novel.115  
 
Whilst field-based studies may operate in terms of anything from hours to decades, 
laboratory studies can hone their methodologies to produce data by the hour, creating artificial 
research environments to neutralise the effects of any external variables. These variables include 
the constraints of time or the investigatory context that time inevitably complicates. For example, 
a laboratory can devise a test to evaluate a particular aspect of primate behaviour and allocate a 
certain amount of time to investigations; issues of temporality are dictated entirely by the 
investigator. This is mostly due to the fact that laboratory tests are replicable and repeatable, to 
be used over and over again at the convenience of researchers. In essence, laboratory work can 
“freeze” time or at least temporarily close out its influence. Scientists can then focus in on one 
mode of investigation for however long they need or want to, whether it be a few days or more, 
and the tests will provide closed-circuit data. This data can be generated into results, published 
and submitted to the scientific community quickly for consideration with each experiment being 
identically replicable by others who would look to refute findings or confirm results. This permits 
laboratory research a considerable amount of self-generated momentum, avoiding the periods of 
relatively unprofitable sedation experienced by those operating in field-based research.   
 
Brazzaville Beach effectively uses these same modes of temporal control within its 
depiction of the quotidian experience of the field-researcher, as the narrative must progress over 
long periods of time. Boyd uses plotting as a method by which to allow literary forms to explore 
what it is to perform researches on non-human animals by way of scientific empirical systems, 
either speeding up or slowing down time to present amalgamated moments for consideration. 
This is doubly beneficial as creative decisions to manipulate forms of temporality can add up to 
 
114 Ibid., p. 26. 
115 Ibid., p. 27.  
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different narrative effects, reworking time to create devices such as direct or indirect antagonism, 
narrative tension, or extended periods of suspense. In effect, as a novelist, Boyd has techniques 
and narrative abilities at his disposal that can manipulate, stretch and ultimately navigate the 
temporal restrictions of empirical science in order to highlight and present those features 
particular to non-human animals in the wild that enable more direct re-examination.  
 
A prominent example of Boyd’s awareness of the temporal restraints of field-based 
research arrives in the form Hope’s initial discovery of inter-group violence between the 
chimpanzee groups. Hope finds a half-eaten chimpanzee body in the aftermath of an instance of 
infanticide and cannibalism, though this is not known by Hope or her field assistant Alda at this 
point in the narrative: 
 
Chimps would eat baby monkeys, duiker, bush pigs, anything they could catch… But I 
knew this wasn’t a baby baboon. This was the corpse of an infant chimpanzee, a few 
days old […] I wondered what Eugene Mallabar would make of this. Alda waited 
patiently for me. After a minute or two I told him to put the corpse in a plastic bag and 
seal it. As he did so, I examined the ground beneath the fig tree and collected samples 
of faeces in my specimen bottles. As I labelled them I tried to keep my thoughts calm 
and rational. What I had here was some very interesting evidence, but the case it 
made was highly circumstantial […] I checked my natural excitement: softly, softly, I 
thought.116 
 
Hope’s visceral excitement is initially kept in check by her inclination toward scientific rationale; 
any projections of the potential significance of her observation mediated by the need to find 
‘more facts, more data’.117 As Hope’s observation does not fit into current models of knowledge 
and understanding of chimpanzee behaviours, the potential impact of her observation is 
disclosed. Any future publication or article is subject to the restrictions of temporality born out 
the environmental context she works in, taking time to reach publishers so that Hope can only sit 
and wonder ‘how Mallabar would react when it came out’.118 However, at this point it remains 
only ever a distant and remote possibility.  
 
116 Ibid., pp. 33-34. 
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Boyd is offering a commentary on the processes of empirical science that insist on 
adherence to particular temporal processes pertaining to the inescapability of linear progression, 
as well as significant implications of patriarchal authority and the particular contestations it 
resultantly implicates. Not only do significant observations have to reveal themselves, but Hope 
must avoid ‘unprofitable speculation’ and remain receptive to the number of potential futures 
that the temporal logic of field-science opens up; one instance does not guarantee repetition.119 
Hope understands her claims will be dismissed without significant evidence to refute Mallabar’s 
current empirical paradigm and would therefore fail to displace it. The principle narrative thread 
in Brazzaville Beach orientates around Hope attempting to collect her supporting data over an 
extended period of time, being wholly reliant on behaviours revealed intermittently by the 
chimpanzees. In the meantime, her time is otherwise occupied by ‘writing up my field notes’ and 
making ‘no alterations to the data’.120 Crucially, Hope must always adhere to the principles of 
temporality that dictate the pace of scientific empirical knowledge production in her discipline, 
opening up an extensive period of time around which Boyd can build the narrative sequence of 
events supplemented by secondary moments of affective encounter between the human and 
non-human animal.  
 
This is not to suggest that these other types of affective moments outside of the empirical 
observation of the investigation are frequently occurring. The immediate quotidian experience of 
the field-researcher poses a challenge to literary narrative strategies looking to accurately portray 
the slow, sometimes monotonous, corporeal existence of the field researcher. Literary authors 
are faced with a dilemma concerning what to and what not to include, without losing a 
longitudinal sense of time and the richness and vibrancy it implicates when working in the field. 
Pollock highlights such instances in Goodall’s own experience, as ‘[s]ometimes she sat for hours 
[…] waiting for the chimpanzee to move […] isolation, disease, danger, discomfort, and boring 
food are occasionally interrupted by rich discoveries – rare glimpses across the species barrier’.121 
Certainly, Boyd’s narrative technique generates a true sense of the frustrations inherent to the 
progressive nature of fieldwork by accentuating moments of unproduction, as Hope often 
‘watched without result’.122 These inclusions conversely help to create a sense of longevity, 
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anticipation and tension when pitted against the impactful potential of her data, being of 
‘inflammatory and controversial nature’.123  
 
To escape the sequential realities of empirical science, Boyd can bend and stretch the 
temporal modes inherent with field-based research, allowing Hope’s progress to continue 
throughout the course of the novel without losing the crucial impressions of endurance and 
longevity. More obviously, Boyd’s choice of the name Hope implicates feelings of optimistic 
expectation and anticipation, a desire for particular things or events to occur, which also 
insinuates a degree of subconscious bias in wanting something to happen. To accommodate both 
the temporal logics and the sense of anticipation that drives events in Brazzaville Beach, events 
of the narrative are interceded with stylistic methods of temporal bypass:   
 
Alda and I planned to go to a large fig tree where the southern group often fed. We 
followed a winding path through the humid undergrowth […] The fig tree proved to 
be empty apart from a small troupe of colobus monkeys. But in the distance, not too 
far off, I could hear the sound of the excited hooting and screaming of chimpanzees. 
Another fig tree grew in an outcrop of rocks about half a mile away […] It took us half 
an hour to reach it […] Alda and I settled down for a long period of observation, our 
analysis sheets ready, our field journals open. The chimps glanced at us from time to 
time but otherwise ignored us – they were thoroughly habituated to observers.124  
 
Boyd can speed up proceedings, skipping large periods of time in order to condense and compact 
revelations to then present to the reader, as well as emphasize environmental logistics of research 
in the wild. Rees highlights, ‘[s]ince researchers wanted to study animals living under natural 
conditions, they had to travel to the field’.125  
 
Boyd’s narrative frequently acknowledges periods of travel to accentuate a sense of 
physical distance between the researcher and the field, also strengthening a feeling of 
anthropological distance. Hope’s default quotidian routine is established by these narrative 
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signposts, being ‘away from the camp most days from dawn to sunset’126 and devoting ‘a fifth to 
a quarter of my day was spent in commuting to and fro’.127 Boyd’s narrative utilises flashbacks 
and prolepses that work against and dissolve the rules of strict linear progression inherent to 
empirical methodologies, without losing the sense of realism in the time taken to reach the field 
physically. Boyd has the capability to regulate, control, and navigate the same kinds of more and 
less significant periods of time in the narrative in order to ensure progression but also consider 
identified, important conceptual instances depicted in the construction of Hope’s model of 
knowledge pertaining to chimpanzee violence.  
 
Boyd’s narrative strategies can be seen at work more visibly in the first instance of 
chimpanzee cannibalism and infanticide in the novel, as Hope begins the day setting off into the 
forest in search of Lena and Bobo, a female chimpanzee and her male infant: 
 
I picked up my provisions from the canteen and headed south to look for Lena and 
Bobo. I found them towards mid-morning, with all the other members of the southern 
group present, at the half-dead fig tree […] I took up my position and observed them 
for almost three hours.128 
 
The linear progression of the narrative at this point is relatively fast, as Boyd bypasses the 
unproductive hours that precede the impending violent event. Not only this, but Boyd’s strategy 
places this particular day at the most recent point within a broader chronology of past days and 
potentially weeks. This not only adds realism and reemphasizes the longevity of field-based 
studies on non-human animals but proposes any shift in temporal logic signals an imminent 
moment of behavioural significance. Indeed, at the moment of action, Boyd abruptly switches 
the narrative to real-time, a minute-by-minute depiction of the events that unfold before Hope’s 
eyes:  
 
Then I heard a warning bark that snapped me out of my circling speculations. I looked 
up. Lena, holding Bobo to her, was now sitting in a low branch of the fig tree. Rita-Lu 
was approaching her, on the ground, one hand held out […] Lena bared her teeth at 
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Rita-Lu. I wondered what I had missed, the mood was now so clearly tense and 
hostile.129 
 
The temporal mode of the narrative decelerates to accommodate the viciousness of the assailing 
chimpanzees in uncomfortable detail, emulating the sequential immediacy of Hope’s own 
experiences being eyewitness. Lena and her infant are attacked by two other females, mother 
and daughter Rita-Mae and Rita-Lu. Rita-Mae eventually captures and kills Bobo, with ‘a distinct 
cracking sound as the frail skull was crushed by her teeth’.130 Boyd’s narrative then dwells on the 
deliberate gruesomeness of their cannibalistic behaviour in the aftermath of such ferocious 
action: ‘Rita-Mae was eating Bobo. She tore into his belly and pulled out his entrails with her 
teeth. She flung his guts away on to the rocks’.131 The eventual end of the chimpanzee’s violence 
is signalled as the temporal logics at play become less immediate and more malleable, with Boyd 
looking to isolate and close off one moment of significant non-human animal behaviour and steer 
towards another. Boyd writes, ‘Lena sat and watched Rita-Mae and Rita-Lu for the rest of the 
afternoon as they fed idly on the body. At dusk, when they moved off to their nesting site, Rita-
Mae draped the shreds of Bobo’s body over her shoulders like a scarf’.132    
 
Once again, to draw effective comparisons between two temporal logics of empirical 
science, Boyd sets the temporal logics of Hope’s research up against the artificiality of those 
installed by Mallabar, most specifically in the form of the Artificial Feeding Area at Grosso Avore: 
 
[T]he first sign of human habitation you came across, as you approached the camp […] 
was a wide cleared area, about the size of three tennis courts, in the middle of which 
was a low concrete structure – hip-high – with four small wooden doors set in one 
side. It looked like some sort of cage […] but in fact it was the research project’s pride 
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In comparison to Hope’s empirical methodology, and considered in the broader narrative 
temporal logic of Hope’s life experience, Mallabar’s artificial feeding area is a blatant rejection of 
the fundamental temporal logics pertaining to field-based observations of non-human animals: 
an endeavour to eliminate all of the external variables that characterise the complexity and 
uncontrollability of the field. To the reader, Mallabar’s feeding installation exposes the complete 
artificiality of both the chimpanzees’ behaviour and any subsequent data or publications derived 
from it. It is an utter jeopardization of non-human animal behavioural genuity for the sake of 
autonomous temporal control and logistical empirical convenience. Here, parallels can be drawn 
with Goodall’s early years at Gombe, as she later ‘regretted having set up the banana feeding 
station that seemed necessary for sustained observation […] to all appearances, the feeding 
stations changed the very behaviours she originally wanted to observe’.134 Mallabar has 
succumbed to external pressures, or the need to sustain knowledge production in order to secure 
the future of Grosso Avore. By drawing a comparison between the temporal logics of Hope and 
Mallabar’s investigations, Boyd can offer a fictional interpretation of the consequences should 
empirical temporal be misapplied or abused. When considered within the broader temporal logic 
of Hope’s life, represented in the narrative of Brazzaville Beach as a whole, the reader can 
consider broader issues of temporality and whether empirical modes of temporal control truly 
capture the truth of non-human animal life. 
 
 
Interpretive Flexibility of the Researcher 
 
The following section investigates Boyd’s fictional exploration and reconsideration of the 
specific empirical practices and procedures that work to produce knowledge on non-human 
animal life. Having considered the implications of the temporal logics presented throughout 
Brazzaville Beach, the chapter now looks to specific methodological practices that form these 
models of knowledge in the field: a borderland where human and non-human animal encounters 
take place within this epistemological mode. With the assistance of Haraway’s conceptual 
approaches, examples in the novel are identified and analysed in terms how they offer a 
reconsideration of these same specific empirical practices and the broader epistemological logics 
of field research. Indeed, during The Infanticide Controversy, Rees raises a significant notion: 
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scientists ‘working within the field environment demands far more interpretive flexibility than is 
called for in the laboratory’.135 The broader implications of the term interpretive flexibility 
reintroduce the perception of models of scientific knowledge being wholly social constructions, 
reminiscent of conceptual approaches outlined in Haraway’s Primate Visions previously. This 
forms the first empirical methodology addressed in this section of the chapter. Followed by 
analyses of the ways in which empirical science historicises non-human animal behaviours to suit 
anthropocentric models of understanding, as well as the contentions that arise between the old 
and new knowledges they produce.  
 
Haraway contends that ‘[s]cientific practice is above all a story-telling practice in the sense 
of historically specific practices of interpretation and testimony’, an amalgamation of factual 
extant phenomena and creative fictions of the researcher.136 Social influences imperceptibly 
formulate at this early stage of knowledge production to guide the resultant narratives 
constructed by the researcher, as Haraway contends that science endeavours to maintain ‘the 
old western dream of perfect representation’.137 She asserts that whilst Goodall ‘transcribed the 
lives of chimpanzees into the languages of sociobiology and behavioural ecology’, in reality 
drawing from ‘the myth of the faithful copy, where interpretation or reinvention disappear and 
history and its complexities can be finally suppressed.138 Nevertheless, non-human animals are 
implicated within these resultant narratives, being all at once true and not true: translational 
reconstructions of what the original observations were supposed to capture according to the 
methodological idealism of empirical science. To ensure an effective analysis of Boyd’s fictional 
reconstruction of this methodological practice, it is beneficial to briefly outline the nature of 
scientific empirical processes out in the field and examine how these could be influenced by the 
emotive lives of the researchers conducting them.  
 
Interpretive flexibility seems to oppose the fundamental tenet of scientific empiricism that 
its researchers remain dispassionate investigators of pure knowledge; being trained observers 
and interpreters of nature seeking truth. Observational skills are ultimately learned skills intended 
to reinforce notions of a centralised methodological process by which to conduct all researches 
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in this epistemological context. Proponents of laboratory-based science would regard 
interpretive flexibility as wholly detrimental to the distinct empirical strategies of field-based 
researches. Initially, first impressions of interpretative flexibility as a scientific empirical approach 
would perhaps threaten contamination by the otiose concepts of anthropomorphism, or a 
misapplication of motivations to newly observed non-human animal behaviours. However, 
degrees of interpretive flexibility reintroduce the potentialities of Goodall’s earlier assertion of 
observations in the wild being more meaningful, there being a multiplicity of explanations equally 
applicable regarding any given behaviour at any given time.  
 
The construction of scientific facts in field-based research starts when observations are 
recorded, collated, and behavioural motivations deduced, one being repeated and reiterated 
over time and eventually becoming established as behavioural truth. Issues regarding interpretive 
flexibility arise during this primary stage: the visual observation of the field researcher. Haraway 
identifies this moment within Goodall’s approach:  
 
Goodall’s first mode of collecting data was to enter in a daily field diary whatever she 
observed and to transcribe the fieldnotes nightly by typewriter […] When the banana 
feeding system was initiated in 1962-63, notes were spoken onto tape and transcribed 
nightly. This highly personal style was progressively broken apart, quantified, and 
standardized.139  
 
Interpretive flexibility occurs at the initial frontline of human and non-human animal encounters, 
the first stage within a broader model of knowledge production that influences all other stages 
that follow. The implication is that each observation is susceptible to subjectivity during this 
process, but positive outlooks of interpretive flexibility propose that this does not necessarily 
make them unusable. Uli Meyer and Ingo Schulz-Schaeffer propose that actually ‘the natural 
world plays only a small or no role in the construction of scientific knowledge […] The facts upon 
which scientific statements are based do not possess an inherent meaning. They have to be 
interpreted to become meaningful’.140 Meyer and Schulz-Schaeffer determine that interpretive 
flexibility primarily occurs when scientific observations and its resulting data cannot be explained 
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with recourse to undisputable knowledge, suggesting adaptability and deliberate application.141 
With non-human animals, this idea is doubly interesting as observations and the subsequent data 
interpreted often do not fit perfectly into an uncontested scientific truth. Some perceive little 
danger of interpretive flexibility in research on non-human animals in the wild, as Colin Allen and 
Marc Bekoff propose: ‘[i]f interpretationalism is a threat at all, it is a threat to all of cognitive 
science; it is of no special concern to cognitive ethology’.142   
 
These wider implications pertaining to interpretive flexibility mean that field-based non-
human animals study and its data seems far more ambiguous than the more demonstrable 
observations made in the laboratory. Therefore, as an empirical method of knowledge 
production, interpretive flexibility presents a number of particular epistemological challenges. 
Firstly, there is the inability to establish a consensus as to what constitutes “typical” primate 
behaviour. Yet conversely, the detrimental effects of more precise behavioural absolutism would 
only promote limitation, as interpretatively flexible approaches potentially benefit and increase 
chances for open-mindedness and genuine revelation. Goodall seems all too aware of both 
dangers in her employment the term meaningful, as it advocates the use multiple explanations 
for each isolated and observed behaviour without the promotion or disregarding of one 
explanation over others. As Goodall elaborates: ‘[chimpanzees] are such complex beings, their 
behaviour so flexible, their individuality so pronounced’.143  This is blatant a rejection of more 
definite empirical approaches: one correct and absolute behavioural explanation that can be 
totally isolated from all others to determine a definitive model.  
 
Indeed, Meyer and Schulz-Schaeffer claim that productive interpretative flexibility can 
greatly influence ongoing ‘future directions of scientific research’.144 If misused, processes of 
interpretive flexibility could then be regarded as a way by which to force the production of 
scientific data, as field-based research and the subsequent discussions and discourses it creates 
within scientific communities, tend to stagnate owing to the obligatory longevity of observation. 
This leads to what is deemed ‘infinite regress’; disputes are locked in a perpetual cycle of 
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discussion, interpretation and theorisation without progression or definitive conclusion.145 This 
consideration recognises the relative autonomy of the non-human animal subjects, as ethologists 
must wait ever-patiently for behavioural results not always particular to one specific behaviour, 
but perhaps several simultaneously. Consequentially, data extracted through field research 
struggles to completely isolate one possible behavioural explanation from another, as it never 
quite eliminates all confounding variables. As an empirical process, the scarcity of data and 
substantial results may manifest as external pressure to drive the continuation and, by 
association, the direction of research; the procurement of which is not necessarily genuinely 
revelatory.   
 
This concept is explored by Boyd in Brazzaville Beach, as Mallabar’s dominant paradigm 
regarding chimpanzee docility turns out to be only ever artificially encouraged by abundances of 
food. By accentuating the inauthenticity of results from Mallabar’s feeding station during the 
narrative, Boyd accentuates the legitimate practices of Hope’s observation. Conversely, Boyd 
implicates Hope’s observations of violence with a sense of genuine revelation and importance 
regarding behavioural truth, as Mallabar’s construction represents the abuse of the positive 
contributory potentials of interpretive flexibility. Certainly, Hope’s thinly veiled professional 
scepticism of Mallabar’s tactics is clear:  
 
All the noise came from the Artificial Feeding Area, and from the volume of pant-
hoots, barks and scream it sounded as if there were two dozen chimps scoffing 
Mallabar’s free bananas […] everybody else would be there […] half a dozen assistants, 
all observing and notating furiously. Ian Vail would be out in the field, I supposed; like 
me he was highly dubious about Mallabar’s celebrated toy.146 
 
Mallabar’s Artificial Feeding Area is not only symbolic of human encroachment on non-human 
animal habitats but exhibitions his abuse of the principles of interpretive flexibility. Observers and 
data gatherers at the artificial feeding area interpret the activities of the chimpanzees there as 
wholly natural and assume they are indifferent to the existence of the feeding device itself. 
Mallabar even instructs Hope at one stage to merely ‘[o]bserve and note. Leave the interpretation 
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to me’.147 Resultantly, readers view Mallabar’s process as compromising the data collected, 
published, and asserted as empirical truth, also highlighting the inherent risks and limitations of 
interpretive flexibility as a process by which to translate non-human animal behaviour.  
 
Boyd’s literary exploration into interpretive flexibility is at its most intricate during Hope’s 
own observations of chimpanzee violence. Pertaining to the individual researcher, Stanford 
introduces two key considerations involving the use of interpretive flexibility as a mode of 
knowledge production. The first is poignantly reminiscent of Haraway, in that ‘paradigm 
formation may itself be subject to social influences, because research biases lead one to collect 
some types of data rather than others at different stages of the research history of a topic’.148 And 
secondly, the impact of the individuals own subjectivity and environmental encouragements, as 
‘contextual biases may emerge from the circumstances in which the research is done. They 
represent the situating of ideas and interpretations of evidence in terms of perspective the 
researcher brings to the research’.149 Through the employment of narrative strategies, Boyd’s 
Brazzaville Beach is able to noncommittally explore both the positive and negative properties 
inherent to interpretive flexibility as a mode of knowledge production, beginning with the 
situational circumstance Hope finds herself in.   
 
Hope’s interpretive flexibility is reflective of her professional status at Grosso Avore as a 
marginal member of the community with little to no influence over matters regarding the 
direction of empirical enquiry nor data or publication outputs. Her low status is emphasized by 
her living situation: ‘at the camp’s northern extremity, was my hut […] a cross between a tent and 
a tin shack, a curious dwelling with canvas sides and a corrugated iron roof’.150 The placement of 
Hope’s at the periphery of the main camp is symbolic of her position as an outsider, or other, 
reaffirmed through the hybrid materiality of her hut. Hope is fully aware of her position, regarding 
it as ‘fitting that it should go to me, on the principle that the newest arrival should occupy the 
least permanent building’, and purports to be ‘indifferent to what it might say about my status’.151 
Hope’s position at Grosso Arvore is therefore reaffirmed within a pre-existing power structure; 
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tenuous and wholly expendable. Conversely, Hope’s arrival at the most recent point in the 
research history of Grosso Arvore frees her from Mallabar’s investigatory traditions, 
uncontaminated by a biased methodology that only ever looks to protect the dominant 
paradigms. The implication is that Hope is perhaps less likely to subconsciously interpret 
behavioural instances to correlate with current epistemological trends and therefore offering the 
potential for true behavioural insight. However, Hope’s implied liberal approaches do not 
necessitate greater empirical accuracy, as the subjective nature of interpretive flexibility 
guarantees some kind of interpretive distortion during the translational stage.  
 
Within these fictional considerations of interpretive flexibility and the specific empirical 
logics of field-based researches, Boyd considers what it is that contributes to make up the 
individual researcher. By presenting Hope’s broader life experience across the novel’s three 
narratives, Boyd can explore potential effects on her emotive personality, her scientific 
approaches, and especially her application of interpretive flexibility in the field. This is achieved 
by the installation of various dramatic parallels between Hope and the chimpanzees she observes 
at Grosso Arvore. As dramatic events in the novel progress, the similarities between Hope and 
her allocation of southern chimpanzees become more and more apparent in Boyd’s narrative 
strategy. These moments of emotive correspondence lead Hope to project her personal 
experiences and situation onto proceedings, colouring the behaviours of the chimpanzees in 
particular ways, such as Pulul’s instance of aggression as being motivationally equivalent to 
human understandings of deliberate cruelty.152 The denouement of Brazzaville Beach witnesses 
Hope being exiled from Grosso Arvore, providing her with the emotive catalyst for her 
catastrophic involvement in the fate of the chimpanzee group and her killing of the two, as she 
sees it, most deliberately violent chimpanzee males, Darius and Pulul.   
 
Preceding this moment in the novel, Hope’s interpretive flexibility in the field appears 
habitual, working to accommodate her propensity toward scientific empiricism whilst enhancing 
her own ability to understand non-human animal behaviour herself. Her liberal observational 
approach, in comparison to her compatriots, is immediately noticeable in her allocating names to 
her chimpanzee group instead of serial numbers as research traditions at Grosso Arvore 
otherwise dictates. The systems of serialisation are established during a tense encounter with 
Mallabar, who ‘smiled benignly at [Hope’s] error’ when she used the name Clovis instead of the 
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serial allocation: XNMI. On the surface, this seems a commentary on the failings of scientific 
endeavour to sterilize anthropomorphic tendencies as Pollock determines:  
 
In (academic) scientific publications, technical language and the formulaic 
organization of material are designed to safeguard scientific accuracy and – perhaps 
equally important – the appearance of accuracy. Many field scientists find that the 
form cramps their style because it is wholly predictable […] Remove the scientist from 
the professional environment (in person or in print), and she typically refers to her 
study animals in thoroughly human terms, acknowledging with humour and irony that 
speaking of them in any other way is virtually impossible.153 
 
Hope’s position on the social periphery at Grosso Arvore enables her utilisation of more informal 
encounter strategies that better familiarize and facilitate her understanding of chimpanzee 
behaviour. Goodall recalls that observational practice at Gombe was a procedure caught between 
‘the conflicting demands between [her] approach, which was holistic and individualist, and the 
protocols of academic science’.154 
 
Hope wholly disregards the dangers perceived by Mallabar in anthropomorphising the 
chimpanzees in an effort to better understand their individual characteristics and identify new 
behavioural occurrences, an informal indulgence shared by others at Grosso Arvore. During her 
investigatory observation of the aggressive northern chimpanzee group, Ian Vail originally 
identifies the alpha male as N4A. Hope then coaxes him, ‘[c]ome on. What’s his name?’ Vail 
eventually discloses that he actually refers to the male as Darius. This revelation is Boyd’s 
proposition that naming has an element of value as a method by which to conduct observational 
study. Rees highlights such techniques correlated with trends in the identification of non-human 
animals in late-twentieth century, as ‘[n]aming was a process fraught with meaning for some 
observers, while for others it was more commonplace’.155 Narratively, Boyd presents this mode 
of interpretive flexibility as permitting Hope a sense of better interspecies understanding. Non-
human animal individuals are understood in terms of their own behavioural traditions and social 
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tendencies toward others, ‘to link present behaviour with past and future – or in other words, to 
write the animals’ life histories […] as individuals became known, behaviourally and socially, so 
their current behaviour could be put in past context’.156  
 
 
Fictionalizing Historiographies of Science  
 
Like Hope in Brazzaville Beach, Goodall’s employment of historiographical vernacular in ‘the 
four-year war’ at Gombe is an intriguing application of interpretive flexibility. It licences events 
with a certain gravitas, a level of significance as a landmark moment within the broader 
chronology of chimpanzee behaviours.157 It is an inversion of human historiographical techniques 
used to better understand significant periods of history, a series of inter-group violent exchanges 
transferred into a manageable sequence of events, predominantly to better determine underlying 
motives and causalities. More importantly, historiographical vernacular is a narrative technique 
used to satisfy a human need to better understand the past, to quantify and qualify whole events 
retrospectively. The use of “war” presupposes a level of agency or consciousness on the part of 
participants, anticipating the roles of both aggressor and victim, or the victorious and the 
defeated, occurring within a period that has both a definitive beginning and an end. Indeed, 
Goodall’s observational prose is crowded with incentive-loaded vocabulary, notably during her 
account of the Kasakela group’s attack on Goliath, an older Kahama male:  
 
One of the students, Emilie, was present during the attack that led to Goliath’s death. 
What shocked her most was the terrifying rage and hostility of the five aggressors […] 
They were definitely trying to kill him […] Emilie followed the assailants back to the 
north and recorded their wild excitement. Repeatedly they drummed on tree trunks, 
hurled rocks, dragged and threw branches. And all the time they called out, as though 
in triumph.158 
 
Goodall’s accounts are filled with similarly charged descriptions that, knowingly or unknowingly, 
vilify the purposefulness of the aggressors and victimise the chimpanzees attacked. The 
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chimpanzees are therefore caught within a historical narrative orientating around a significant 
event, the significance of which being only ever defined as such by observers projecting human 
principles and systems of morality.  
 
Historiographical forms tend to insinuate a before and after, implying a sense of change or 
progression during the event and endowing a significance to events that are perhaps 
inappropriate to non-human animals. As mentioned, it also proposes a definitive end to events 
which is perhaps inappropriate to the ambiguous complexities of non-human animal behaviour; 
inferring unrelatedness to any subsequent events that occur afterward. Whether knowingly or 
not, Goodall bestows chimpanzee life with its own broader narrative history, a model of analysis 
unlike more scientific modes and a far more descriptive than analytical form of producing 
knowledge on non-human animal life. Crucially, it is a method by which Goodall can bypass issues 
of temporality, compartmentalising four-years of particularly violent chimpanzee behaviours into 
a more manageable outline for more effective reflection and translation to the public domain.  As 
a form of chimpanzee social history, these historizing narratives insist a sense of linear 
progression. They implicate a change from one state to another and a sense of anthropological 
distance encouraged by narrative elements of story, fable, or mythology implied within a 
synthetic cultural tradition. Rees highlights this narrative approach correlated with wider trends 
in cognitive ethology at the time, ‘since it was only in the context of those individual histories that 
the proximate and adaptive explanations for behaviour could be developed’.159 
 
Boyd offers a fictional reimagining of these same processes of scientific historicization. 
When Hope’s new knowledge on chimpanzee violence and cannibalism is eventually seized by 
Mallabar and incorporated into his existing model of knowledge, the pending publication also 
looks to consign the chimpanzees’ behaviour into the historiographical form: ‘[t]he war. The 
chimpanzee wars they’re calling them. The northern chimps – they’ve been systematically killing 
the southerners’.160 The historicization of chimpanzee behaviour works to dramatize events and 
provide the final motivation for Hope’s eventual tragic intervention. Indeed, Hope’s last act in 
Brazzaville Beach is to commit the violence between both chimpanzee groups to the past 
following her own potent act of violence and using similar historiographical devices in her own 
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understanding of events, announcing that ‘[t]he chimpanzee wars were over’.161 Although such a 
narrative strategy helps bring events in the novel to a conclusion, it conversely raises further 
questions regarding process of knowledge production. Do processes of historicization in scientific 
narratives consider knowledges produced during these episodes to be constantly active or one-
off irregularities within a broader species model of behavioural knowledge? Rees asserts that 
‘[w]hether observing individuals within groups or watching solitary animals, researchers showed 
animals acting with motivation and intent […] their histories had shaped their characters and 
present interactions’.162 
 
Whilst systems of historicization exist, they operate entirely differently within the empirical 
sciences, as Stanford observes, ‘[the] history of primatology has been composed of a series of 
new paradigms to explain accumulating new data. These often involve dichotomies that are 
shown later to be false’.163 The epistemological terrain of cognitive ethology is in a state of 
perpetual change, albeit very slowly, forever shifting to accommodate the new scientific 
discoveries and knowledge produced on non-human animal behaviours. It proposes a deviation 
from two fundamental principles of science that apply differently to cognitive ethological studies 
of non-human animals: refutation and conjecture. As previously discussed, field-based researches 
cannot challenge existing paradigms immediately, being reliant on revelatory behaviours 
displayed by the non-human animal subjects under observation. The environmental and social 
conditions of wild chimpanzees cannot be replicated by the repeatable modes of experimentation 
created in the laboratory and so ethologists depend on observations prescribed entirely by 
circumstance. In essence, the research direction, and broader empirical evolution of cognitive 
ethology, is dictated by the behaviour of non-human animal subjects, not those conducting the 
research. That is not to say that the principles of refutation and conjecture do not apply to 
cognitive ethology, as observations are translated, interpreted and theories of behavioural 
agency then argued for and against, but rather work differently in terms of temporal logics as 
dominant paradigms cannot be effectively contested until substantial evidence of a 
counterargument reveals itself.   
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Shifting Paradigms: Old Versus New Knowledges 
 
Boyd is clearly aware of these codes of conduct specific to cognitive ethology, as any new 
evidence only emerges gradually over time to eventually challenge dominant empirical trends. 
This epistemological characteristic is explored through the fictional personification of old and new 
knowledges, represented by Mallabar and Hope, respectively. Boyd draws heavily from scientific 
organisations of knowledge ownership and intellectual property rights, concepts developed ‘on 
exchanges between knowledgeable and consenting trading partners’, though opponents contend 
it has led to ‘issues of inequity that are inherent in the current system’.164 Such notions of 
ownership emphasize a contradiction within scientific idealism regarding openness, looking to 
produce knowledges that can be transferred to and used within the public domain, whilst also 
having ‘to facilitate scientific and economic benefit from innovation […] that it provides a fair and 
morally justifiable way of rewarding those who invest in the process of discovery and regulating 
access to these benefits’.165 Boyd accentuates these two determinations and repurposes them as 
the basis of the underlying frictions between Hope and Mallabar, both desiring ownership of and 
recognition for their discoveries. 
 
Mallabar’s outright denial and obstinacy regarding Hope’s observations of chimpanzee 
violence is markedly representative of the tensions that occur between old and new knowledges 
during processes of paradigm contention and displacement. Boyd creates narrative effects out of 
theses tensions, free from the temporal constraints that the operational scientific context would 
otherwise complicate, dramatizing the situation of there being ‘no laws of trespass in the world 
of science’.166 Establishing tensions narratively, Boyd accentuates the gravitas and potential of 
Hope’s preliminary discoveries as she recognises the potential reverberations of her new 
knowledge pertaining to violent chimpanzee behaviour:  
 
Alongside her alarm and her shock had been another sensation: excitement. She felt 
lucky, almost blessed. It was Hope Clearwater who was witnessing these extraordinary 
 
164 Catherine Rhodes and others, ‘The “ownership” of science’, Prometheus: Critical Studies in Innovation, 29 
(2011), 325-336 (p. 327).  
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events. What was taking place at Grosso Arvore was unparalleled, revelatory – no 
matter what explanation might be offered up later. And Hope was aware, from very 
early days, that there was every chance that it would be her name for ever associated 
with this new knowledge and understanding […] Hope was in thrall to a vision of the 
future in which her name glowed with lasting renown. She had to be very careful that 
she did not throw this opportunity away.167 
 
Hope intends to consciously initiate a shift away from current empirical trends to eventually form 
a new paradigm of her own and condemn the one displaced into redundancy. The passage pre-
empts the scientific procedures of refutation and conjecture that Hope must maintain in order to 
achieve recognition and success. It is the tensions that arise between these old and new 
knowledges that subsequently drive the following events of the novel, illustrating an ironic 
parallel between the capacities of both chimpanzees and humans for intraspecies violence.  
 
OId knowledge is represented by Mallabar and his long-established research traditions at 
Grosso Arvore, as well as the ‘scientific acclaim and increasing public renown […] [that] became 
genuine celebrityhood’.168 The development pathway of Grosso Arvore resonates clearly with 
Goodall’s research centre at Gombe; ‘from small beginnings to become one of the most dynamic 
field stations for the study of animal behaviour in the world’.169 Similarly, Grosso Arvore is born 
from Mallabar’s explicit intention to conduct ‘investigations into the society of wild chimpanzees’ 
through ‘scrupulous and original field studies’.170 Boyd bestows Mallabar with all the 
appurtenances expected of an illustrious individual, one exalted within the scientific discipline 
who also transcends into the public domain:  
 
When he published his first book, The Peaceful Primate, in 1960 […] television films 
and documentaries followed and Grosso Arvore, along with its telegenic founder, 
thrived and grew. Research grants multiplied, eager PhD students offered their 
services and government influence broke through the hitherto impenetrable barriers 
of red tape […] Then came the international success of Mallabar’s next book, Primate’s 
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Progress. Invitations, citations and honours followed; Mallabar became the recipient 
of a baker’s dozen of honorary doctorates […] chairs in Primatology were established 
in Berlin, Florida and New Mexico. Eugene Mallabar’s place in the annals of science 
and ethology was secure.171 
 
Mallabar’s two publications are representative of the active and long-reigning dominant paradigm 
concerning chimpanzee behaviour that Hope must eventually engage, contest, and eventually 
displace. The professional accolades Mallabar has consequentially collected not only accentuate 
the prestigious position within his discipline, but also reemphasize the relative professional 
security he enjoys. So established is Mallabar’s current empirical paradigm, that when Hope relays 
her hypothesis to her colleague Ian Vail, he instantly retorts ‘[b]ut it’s so odd. So out of the blue 
[…] it doesn’t fit the data’.172 The reader thus realises that chimpanzee behaviours at Grosso 
Arvore are fitted into a predetermined model of knowledge, entirely closed off to any new 
behavioural potentialities that should govern the composition of the model from the beginning. 
In essence, Mallabar’s model of knowledge is fixed, rather than fluid, and nonadaptive to 
instances of genuine revelation. In a narrative sense, this reiterates the magnitude of Hope’s 
empirical task, especially in comparison to her more unestablished position: ‘someone like you – 
I mean, a new arrival’.173 The rupture in the chimpanzee social group at Grosso Avore foreshadows 
the impending threat to Mallabar’s active empirical paradigm of primate behaviour that Hope 
comes to represent. The potentialities of these new knowledges are insinuated to have the same 
epistemological reverberations experienced throughout the field of primatology as Goodall’s 
initial observations of chimpanzee infanticide in the 1970s.  
 
Throughout Boyd’s narrative, old and new knowledges are signified by motifs relating to 
empirical design and scientific literature, the primary medium of scientific productions of 
knowledge of non-human animal life in the field. For example, Hope’s observations are always 
carried out with ‘analysis sheets ready […] field journals open’, documenting behaviours and 
collecting data.174 Later, the transcribing process commences, as she recalls ‘writing up my field 
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notes […] I described the day’s events precisely, and made no alterations to the data’.175 Certainly, 
every foray into Boyd’s fictional field is notably concluded by Hope always ‘writing up my field 
notes for the day’ back at camp.176 The narrative constantly reminds of the continuous scientific 
modes of knowledge production and their own resultant narratives, what Haraway describes as 
‘the act of fashioning, forming, or inventing’.177 These translational processes by which knowledge 
is captured when researching on non-human animals which, by simply having been written down, 
is then immediately converted into intellectual matter and property. Mallabar and Hope are both 
bound to these legitimized scientific literary modes of conduct; the epistemological medium by 
which to either defend old knowledge or promote and circulate new. These physical 
configurations of knowledge become dramatic devices through which Boyd can explore the 
transitional stages of knowledge production: from raw data into scientific materials that are then 
passed into the public domain. Through physical representation, both old and new knowledges 
move from conceptual oppositions to tangible objects to depict the tensions between them. 
These include assertions of authority, shifts in power, and issues of ownership during exchanges 
between Mallabar and Hope.  
 
In Brazzaville Beach, all empirical researches and the knowledges produced by them are 
signified through the motif of scientific literature. Mallabar’s two seminal publications, Vail’s 
paper on the sexual and social strategies of female chimpanzees, and Hope’s eventual article on 
infanticide and cannibalism are all representative of distinctly separate behavioural 
characteristics yet are interrelated within the model of knowledge on chimpanzee life. When 
Mallabar realises Hope’s discovery represents a very real and distinct threat to his research 
traditions and dominant paradigm on chimpanzee behaviours, he moves to quickly close down 
her avenues of legitimizing and circulating the new knowledge. Boyd dramatizes this tension to 
drive events in the novel, as Hope describes:  
 
Later, I walked back alone up the track to Grosso Arvore, hefting a thick bundle of daily 
field records under my arm […] I wasn’t entirely sure what I was going to do with all 
this data, to tell the truth, but it seemed to me clear that if Mallabar and Hauser 
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wanted my records destroyed, then it would be prudent for me to try and reproduce 
some copy of my own research.178 
 
As knowledges are symbolically contained within Hope’s scientific materials, Boyd can narratively 
represent increasing tensions by having characters actually possess the knowledges in a physical 
configuration.  
 
Later, Hope returns to discover her hut has been deliberately disturbed, her papers and 
journals having been read by an unnamed intruder. A few days later, her hut inexplicably burns 
down through insinuated foul play. The motif of her new knowledges turned to ‘[b]lack soaked 
lumps. Cinders […] All my field notes and journal’.179 During that time, Hope’s new knowledge is 
gone, ‘a year’s data gone up in smoke’, so bound are scientific methods of knowledge production 
to literary material form.180 Due to Hope’s relatively low position within the professional hierarchy 
of Grosso Arvore and wider scientific community, having none of the reputational influence or 
professional accolades as Mallabar, the new knowledge contained within her scientific materials 
poses the greatest threat to him. As Hope notes, in the eyes of her colleagues, ‘[e]ven the 
destruction of my field notes was of minor significance. My job at Grosso Arvore was no more 
than a watching brief; the main body of work at the project would be unaffected by the loss of 
my data’.181 A few pages on, Hope learns that her field assistant Joāo had kept copies of the 
observational field notes, and so the potentialities of the new knowledge are restored; with Hope 
declaring ‘[w]ell done, Joao […] We’re going to be famous’.182  
 
Frictions between Hope and Mallabar are not limited to indirect skirmishes, as Boyd 
orchestrates a number of direct and volatile engagements between two representatives of both 
knowledges to interact, discuss, and explore their motives. There is a blatant sociobiological 
parallelism between the tensions and volition between Hope and Mallabar and then between the 
chimpanzees, installed by Boyd to emphasize concepts of intra-group tribalism, territorialisation, 
and dominance that operate in both nature and, ironically, the empirical sciences. As the 
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instances of violence, cannibalism, and infanticide among the chimpanzees become recurrent, 
Hope goes to Mallabar a number of times with her emergent hypothesis. Boyd sets up power 
hierarchies during these exchanges, as Mallabar’s authoritative position allows him the gravitas 
of ‘the wise headmaster confronted by the difficult pupil’183 keen to warn Hope of the ‘potential 
damage of wild […] hasty theorizing’.184 Mallabar deems Hope’s verbal account of the first serious 
instance of chimpanzee violence, Rita-Lu and Rita-Mae’s killing and consumption of infant Bobo, 
as simply a ‘fantastical story’ and threatens ‘if you persist in these fabrications, if you repeat them 
to anyone outside this room, I will have to terminate your employment here, immediately’.185 
Later Mallabar directly intervenes to halt Hope’s process, stating ‘these allegations you’ve made 
are pure speculation. You are jumping to conclusions based on the patchiest data. Bad. Bad 
science, Hope […] You are wrong’.186 Mallabar’s utter rejection emphasizes the threat presented 
by Hope’s new knowledge regarding his current paradigm and scientific establishment. 
Narratively, Hope’s newfound knowledge embodies empirical truth, implicating Mallabar’s work 
to be mendacious as the current model of knowledge concerning chimpanzee behaviour. 
Mallabar thus becomes an unlawful obstacle in the way of legitimate epistemological progress, 
an outright rejection of the objectivism expected of scientific empiricism.  
 
In response, Hope commences the next phase of scientific knowledge production: the 
official publication. Boyd reemphasizes the medium and strict processes of scientific conduct, as 
Hope describes:  
 
I worked hard that night. By the time I went to bed I had most of my article drafted 
out. I was pleased with my title too: ‘Infanticide and cannibalism amongst the wild 
chimpanzees of the Grosso Arvore project’. The peaceful primate’s days were over.187 
 
The deliberate wordplay evoking Mallabar’s own publication here is a dramatic reimagining of the 
processes concerning paradigm contestation and displacement within the empirical sciences. As 
Hope sculpts these new knowledges into an official publication, it becomes legitimised by 
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narrative practices determined to be inherent to scientific conduct, ready to be transferred to and 
circulated amongst the scientific community and then potentially the public domain. Mallabar’s 
supposed conviction in his own materials is eventually revealed to be total denial of any other 
behavioural possibilities, deluded by his belief that ‘I know more about chimpanzees than any 
living person, more than any person in the history of mankind’.188 His incessant self-adulation 
culminates in a physical assault on Hope toward the end of the novel. Right to the last, Mallabar 
still refuses to acknowledge legitimate observations of chimpanzee violence and cannibalism, as 
he accuses Hope: ‘[i]t’s you. It’s something you’ve done to them […] WHAT HAVE YOU DONE?’.189  
 
Significantly, the same terms of epistemological engagement play a crucial role in Hope’s 
eventual failure to circulate the new knowledge and claim ownership over it. After fleeing 
Mallabar’s violent attack, Hope is consequently held captive by a paramilitary group for a time. 
Upon her release and eventual return, Hope is presented with her original contract of 
employment:  
 
I read it. I had to smile. All publications, its gist ran, based on original research carried 
out at Grosso Arvore, were the copyright of the Grosso Arvore Foundation, unless 
alternative permission were given. All data gathered was similarly protected and had 
to be surrendered to the Foundation for its archives on terminations of 
employment.190  
 
Hope’s absence allows Mallabar enough time to employ the legislative protections available to 
him resultant of his authoritative position and reputation, a characteristic particular to scientific 
systems of knowledge production and ownership. Hope is removed from the empirical 
environment of Grosso Arvore; a space with legal indemnification that authorises the productions 
of knowledge as well as the way they are then utilised. Through her expulsion, Hope loses 
ownership of her original knowledges and her access to the epistemological processes by which 
to produce, develop, and distribute them and potentially others. Notably, the projected impact 
of the new knowledges on chimpanzee violence and cannibalism remains unchanged, eventually 
incorporated by Mallabar into his work; as Hauser informs Hope: ‘Everything’s changed. The 
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book’s postponed. The feeding area’s been closed down […] The war. The chimpanzee wars 





This chapter has analysed the ways in which Brazzaville Beach fictionally represents field-
based scientific practices as a critique of its operational epistemological logics that ultimately 
dictate the kinds of knowledges produced on non-human animal life. Focusing particularly on the 
logics of temporality, scientific modes of temporal control applied to the natural environment, 
and the influence of interpretive flexibility, the chapter argues that literary strategies available to 
contemporary authors can effectively navigate, present, and accentuate working epistemological 
logics to consider their influence on the experience of both the non-human animal and human 
researcher and the interspecies encounters engendered within the setting. Such an analytical 
approach has the great potential to reconsider the non-human animal throughout field-based 
practices more broadly and to prompt a re-examination of scientific, humanist language-based 
methods of observation, translation, representation, and misrepresentation, as the best way to 
produce knowledge concerning non-human animal life in this situation. The thesis now moves to 
consider contemporary literary representations of the scientific laboratory setting, to examine 
whether specific epistemological logics that shape non-human animal experiences there can be 














‘Through the bars’: Literary Reconfigurations  




The entire facility was designed to make it easier for the workers to have access to 
the chimps’ blood. Sterile-gowned technicians came around on schedule to inject the 
chimps with hepatitis B vaccine, or to challenge the vaccine with live hepatitis virus, 
or to draw their blood to see whether the vaccine was effective. The chimps did not 
stop signing, though the technicians didn’t understand them. We heard from visitors 
that Booee, Bruno, Nim, Ally and others kept asking the techs in ASL for food, drinks, 
cigarettes and the keys to their cages.  




The history of the non-human laboratory animal correlates with that of both the human 
empirical sciences and the laboratory space. However tenuous, the physiological, pathological, 
and psychological similarities between humans and non-human animal species ensures their 
consistent use as explorative vehicles in the construction of cognitive and biological models, often 
in order to better understand corresponding human systems. Non-human animals are ubiquitous 
within the broad and extensive history of human medicine; ever-present in its development from 
the time of classical antiquity to modern-day practices.193 More recently, a large proportion of 
non-human animals have found themselves utilised within biomedical researches, burdened with 
the promissory future of securing health benefits for human society. During the mid-twentieth 
century, non-human animals were taken into the laboratory space to assist in the development 
of psychology. The sub-fields of cognitive ethology and comparative psychology were born; the 
former is an exploration of natural non-human animal behaviour and the latter an extension of 
human psychology that identifies and compares correspondent evolutionary developments, such 
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as cognitive learning, in non-human animal cognition.194 The modern laboratory provided these 
sub-divisions of the empirical sciences with an autonomous environment in which to conduct 
these experimentations on non-human animal life; it is a space regulated and protected by 
humanist conceptualisations of scientific idealism. 
  
The scientific basis of this chapter will concentrate on a significant episode in the history of 
the non-human animal in the laboratory space, evidenced in the extract of Roger Fouts’ Next of 
Kin: the utilisation of primates during mid-twentieth century cognition and biomedical 
experimentations. In an official scientific capacity, primate research subjects have existed since 
1930 and the founding of the Yerkes National Primate Research Centre in Atlanta, U.S. under 
comparative psychologist Robert Yerkes. He established the first large-scale laboratory-based 
studies of primate intelligence and learning capabilities, including group social behaviours, 
individual learning and sensory capacities.195 Yerkes’ studies were symptomatic of a wider 
scientific movement, a human fascination with primate cognition and their potential to illuminate 
the pathways of our own evolutionary development.196 Catalysed by post-war technological 
breakthroughs in medicine and the global HIV/AIDS epidemic of the late twentieth century, 
chimpanzees became the obvious biological model against which to test pathological hypotheses 
and potential treatments. Only recently have these genetic similarities been challenged as 
providing an accurate biological framework for improving human health.197 In terms of 
chimpanzee populations in the empirical sciences, due to population restrictions determined by 
issues of availability and financial cost, there has been historically an interexchange of non-human 
animal subjects between cognitive and biomedical fields; both permanently situated within the 
laboratory space. The result has been a chimpanzee population continuously subjected to physical 
and psychological experimentation for decades, the psychiatric ramifications of which are only 
just being realised by those both in and outside of the empirical sciences.198 
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The ultimate purpose of this chapter is to examine the way in which fictional literary 
strategies can offer effective re-evaluations of the investigative systems employed within the 
modern laboratory environment using two examples of contemporary fiction: Colin McAdam’s A 
Beautiful Truth and Karen Joy Fowler’s We Are All Completely Beside Ourselves. With this key 
objective in mind, the chapter maps out five different ways in which fiction can undermine and 
complicate the epistemological logics of the laboratory setting that uses non-human animals. 
Firstly, how contemporary literature depicts and negotiates around systems of autonomy that 
present the laboratory as an isolationist construction being spaces hermetically sealed off from 
the social world. Then how these same strategies that open up the laboratory space navigate 
around the logics of scientific empirical investigation to reconsider the broader non-human 
animal experience, otherwise never acknowledged by scientific practice. Thirdly, to highlight 
advantages of literary strategy in contextualising current empirical paradigms and methodological 
practices within a broader historiography of laboratory practice in order to challenge 
conceptualisations of total scientific objectivity and the wider implications this has on non-human 
animal experience. Fourthly, how fiction can help to expose and critique scientific systems of 
visibility and invisibility pertaining to the use of non-human animals in the laboratory space, and 
the ethical and moral issues that these complicate. And lastly, how fiction encourages a sense of 
constructive scepticism regarding scientific exaltations of particular modes of knowledge 
production that in turn create particular kinds of knowledge. This final enquiry focuses on 
scientific employments of human language, specifically the scientific vernacular, as the primary 
form through which to capture and relay the complexities of non-human animal life and how 
these two fictions propose other modes of communication can facilitate different kinds of 
valuable encounter and exchange between humans and non-human animals within the 
laboratory. To effectively examine these characteristics of the laboratory as both a physical and 
conceptualised space, this chapter takes from and applies Bruno Latour’s theoretical approaches 
to critique epistemological procedures and practices to isolate key queries and conceptual 
oppositions to weigh against textual examples identified within the literature. For now, 
considerations of the laboratory will focus predominantly on broader, more general 
epistemological features, as more detailed enquiries into explicit modes of scientific empiricism 
are reserved for Chapters Three and Four.  
 
Latour’s sociological studies of the laboratory environment determine that empirical 
science is fundamentally the same as any other social process, practice or activity. Latour’s 
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revolutionary approach offers a framework against which to consider the deliberate construction 
of scientific facts within the laboratory space, and is so used throughout this chapter. Michel 
Foucault’s excavations into the epistemological origins of the human sciences in his seminal work 
The Order of Things will also ensure scientific empirical research is regarded as a part of a 
historiography of science with its own underlying, socially constructed epistemological 
foundations that determine the nature and direction of scientific investigation. Featured later in 
the chapter, Foucauldian theory offers valuable deconstructions of the institutionalised space 
which in turn contribute to understandings of the nature of laboratories in late-twentieth century 
America. These two theoretical approaches offer a reinterpretation of the laboratory 
complementary and conducive to the main objectives of the chapter, the interdisciplinary 
ambitions of which necessitate the need to, in places, delineate the history and characteristics of 
scientific movements to extricate and assimilate valuable considerations. This in turn will help 
examine the ways in which literary efforts articulate these same epistemological features of 
knowledge production concerning non-human animal life in the laboratory setting and broader 
implications of animal ethics.  
 
 
Introducing the Fictional Texts 
 
In relation to the key investigative aims of the chapter, this section has two objectives. 
Firstly, to introduce Colin McAdam’s A Beautiful Truth and Karen Joy Fowler’s We Are All 
Completely Beside Ourselves. These introductions will include an outline of the key 
epistemological logics of the laboratory space that each text is interested in exploring, as well as 
a summary of each novel’s narrative in order to better identify the non-human animal presences 
that feature. Secondly, to provide an initial overview of how the authors look to draw attention 
to the epistemological contestations at work within the laboratory space as an environment that 
produces knowledges on non-human animal life. Advantageous to this second objective are the 
auxiliary works of Laura Jean McKay and Matthew Calarco into notions of otherness and 
limitations of language as an empirical measurement of non-human animal intelligences, 
respectively. Catherine Parry’s examinations into the limitations of the scientific vernacular by 
which to record, translate, and then document non-human animal capacities will also feature. The 
critical approaches of McKay, Calarco, and Parry provide a set of initial approaches by which to 
consider key thematics in McAdam and Fowler’s texts, forming a framework against which to 
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consider the implications of those thematics, and others identified by omission, specific to the 
laboratory setting.  
 
 
Colin McAdam’s A Beautiful Truth  
 
A Beautiful Truth offers a fictional reconsideration of two spaces that have played host to 
human and non-human animal encounters: the domestic and laboratory. Whilst the domestic 
space is not the investigative focus of this chapter, it must be acknowledged as fictional 
reconstructions feature throughout both novels. More significantly, comparisons between the 
two settings offer fictional authors a literary strategy by which to conversely identify and 
accentuate conceptual oppositions within the laboratory space by moving non-human animals 
between the operative logics of the domestic and laboratory settings. By showing the domestic 
setting, it is impossible not to read the non-human animal in the fictional institutionalised space 
of the laboratory against the affective potentials experienced during their time in the domestic 
space and the valuable comparisons it engenders. A Beautiful Truth works to influence our 
understanding of laboratory-based research on non-human animals by considering the wider life 
experience of both the researcher and non-human animal subject by setting it against the 
epistemological logics of the empirical laboratory setting and the interspecies encounters 
engendered there. McAdam is particularly interested in issues of temporality, scientific 
idealisations of the laboratory as a constructed conceptual and physical space, and dogmatic 
empirical practices that produce particular kinds of knowledges concerning non-human animals 
in particular kinds of ways. 
 
McKay considers how A Beautiful Truth looks to navigate issues of otherness in human-non-
human animal relationships, exploring notions of territorialisation in the domestic environment, 
buoyed by the conceptualised approaches of the human and non-human divide by theorists that 
include Margot Norris, Donna Haraway and Val Plumwood. 199 These supplementary approaches 
are introduced to ‘allow a discussion of novels that challenge the human/animal binary, and 
reveal what interspecies relationships may look like when the binary is destabilised, reversed or 
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eradicated’.200 McKay delineates the domestic space as ‘marked out as home by humans and 
other animals’, expanding the notion of territory to include physical bodies.201 McKay recognises 
the aptitude of literary fiction to reimagine the domestic setting as ‘a space that is shared, 
transgressed and disputed by humans and other animals […] […] where animal minds are 
imagined into human worlds and vice versa’.202 McKay continues to explore domestic territories 
in A Beautiful Truth as a conceptualised space that accommodate reconsiderations of agency, the 
deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation of bodies, as well as the broader implications on 
physical space within the overarching framework of theoretical approaches to notions of 
otherness.  
 
Conversely, McAdam’s representation of the laboratory space is one ‘that takes human 
territorialisation to a level where other bodies are […] resources to be owned, manipulated and 
discarded’.203 During the novel, Looee, a male chimpanzee adopted by a human surrogate family, 
is incarcerated into a U.S. biomedical facility during the mid-1970s. As McKay describes, he is 
‘confronted with the horror of his own otherness: he sees the chimpanzee as he himself has been 
seen by humans, and the horror is almost insurmountable’.204 Looee’s struggles symbolize what 
McKay deems to be a ‘challenge to the notion of de- and reterritorialization’: the change from 
one environmental logic to another.205 McKay’s ensuing considerations focus on the invasive 
procedures made upon Looee’s physical body and psychological situation, actions predetermined 
and justified against his otherness. She focuses predominantly on the psychological fallout of his 
human cohabitation and upbringing, being ‘unable to rectify his human experiences with his 
nonhuman physicality […] his animal companions with his human memories’.206 Therefore, in 
McKay’s examination, the laboratory is only ever considered as secondary to the domestic space, 
implicated by Looee’s past and memories made there. Although McKay’s analytical concern is to 
explore McAdam’s fictional representations of the domestic space, she conversely raises an 
intriguing proposition regarding the laboratory space. How can fictional strategies offer a way by 
 
200 Ibid., p. 235. 
201 Ibid., p. 233. 
202 Ibid. 
203 Ibid., p. 251. 
204 Ibid., p. 243. 
205 Ibid., p. 245.  
206 Ibid., p. 248. 
84 
 
which to explore the potentialities of human and non-human animal encounters within this 
empirical environment?  
 
Published in 2013, A Beautiful Truth alternates between two central narratives based in 
these two narrative settings: an interspecies cohabitation study in the domestic home and the 
scientific laboratory. The principal narrative orientates around Looee, an adolescent male 
chimpanzee, who is adopted by a human couple, Judy and Walt Ribke, and the relationship 
between them. The novel offers the narrative perspectives of Looee, Judy and Walt, and features 
differing interpretations of events and interactions during their period of inter-species co-
habitation during the 1970s in rural Addison County, Vermont. The second narrative concerns the 
non-human animal inhabitants and their human researcher at a laboratory conducting biomedical 
and language studies based in Florida, named the Girdish Institute. This narrative is halved, on 
one hand exploring the social relationships within of a community of chimpanzees under 
ethological observation – Ghoul, Mama, Podo, Fifi, Jonathan, Magda, Rosie, Billie and Burke – and 
on the other the studies and introspective reflections of head cognitive ethologist, David Kennedy. 
The novel’s inciting incident revolves around an act of severe violence on the part of Looee, who 
afterwards finds himself in the laboratories of the Girdish Institute. The merging of these two 
narrative threads sees Looee become the subject of biomedical experimentation, though later 
reduced to behavioural observations, and housed with other chimpanzees for the first time in his 
life.  
 
McAdam sets the novel during the chimpanzee cognition sign-language and cohabitation 
studies of the 1960s and 1970s, which also coincided with the dominance of biomedical 
experimentation on primates during extensive AIDS and HIV biomedical researches of the 
1980s.207 Looee’s narrative sequence is recognisable in the life histories of many actual 
incarcerated chimpanzees; subjected to constant invasive biomedical experimentation for years 
after cognition studies were determined to have failed. McAdam does not offer what could be 
considered to be a satisfying denouement at the end of the novel, as Looee never escapes the 
empirical environment of David’s research facility. Instead, he leaves readers to contemplate the 
 





ethical implications of the utilization, treatment, and artificiality of non-human animal existence 
in the scientific laboratory setting. 
 
 
Karen Joy Fowler’s We Are All Completely Beside Ourselves  
 
Karen Joy Fowler offers an alternate fictional laboratory space by which to reconsider the 
potentialities of human and non-human animal encounters that occur there. Like McAdam’s 
novel, We Are All Completely Beside Ourselves is predominantly interested in epistemological 
logics concerning issues of temporality and the empirical laboratory as a conceptually and 
physically delineated space, as well as the situational circumstances this then places them into. 
Additionally, Fowler also offers an investigation into scientific adulations of language as the 
benchmark by which human regard and treatment of non-human animals are determined within 
the laboratory, and the types of human and non-human animal encounter this engenders. In 
terms of how We Are All Completely Beside Ourselves affects our understanding of laboratory-
based science, Fowler enforces a reflection of laboratory practices and procedures through a 
distinct blurring of human and non-human animal species lines through the cohabitational 
upbringing of a human child and chimpanzee infant in the narrative and then by placing the 
chimpanzee within the epistemological logics of the laboratory setting later. These empirical 
practices can then be seen within the broader context of this shared upbringing to consider the 
role of memory and the situational circumstance that the laboratory space places non-human 
animals into.  
 
Calarco explores the notions of indistinction and radical alterity.208 He begins by establishing 
the exaltation of language as the way by which to attain ‘full admission to the human community’ 
through a close analysis of Franz Kafka’s A Report to an Academy, extracts of which preface the 
prologue and the six parts of Fowler’s text.209 Presenting Kafka’s work as ‘a challenge to its readers 
to rethink the limitations of human language as well as the structures and processes through 
which becoming human takes place’, Calarco resumes to offer an interpretation of Fowler’s novel 
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as ‘one possible and provisional response’ to such a challenge.210 Calarco argues that We Are All 
Completely Beside Ourselves questions the fundamental scientific idea that although language has 
‘long served as the definitive marker of human specificity and uniqueness’, it actually threatens 
to ‘miss all of the various capacities and possibilities that animals have and that, by contrast, 
human beings might lack [..] [and how] language fails to measure up to the richness and difficulty 
of reality’.211 Calarco scrutinises the way in which the anthropocentric approaches of scientific 
empiricism maintain language as the benchmark against which to define boundaries of alterity or 
otherness. Borrowing from the philosophical approaches of Jacques Derrida and Friedrich 
Nietzche to renegotiate these terms by which language signals human propriety, Calarco offers 
that ‘human language has no clear or privileged access to truth’.212 Referring to specific instances 
in the novel, Calarco presents an argument for greater indistinction between human and non-
human animals and a recalibration of those relationships, concluding that ‘indistinction opens us 
onto a realm of fundamentality unknowable and anticipatable relations and possibilities’.213 This 
reverberates potently with Fowler’s proposition in the novel ‘to start from a place of congruence’ 
from which to renegotiate the human and non-human animal relationship.214 
 
Conceding that current anthropocentric parameters run into ‘domains well beyond the 
boundaries of scientific inquiry’, Calarco proposes that the ideological root of the human/non-
human divide are nevertheless greatly influenced by scientific outputs, and that ‘when those 
ideological coordinates are called into question, the injustice of the established order is brought 
to the fore’.215 Fowler’s Fern is a female chimpanzee removed from her surrogate family to a 
biomedical facility, occupying the laboratory found at the epicentre of Calarco’s ideological 
coordinates in the novel. Dissimilarly to McAdam, Fowler’s domestic space is one with empirical 
undertones, as Fern is there as part of a cognitive development experiment. Upon admission to 
the laboratory space, Calarco notes ‘once [Fern] enters the world of the laboratory she is taught 
which side of the distinction she belongs to with brute force: she is literally caged by her human 
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handlers […] all in the name of becoming an object of research’.216 Similarly to McKay, Calarco 
observes the ethical and psychological implications of moving Fern, raised in tandem with Rose 
her human surrogate sister, into a space ideologically independent that ‘effectively rendered 
Fern’s body and life commodifiable and sacrificeable’.217  
 
Significantly, Calarco observes the way in which Fowler offers an interpretation of the 
laboratory space, and ‘the ways in which human-animal relations get recoded and 
reterritorialized by the established order’.218 Calarco’s established order pertains to the 
intellectual sovereignty of scientific empiricism and its ultimate dictation of human and non-
human animal relations more broadly. Poignantly, and beneficially to the investigative aims of 
this chapter, Calarco continues:  
 
What is thought-provoking about Fowler’s novel, though, is that her characters’ affects 
and sense of responsibility for animals do not stop at these standard and recognizable 
familial borders […] [w]hat is likely more difficult for some readers to absorb is how such 
relationships can cause affects, passions, and identifications with animals to spread 
beyond those limits.219 
 
Comparable to McKay’s observations of human-non-human animal relations in the domestic 
space, Calarco incites a deliberation of the ways that fictional representations can extrapolate 
similar considerations of the laboratory space. Equally, Calarco’s considerations catalyse 
intriguing considerations of the same approaches of the fictional laboratory. What are the 
standard and recognizable borders or limits of these human and non-human animal encounters 
within the laboratory, and do the same manifestations of affect and identification exist there? 
How can reconstructions of the laboratory in literary fiction offer original and interesting ways of 
thinking about these human and non-human relationships? 
 
Catherine Parry considers the ability of We Are All Completely Beside Ourselves to both 
question and reconsider anthropocentric approaches to the human and non-human animal 
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relationship in ‘The Sameness and Difference of Apes’.220 Similarly to Calarco, Parry regards 
Fowler’s novel as querying the exaltation of language, and that ‘the quality of cognition and 
distinctively rich mode of engagement with the world it is taken to imply […] is the traditional way 
of defining ethical obligations to animals’.221 Parry offers an intriguing reconsideration of a 
linguistic development test, disguised as a game, that Rose and Fern play under behavioural 
observation during infancy. Parry proposes this game ‘evokes the history of similitude and 
exclusion in human-ape relations […] destabilising assumptions about what humans think they 
and chimpanzees really are’.222 Conversely, Parry outlines the scientific, methodological 
particulars of such a test, noting ‘[t]he rules [Fern] must play by strictly prescribe her answers […] 
Fern’s rule-bound game (among other problems in its design and assumptions) does not search 
for the workings of her imagination […] [it] ignores the unknowability of what it enquires into’.223 
Although this specific example of cognitive testing occurs in the domestic space, Parry 
inadvertently questions the fundamental policies and practices of broader scientific investigation 
regarding the non-human animal. Her considerations solicit further key questions: can fictional 
representations of the laboratory space offer a similar review of the practices it maintains on 
human and non-human animal encounters? Do literary reconstructions of the laboratory provide 
an opportunity to find value in moments that can legitimately contribute to discussions of human-
non-human animal relations? Can fictional reconsiderations of the laboratory space and its 
practices help further elaborate on, what Parry deems to be, ‘the limit humans have erected 
between themselves and apes’, and excavate examples of human-non-human animal interaction 
missed by these processes?  
 
We Are All Completely Beside Ourselves shares many of the same thematic characteristics, 
background material and influences as McAdam’s novel. The opening exposition finds the 
protagonist-narrator, Rosemary Cooke, struggling to deal with the familial fallout of a failed co-
habitation experiment conducted by her father during the 1970s. By beginning in media res, 
Fowler encourages readers to ground themselves in Rose’s recollection of her co-species 
upbringing and its effect on characters up to the narrative present of 1996. Rose’s narrative thus 
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orientates around and is defined by her relationship with Fern, the resultant abandonment of her 
older brother Lowell, and emotional alienation from her parents. Rose struggles to establish her 
own sense of identity following Fern’s forced ejection from the family dynamic, the catalyst of 
which is a violent incident on the part of Fern. Rose refuses to frame her experiences and 
relationships with Fern as simply the methodological design of her father’s behavioural study, 
with the developmental ramifications blatantly apparent throughout. Indeed, Fowler portrays 
Rose as someone half of a whole; her mannerisms are punctuated with those of Fern to form a 
fusion of multi-specie socio-interactive characteristics consisting of vocal, sign, and touch 
communications that emit from their inter-species upbringing. Rose considers her identity 
trapped somewhere between two worlds as other, struggling to completely interact and immerse 
herself in human society due to emotive and behavioural reverberations of her childhood with 
Fern and befriending other individuals who occupy the same social periphery. After reuniting with 
Lowell, who now operates within the Animal Liberation Front, Rose learns that Fern has spent the 
intervening years in and out of various biomedical laboratories throughout the country.  
 
The critical approaches of McKay, Calarco, and Parry valuably address specific conceptual 
problematics of otherness, territorialisation, and the inherent anthropocentrism of scientific 
approaches, such as the utilization of language, that predetermine the relative limitation of 
knowledges concerning non-human animals produced in the laboratory space. However, their 
considerations do not elaborate on how human and non-human relations and encounters are 
constructed and then operate within the laboratory specifically, determined by epistemological 
characteristics fundamental to this particular empirical setting and congenital idealisations of the 
laboratory as a conceptual and physical space. More explicitly, they do not fully consider the 
nature of human and non-human animal encounters occurring under the specific operational 
empirical logics of the laboratory space. Therefore, to return to the key investigative aims of this 
chapter and effectually facilitate such considerations, the useful theoretical approaches of Bruno 
Latour will be employed and outlined in the following section. As such, Latour’s deconstructive 
approach will offer the methodological framework by which to analyse fictional depictions of the 
laboratory space by McAdam and Fowler and the experiences of the non-human animal situated 
within the physical space as well as the empirical systems of knowledge production that operate 





Into the Laboratory with Bruno Latour’s Laboratory Life 
 
This section introduces Bruno Latour’s theoretical approaches to the laboratory setting that 
will be borrowed from to analyse the conceptualised scientific ideal of “the laboratory” and 
isolate key epistemological features. These can then be more directly compared against literary 
instances that look to reconsider these same empirical mechanisms. Latour’s Laboratory Life: The 
Construction of Scientific Facts, co-written with Steve Woolgar, offers one such conceptualised 
approach. Latour is a preeminent figure in the field of science and technology studies, an 
amalgamation of anthropological, philosophical, and sociological approaches that looks to 
critically examine and reconsider the empirical sciences. Latour’s seminal works have influenced 
the critical approaches of others such as Donna Haraway, Vinciane Despret and Jane Bennett, all 
of whom feature throughout this thesis. Published in 1979, Laboratory Life is a comprehensive 
study pertaining to the material laboratory space and the technologies that enable extractions of 
truth and the production of knowledges. Intriguingly, the anthropological quality to Laboratory 
Life carries all the hallmarks of an ethological study conducted in the field, accentuating a sense 
of distance that emphasizes Latour’s blatant scepticism of the epistemological foundation and 
cultures of both the sciences and the scientist. Crucially, Latour’s approaches present a useful 
overview and breakdown of empirical processes, beneficial to the broader aims of this chapter to 
analyse literary reconstructions of these same procedures.  
 
Laboratory Life is based on Latour’s own first-hand observations of the daily routine and 
empirical activities of the Salk Institute in San Diego, U.S. Reminiscent of the fictional instances of 
Shelley, Hawthorne and Wells, Latour’s anthropological vernacular conveys an image of the 
laboratory as existent apart from the social world; a space to be visited and observed with its own 
dialects and customs. Upon first admittance to the laboratory, Latour offers this consideration:  
 
When an anthropological observer enters the field, one of his most fundamental 
preconceptions is that he might eventually be able to make sense of the observations 
and notes which he records […] No matter how confused or absurd the circumstances 
and activities of his tribe might appear, the ideal observer retains his faith that some 
kind of systematic, ordered account is attainable. For a total newcomer to the 
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laboratory, we can imagine that his first encounter with his subjects would severely 
jeopardise such faith.224 
 
Latour’s introductory overview underlines that each laboratory differs from one to another, 
despite the scientific ideal of centralising methodologies and empirical practices. He proposes 
that his choice of anthropological narrative is actually ‘intended to dissolve rather than reaffirm 
the exoticism with which science is sometimes associated’.225 Latour acknowledges the limitations 
of interpreting a devoutly empirical space through such a narrative, but argues that whilst ‘the 
notion of a total newcomer is unrealisable in practice […] [a] description of science cast entirely 
in terms used by scientists would be incomprehensible to outsiders’.226 By transforming the 
laboratory space into a working social system of knowledge production, Latourian theory offers 
this chapter the design by which to observe human researchers, non-human animal research 
subjects, technologies, discourses and spaces within an interactive framework, concurrently 
separate from and connected to one another within this unique environment.  
 
Latour’s first contribution to the investigative focus of this chapter is in drawing attention 
to the significance of laboratorial activities that are not documented, alluding to the selectivity of 
scientific materials and outputs emitted from the empirical space. Latour’s chief observation is 
that he is ‘confronted with a strange tribe who spend the greatest part of their day coding, 
marking, altering, correcting, reading and writing’.227 Latour considers the implications of these 
modal forms of knowledge production, noting that ‘[t]he construction of facts depends critically 
on these microprocesses’.228 The human and non-human animal encounters engendered during 
the scientific process are completely dominated by the process: shaped, constructed, and 
determined by the experiment at hand where agencies and potentials of encounter are heavily 
scripted. Latour questions: ‘[w]hat then is the significance of those activities which are apparently 
not related to the marking, writing, coding and correcting?’.229 This approach broadens our initial 
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overview of laboratory activities to include other forms of human and non-human animal 
encounters, not just those explicit to the empirical investigation at hand. It helps to identify a 
variety of potential interspecies interactions that are not so heavily influenced by the same 
empirical logics present during investigations. Latour’s approach conversely implicates a more 
comprehensive picture of the laboratory space that can reconsider the broader experience and 
encounter between humans and non-human animals outside the laboratory’s operational hours 
or allocated time of a study. Whilst data is recorded, Latour observes that ‘[i]n the meantime 
animals have been killed and various materials such as ether, cotton, pipettes, syringes, and tubes 
have been used’.230 Latour reprioritises attention to include these other accompanying processes 
that are not documented in the scientific data or resultant literary outputs. These other activities 
will never exist outside of the laboratory space, as they are not the hypothetical or methodological 
phenomenon under investigation, simply the operational means by which reach a final empirical 
objective. Through his conceptualised approach, Latour offers a valuable reconsideration of 
laboratory activities to include all moments of interaction between humans and non-human 
animals outside the empirical process. The resultant implication is that literary fiction can rely on 
a similar approach, painting a comprehensive a picture of the laboratory space that encapsulates 
the entire non-human animal experience away from empirical logics specific to experimentation.  
 
In order to effectively consider the potentialities of these other activities, it is reasonable to 
divide them into two sub-sections: those occurring inside and outside empirical processes of 
knowledge production involving non-human animal participation. Latour’s approaches can be 
more effectively applied in relation to these different moments of human and non-human animal 
interaction and encounter. As will be demonstrated, fictional strategies can navigate around these 
empirical investigations in which scientific data and results are then produced, during which 
broader non-human animal existences are never acknowledged. Instead, literary fiction can 
reconstruct the experiences of non-human animals outside the duration of any laboratory 
research study; fragments of their true experience are only ever glimpsed at through scientific 
vernacular and literary outputs. Several scientific documents all concerning the same group of 
non-human animal subjects, though each pertaining to a different study, would not represent an 
effective impression of non-human animal life in the laboratory space. How then can fictional 
strategies paint a more comprehensive picture of non-human animal life in the laboratory space 





Empirical Cultures: Narrative Strategies of McAdam and Fowler 
 
Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein, Nathaniel Hawthorne’s The Birth-Mark, and H. G. Wells’ The 
Island of Doctor Moreau exhibit how canonical literature addresses the laboratory as both a 
physical and conceptual space, evidencing that visions of the laboratory as a reserved space are 
not new. These literary traditions of representing the laboratory will be briefly outlined in order 
to help frame the literary contributions of McAdam and Fowler; contemporary novels that are 
also interested in how the scientific laboratory constructs itself as hermetically sealed off and 
separate from the world. Historically, writers have represented the laboratory as a space to be 
visited but never fully comprehended, endowing their reconstructions with a sense of exclusivity 
and anthropological exoticism. Often, laboratory systems of autonomy are seen to become 
diluted upon intrusion by external bodies and result in dissolutions of power and scientific 
sovereignty.  
 
Published in 1818, Shelley’s Frankenstein paints the laboratory as a reserved space, away 
from the public domain and independent of the parameters of social conscience. Frankenstein’s 
unconstrained passion eventually sees him withdraw from social interactions completely as his 
‘person had become emancipated with confinement’231, his research having ‘secluded [him] from 
the intercourse of my fellow-creatures, and rendered [him] unsocial’232. Philip Armstrong notes a 
sense of ‘irresponsible isolationism and instrumentalism’ through such endogenous methods of 
control.233 Published in 1843, Hawthorne’s The Birth-Mark features Alymer, who is vehemently 
seized by ‘his strong and eager aspiration towards the infinite’.234 Hawthorne’s laboratory is 
portrayed as technologically exotic. Mary Rucker observes ‘[t]he laboratory, with its fiery furnace 
and soot, its machines […] its unadorned walls, is the realm of the intellect and the empirical’.235 
H. G. Wells’ 1896 novel The Island of Doctor Moreau is especially interesting due to contextual 
influences. During the Victorian era, scientific empiricism was legitimized as a medium of 
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knowledge creation. Wells’ laboratory exists out on ‘a small volcanic islet, and uninhabited […] 
out of human knowledge about latitude 5° S. and longitude 105° W.’, ironically the geographical 
locale as the Galapagos archipelago and Darwin’s work on the evolution of species.236 The novel 
considers broader ethical and moral implications of scientific activities that necessitate the 
establishment of a space detached from the public realm and free from legislative constraints, 
noting ‘[i]t is when suffering finds a voice and sets our nerves quivering that this pity comes 
troubling us’.237 These three texts highlight traditional thematic trends in literary depictions of the 
laboratory space to contrast with contemporary representations of the modern empirical setting, 
as well as the human and non-human animal encounters engendered there. Crucially, they 
prompt a consideration as to whether contemporary literary representations of the modern 
laboratory in Fowler and McAdam’s novels depend on the same kinds of strategic literary 
approaches to instigate the same notions of exposure, critique, and moral revelation.  
 
McAdam’s A Beautiful Truth and Fowler’s We Are All Completely Beside Ourselves employ 
two different narrative strategies to facilitate an exploration of the laboratory space. A 
preliminary comparison of these approaches is beneficial to consider how contemporary literary 
fiction can employ different stratagems to help understand human and non-human animal 
interactions engendered there. Regarding McAdam’s narrative strategy, McKay offers the 
summary: ‘McAdam weaves together an enormous cast of human and nonhuman characters, 
perspectives and locations in order to tell the story of Looee […] [t]he novel is told from first, 
second and third person perspectives, from the points of view of different – sometimes multiple 
– characters, and in present, past and occasionally future tenses’.238 She goes on to deem 
McAdam’s stylistic approach as a ‘risky narrative style, where the author is attempting to present 
multiple sides of the story […] enabling a broad reading of human/nonhuman animal 
relationships’.239 Though McKay is predominantly concerned with the territorialisation and 
interplay of interspecies exchange within the domestic setting, this synopsis of McAdam’s 
narrative strategy becomes all the more interesting when considered within the laboratory space. 
The laboratory featured in McAdam’s novel is inhabited by a troop of chimpanzees, each 
transplanted from various biomedical backgrounds into the present cognitive behavioural study 
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featured in the novel. For McKay, the dangers of McAdam’s narrative emanate from his 
endeavouring to depict ‘the voices and interiority of human and nonhuman characters’.240 
Certainly, McAdam goes to great lengths to endow the primate-led narratives in the novel with a 
combination of syntax and diction, delivered always with an element of visceral impulsivity, 
designed to encourage readers to identify a unique chimpanzee identity and sensibility. The 
chimpanzees are oblivious to being subjects of scientific investigation and it is only through Mr 
Ghoul’s recollections that readers learn of past experiments that are now omitted from their daily 
routine.  
 
McAdam’s David Kennedy is lead cognitive ethologist of the Girdish Institute and is the only 
specifically scientific character in the novel; a narrative strategy that permits McAdam to present 
the viewpoint of the investigator within the laboratory space. David’s narrative is a collage of 
recollections and observations taken from both the past and immediate present, the totality of 
which offer a view of primate research history and chronological approaches to investigative 
methods that accommodate various scientific episteme. Whilst sympathetic toward the 
chimpanzees and their incarcerated situation, McAdam’s narrative strategy nevertheless places 
David as a proponent of the laboratory; an active instigator of scientific investigative practices. 
David genuinely believes in the legitimacy of laboratory-based study, as he ‘used to envy the 
people doing the field studies […] but he also had plenty of his own stories, his own examples of 
culture and of inventiveness’.241 Intriguingly, there are moments of contradiction within his 
contemplations, for example when he considers ‘[t]hat there were experiments that made him 
feel he was part of a family’, paradoxically implicating a dual sense of familial relationship and 
genealogical inheritance resultant from an artificially constructed proximity.242  
 
David’s early-career memories are ‘not just of youthful enthusiasm but of iconoclasm […] 
he wanted to demolish beliefs about what it meant to be human’, the pursuit of which 
paradoxically finds him joining the anthropocentric constructivism of the empirical sciences at the 
expense of non-human animal freedom.243 Most significantly, David proposes that ‘[w]herever 
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they are, apes invent culture, and their culture is strengthened through the exclusion of others’.244 
This reverberates with Latour’s sociographical approach of the laboratory space and that science 
is a predominantly socially constructed sub-culture of human civilisation. McAdam’s mention 
reiterates this notion of the empirical sciences having its own dialect, customs, and ideological 
principles that actively look to exclude other cultures or species in order to operate. McAdam 
describes that ‘every ape, humans included, [are] always adapting to some sort of culture 
imposed by others’, not only applicable to David’s own situation but also a reverberation of 
Haraway’s theoretical approach that considers knowledges produced within the laboratory space 
can be influence and even inhibited by the dominant culture that determines the situational 
circumstance of non-human animals.245 The implication here is that David is always an insider, a 
denizen of the laboratory space and his considerations, though compassionate, are nonetheless 
always influenced by the epistemological processes and practices of scientific investigation; thus 
they are wholly subjective.  
 
Conversely, Fowler has no character within the laboratory space in We Are All Completely 
Beside Ourselves. The events of the novel are chronologically muddled, an implied deliberate 
tactic by the narrator Rose, who is always acutely aware of the limitations of linguistic ability; her 
maxim being ‘[w]hen you think of two things to say, pick your favourite and only say that’.246 This 
seems to be an initial admission of limitation, but is actually a narrative strategy by Fowler to 
liberate Rose, who is now ‘aware that her narrative will be structurally incapable of doing full 
justice to her complex relations with Fern’.247 Reminiscent of more traditional thematics in 
Shelley, Hawthorne and Wells, Fowler’s laboratory remains a remote space that Rose’s narrative 
never offers full access to, an unvisited yet prominent presence on the periphery of events 
throughout the novel. Indeed, Rose’s unscientific background ensures that the laboratory space 
retains a sense of anthropological distance and exoticism throughout. Alternatively however, 
Rose’s brother Lowell provides a guest narrative that offers some perspective of the laboratory 
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Lowell’s intermittent narrative represents a significant strategy by Fowler to reinterpret 
traditional thematics of the dilution of scientific autonomy via the intrusion of foreign bodies to 
accommodate modern activist methods of exposure, revelation, and liberation concerning the 
use and exploitation of non-human animals in the laboratory. Never following Lowell into the 
laboratory space, the narrative relies on Lowell’s extraction and recollection of evidence to 
elaborate on Fern’s circumstance, as ‘ALF tactics included animal rescue and release, and also the 
theft of notebooks and lab records. They took photographs of vivisections for release to the 
press’.248 Though never entirely condoned in the novel, Lowell’s activism is the primary tool by 
which an evaluation of Fern’s incarceration is obtained.249 Otherwise, there is no “whitecoat” 
character inside Fowler’s fictional laboratory. Rose’s father is a cognitive behavioural scientist, 
but he is portrayed as inhabiting a separate hybridised space with its methodological roots in the 
laboratory operating under self-direction in the domestic setting, now shunned by the wider 
scientific community following the collapse of his co-habitation research project. Instead, Fowler 
punctuates her novel with real-life accounts of the experiences of primates, both in cognitive 
behavioural language studies and later biomedical experiments, going on to fictionally transplant 
Rose’s narrative into the historiographical framework of these actual anthologies. Fern’s 
experiences within the laboratory space are thus perceived from the outside looking in, by those 
whose definition of the human-non-human animal relationship are distorted and weighed heavily 
with sentiment.  
 
These novelistic strategies clearly demonstrate two entirely different literary approaches in 
terms of reconsidering the human and non-human animal encounters within the modern 
laboratory space. Fowler’s narrative strategy to present fictional narrative and scientific 
contextual resources side-by-side results in a greater sense of distance; the laboratory is always 
separate from the core events of the narrative. Through this approach, not only does Fowler 
promote a more traditional version of the laboratory space existent on the peripheral of the social 
world, but also encourages a reflection of the potential for other encounters being omitted from 
scientific documentation; the only outputs emerging from these spaces are informative of non-
human animal life there. Conversely, McAdam’s narrative strategy could initially threaten to 
negate the same kinds of objective exploration or reconsideration of the laboratory space as one 
key narrative is narrated by an insider. However, despite his scientific leanings, David instinctively 
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offers a view of the more intimate interspecies encounters occurring at specific points during the 
scientific process, through which McAdam can explore affective ramifications of those moments.  
 
 
Moments Outside the Process: Personal History and Memory 
 
Throughout A Beautiful Truth, David’s narrative is full of contradictions that belie both a 
sense of loyalty to the methodologies of science and an understanding of its limitations, 
demonstrated in the continued indulgence in his visceral responses to the circumstances of the 
chimpanzees. David admits that ‘[w]e never had the choice of chimps that I wanted […] I had an 
ideal subject in mind […] [o]ur chimps came from everywhere, and it soon appealed to me as a 
city in a microcosm’.250 The use of plural possessive pronouns blatantly sees him identify with the 
scientific establishment and his conceding to the artificial creation of a social group of 
chimpanzees: transplanted individuals whose memberships are determined by human constructs 
of availability and cost. Intriguingly, McAdam has David muse that ‘[o]f course backgrounds and 
personal histories mattered, but […] those personal histories would have to come up against the 
reality of this new society’.251 In essence, this summarises the key narrative strategies featured in 
both McAdam’s and Fowler’s novels; the personal histories of Looee and Fern are contrasted 
against their situational circumstance following admittance into the laboratory space. Both 
authors offer a reconsideration of the potential value in moments occurring outside the empirical 
process to better deliberate non-human animal experience and the epistemological constructs 
that put them there by evaluating what is changed or even lost during transition.  
 
These narrative strategies are inherently linked with notions of temporality and literary 
meaning, instances of which will be exhibited throughout this section. As highlighted, McAdam 
and Fowler deliberately force a comparison of Looee’s and Fern’s experience in the laboratory 
against their prior domestic upbringings to consider whether their situations are morally 
outrageous because they were raised as human or because it is the situation of all non-human 
animals in the laboratory space. Both authors construct a sense of character history, thus placing 
their time in the laboratory within the chronology of non-human animal lives and expanding their 
existence beyond their inclusion in scientific experimentation. This is achieved via narrative 
 




strategies of temporality in the form of memories and recollections that broaden considerations 
of the non-human animal experience, against which the affective impact of their incarceration 
into the laboratory space can be more effectively contrasted and evaluated.  
 
Firstly, specific fictional strategies invert the way in which a non-human animal exists within 
the parameters and duration of a study. McAdam writes: ‘David has had the courage to touch his 
hands through the bars. He sensed that Looee is comfortable with people and surmises that he 
spent time in a human environment. His records have long been lost’.252 McAdam renegotiates 
the confines of linear temporality to consider that the non-human animal under experimentation 
has existed and will exist beyond the parameters of a research study, during which their past is 
obsolete and current existence determined by usefulness. McAdam summarizes empirical 
processes, outlined in the space of a short paragraph:  
 
[David] has his stopwatch and timesheet, and it is all being recorded. He will have to 
describe it in the language of his trade and the data will have to be mapped. With his 
colleagues he will talk about side interventions, new coalitions, eye contact and 
posterior grooming. His assistants will help him put a paper together.253 
 
McAdam’s succinct summary highlights all major stages, namely observation, recording, writing 
and eventually publication, decidedly reminiscent of Latour’s own key activities. Latour notes 
these processes are signposts of what he determines to be ‘the retrospective characterisation of 
scientific activity’.254 In David’s investigation, certain chimpanzee behaviours are prioritized over 
others and filtered out from a mosaic of behavioural and social activities to be later relayed and 
translated into the scientific vernacular. Echoing Latour’s principle observation that ‘[t]he 
production of papers is acknowledged by [human] participants as the main objective of their 
activity’, David’s narrative is made more poignant for what it both includes and insinuates to 
ignore.255 David’s scientific role is therefore invaluable, as his narrative reveals the scientific 
reliance on methods and devices of temporal control, shown through his use of a stopwatches 
and timesheets, to allocate specific periods of time for information extraction and knowledge 
 
252 Ibid., p. 244. 
253 Ibid., p. 265.  
254 Latour and Woolgar, Laboratory Life, p. 41. 
255 Ibid., p. 71.  
100 
 
production. Conversely, David’s narrative throughout A Beautiful Truth never indulges in the 
calculating specifics of empirical investigation, relying on his personal experiences and encounters 
to rationalise his attitude toward the chimpanzees. Any apparatus or features of the cognition 
studies that do appear are glimpsed at through the narratives of the chimpanzees, and therefore 
their empirical significance is never fully recognised or acknowledged. Instead, McAdam’s 
inclusion of empirical processes works to acknowledge but ultimately refocus attentions beyond 
the specifics of empirical design with the intention of exploring the ways in which non-human 
animal life exists beyond it.  
 
Within the laboratory, McAdam expands manipulations of temporality through the 
inclusion of memories and personal recollections to instigate considerations on non-human 
animal experience; multiple narratives of the novel are held against one another to elicit valuable 
deliberations on memory. These are presented and then held in comparison to Looee’s immediate 
situation within the epistemological logics of the laboratory space. For example, laboratory 
practices dictate that David and his staff ‘no longer introduce the apes by name […] [as] names 
don’t exist in the wild’,256 and yet Looee himself ‘sometimes wonders whom people are calling. 
He remembers Looee, who lived in a house’.257 Ironically purporting to emulate wild conditions 
within the artificiality of the laboratory setting, Looee’s quotidian experience is determined by 
these scientific procedures and missing records; his past history lost with them. When the 
histories of Looee and the Girdish Institute intertwine, it is Looee who loses the identity that 
McAdam’s narrative has worked to establish thus far. During their brief interaction, Looee’s past 
is acknowledged by David but ultimately ignored, as the model of knowledge produced from him 
will always omit unimportant details; determined to be so under the principles of scientific 
empiricism. Looee’s past history maintains he is something more complex and far richer than the 
empirical processes and resultant materials would represent him as. By exploring the potential of 
memory to broaden considerations of the non-human animal experience, McAdam reconsiders 
the traumatic experience of incarceration into the laboratory setting by proposing that non-
human animals are not the idealised vacuous models for scientific experimentation.  
 
Fowler also examines the potentialities in moments outside of empirical processes, 
including the same notions of loss of identity upon admission to the laboratory space. However, 
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as there is no non-human animal narrative, Fowler achieves this by exploring specific systems of 
acquisition and regulation that reduce the non-human animal to scientific materials. This 
reconfiguration sees Fern, a chimpanzee with all the properties and emotional accompaniment 
of a human infant, placed within the scientific structure that denies her past identity and 
determines her future based on human conceptual constructs, such as ‘closing a budgetary 
gap’.258 Like McAdam,  Fowler contrasts Fern’s domestic upbringing to weigh against her 
commodification upon entry to the laboratory, reemphasizing the various legislative policies 
available to the scientific community regarding non-human animals. Fowler writes:  
 
There was something NotSame about Fern and me, something so outrageous that 
Lowell hadn’t even suspected it until he went to South Dakota […] Like a chair or a car 
or a television, Fern could be bought and sold. The whole time she was living in the 
farmhouse with us as a part of our family, the whole time she was keeping herself 
busy being our sister and daughter, she was, in fact, the property of Indiana 
University.259 
 
Fern and Looe are non-human animals, or other, and so are therefore subject to commodification. 
Certainly, Roger Fouts recalls the moment Nim was sold into biomedical experimentation, 
learning ‘that [Dr. William] Lemmon was selling his entire chimpanzee colony, including Nim, to 
the Laboratory for Experimental Medicine and Surgery in Primates (LEMSIP) in New York […] 
owned by New York University’.260 Like Looee, Fern’s past, present and future is now 
predetermined by a contractual arrangement that sees her move from family member to 
biological material that is property of the scientific institution. Though considering the initial 
reasons for Fern’s arrival, Fowler is careful to continually emphasize that she was the subject of 
an empirical investigation always present behind the façade of familial domesticity.  
 
Like McAdam, Fowler negotiates issues of temporality pertaining to notions of memory 
through narrative strategy, however she accentuates elements of its unreliability in order to 
better consider its affective potential. Whilst Rose’s childhood memories of Fern encapsulate 
moments within and without her father’s temporally allocated experimentation periods, readers 
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never have to determine its success but are instead encouraged to consider the broader 
experience and implications of living in close proximity with a chimpanzee. Certainly, Rose’s 
memories help to contextualise her father’s work and elaborate on Fern’s situation, as she 
considers: ‘[w]as my father kind to animals? I thought so as a child, but I knew less about the lives 
of lab rats then […] my father was kind to animals unless it was in the interest of science to be 
otherwise’.261 Crucially, Rose’s plethora of memories ultimately implicate the existence of shared 
memories. Fowler’s implied existence of these shared memories enhances the traumatic 
potential of Fern’s eventual incarceration; her commodification confirmed upon admittance into 
the laboratory space.  
 
Fern’s identity becomes blurred during the transitional phase from outside to inside the 
epistemological logics of the laboratory setting; her future is determined by the fact that she was 
‘an expensive proposition’ and the institution had ‘no place to house her’.262 As Rose and Fern’s 
cohabitation occurs during infancy, events are translated through a lens of childish innocence and 
subjected to the hazing of memory over time. Rose never suggests that time is detrimental to her 
recollections, but rather fuels her present inner conflict to reflect the complexity and multifaceted 
nature of her relationship with Fern; stressed through Fowler’s deliberately disjointed narrative. 
Fowler realises the potential of memory to present reconsiderations of the non-human animal 
experience, and the temporal complexities of memory are utilised throughout. Indeed, Rose even 
admits that the inciting moment of the novel, an act of severe violence and maliciousness by Fern, 
is a memory ‘only as vivid to me as the one it replaces’.263 Only the specific aesthetic details of the 
memory are gone whilst its affective resonances remain. Such recollective instances amalgamate 
to create an unsystematic collage of interspecies encounters over a total of five years; the end of 
which sees Fern removed and redefined as other upon her incarceration into the laboratory.  
 
Fowler includes another reverse form of temporality in We Are All Completely Beside 
Ourselves, through a comparison of Rose and Fern’s upbringings even before or outside the 
cohabitation study. Fowler expands considerations of Fern to include her species point of origin 
and what would be natural habitat in a time before Rose and the laboratory. Fowler broadens our 
consideration through literary modes of temporal negotiation, as Rose notes: ‘I was born in a 
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hospital in Bloomington, an unremarkable delivery. Fern was born in Africa, where, barely a 
month later, her mother was killed and sold as food’.264 The part of the novel uncomfortably 
reiterates Fern’s classification as other and that her entire association with Rose and her family is 
completely artificial by nature, though she never implies Rose’s affected response is disingenuous. 
Nevertheless, this cue prompts a total reconsideration of both the sincerity and ethical foundation 
of events in the novel, placing Rose’s narrative under scrutiny as the derivative of human 
insistence upon non-human animals for knowledge production. Evidence of Fern’s origin comes 
to the fore during Rose’s recollection of a college lecture on chimpanzee ‘propensity for 
insider/outsider violence’.265 By this point in the novel,  this information is so far removed from 
what a reader has experienced of Fern, wholly indistinguishable from Rose in her emotive 
upbringing, that her point of origin seems now permanently estranged. This is further 
accentuated by Fowler’s narrative strategy to reveal Fern is a chimpanzee almost a third of the 
way through the novel itself. Fowler has Rose proposition that this is so the reader could ‘see it 
how it really was […] thinking of her as my sister’266, conceding Fern was ‘the only sister I ever had 
[…] an experiment with no control’.267 Fowler’s approach thus holds together the two narratives 
of Fern’s incarceration in the laboratory and her cohabitation with Rose to instigate a comparison 
of empirical  treatments of non-human animals, yet both occur simultaneously within the broader 
narrative of her having been captured and transplanted out of her natural point of origin.  
 
 
The Laboratory: A Physical and Conceptualised Space 
 
The chapter will now examine how literary fictional strategies can prompt further considerations 
of the laboratory as both a conceptualised and physical space through negotiations of temporality 
and contextualisation, and the broader implications these have on the experience of the non-
human animal within it. Beginning with the conceptualised laboratory, it is beneficial to briefly 
outline the inherent epistemological features of empirical processes to better understand it as a 
mode of knowledge creation. Universally, systems of knowledge production within the laboratory 
space are strictly confined to scientific methodological processes and the systems of linear 
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temporality that these subsequently implicate. More simply, the successful production of 
knowledge depends on the extraction of data over time from sequential events during their 
chronological progression until a predetermined endpoint that satisfies a working hypothesis. 
Crucially, a major advantage of literary strategy lies in broader contextualisation: the ability to 
place these current methodologies within a wider historiography of science that perceives 
currently active empirical paradigms as part of a larger developmental process, or simply one 
active investigative trend at the end of a sequence of now expired methodologies. Resultantly, 
this allows for a more comprehensive consideration of the laboratory space, particularly as it 
places non-human animals within a broader historiography of scientific use of non-human animal 
subjects. The fundamental implication is that these current paradigms, and their use of non-
human animal subjects, can be perceived as one particular epistemological trend and ultimately 
temporary. This prompts further considerations as to the focus of current empirical 
methodologies to deliberate what is conversely being overlooked and how the non-human animal 
experience changes during these epistemological shifts. Using McAdam’s character David, whose 
narrative setting is the laboratory space, the chapter will now examine how narrative strategies 
offer a comprehensive view of the laboratory as a conceptualised space by renegotiating inherent 
issues of linear temporality.   
 
David’s narrative throughout A Beautiful Truth allows McAdam to paint a retrospective of 
his literary laboratory in a way that foregrounds the broader epistemological landscape of 
laboratory non-human animal science as something forever shifting. McAdam writes:  
 
[The Girdish Institute] was a warren of different interests in those days and when he 
thinks of it he remembers a time of great excitement […] Staff would smoke pipes and 
pot and sit with younger apes, and ideas were openly traded […] David was young 
then, as was his profession. And when you’re young it sometimes seems like the 
world, no matter how old, is being shaped anew. It seemed like everyone was talking 
about primates. Journalists often visited, and some of the research was published in 
the popular press around the world […] it seemed like humans were at least talking 
about kinship, if not actually acknowledging that they were apes.268 
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Though rather rose-tinted, David’s recollection is of an emergent profession that used to 
encourage physical integration and mutual learning during a form of interspecies exchange. 
Again, David’s belief in the sovereignty of science threatens bias, but this sense of freedom was 
true of laboratories even as late as the 1980s. Researchers investigating primate cognitive 
development and language acquisition at Yerkes noted the routine of Kanzi, a young second-
generation captive-born male chimpanzee, reporting that he ‘strongly bonded to the human 
companions who had been with him and his mother daily […] [o]ne or more of these caretakers 
was with Kanzi daily, 24 hours a day, seven days a week, and he was never caged’.269 Fifteen years 
on, the same institution records the extinction of such interactions, encouraged by new 
innovative technologies and redeterminations of scientific empiricism. In 2000, Lana, a 27-year-
old captive-born female chimpanzee taught to use a ‘visuographic language system as an infant’, 
is recorded to have participated in an enumeration task involving a ‘computer and monitor […] 
on a mobile cart that that was moved into the chimpanzees’ home area for test sessions […] 
attached to the chimpanzees’ home cage through a portal on the face of the cage’.270 The 
interspecies interactions have disappeared, as changes are made to accommodate new 
epistemological shifts in scientific conceptions of the laboratory and how its methodologies 
should operate.  
 
These instances evidence the ever-changing complexion of the laboratory; an environment 
forever being readapted to accommodate various scientific episteme, reorganisations and 
renovations of staff, apparatus, equipment, and non-human animal subjects in order to 
accommodate new hypotheses and ideological criteria. To accentuate this same conceptual 
subjection, McAdam’s narrative strategy condenses the history of the laboratory, signified by the 
Girdish Institute, into a manageable historical timeframe though anecdotal recollection in order 
to suggest the space has witnessed the same ideological shifts determined by dominant scientific 
paradigms. More broadly, this implies that these methodological barriers are created, that there 
was a time before the permanent separation of investigator and subject. When coupled with Mr 
Ghoul’s narrative, readers can consider what is now missing from present human and non-human 
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encounters, allowing a more comprehensive picture of the laboratory’s own historiography and 
history of interaction.  
 
The non-linear temporalities of literature can reconsider conceptualisations of the 
laboratory as permanently fixed or a purpose-built space designed specifically for one 
investigation. McAdam writes, ‘[c]oncrete cannot bury memories but it makes them harder to 
envision. It is only when he wills his recollections that he can picture what these spaces once 
were’.271 Literary representations of the laboratory become domains charged with a history that 
resonates throughout the architecture and establish a sense of consequence undetectable in 
laboratory result sheets and data outputs concerned only with satisfying current paradigms. 
During A Beautiful Truth, McAdam confirms the year the Girdish institution was founded, potently 
similar to that of the Yerkes laboratories: ‘a large primate research facility that had started in the 
1920s. They bred their own animals and acquired them from wherever they could’.272 McAdam 
has the Girdish Institute benefit from ‘a historic relationship with primates and a facility that 
occupies a hundred acres’, implying that the terms of this relationship have changed over time. 
Moreover, McAdam reconsiders the multi-purpose nature of laboratory spaces, reemphasizing 
the selectivity of scientific investigations and the materials produced within it. For example, David 
recollects that ‘[f]rom room to room there were studies of intelligence, memory, communication, 
breeding, all distinct and diverse but united by a sense that we were always on the verge of 
something’ during the early days of the Girdish Institute.273 Halfway through the novel McAdam 
includes a mention of biomedical testing at David’s own facility: ‘biomedical experiments, 
research done for the benefit of all species’.274 The revelation that David’s primate behavioural 
study shares the same walls as biomedical experimentations causes his laboratory to change into 
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Physical Laboratories: Contextualisation and the Politics of Sight 
 
The moral and ethical complexities of modern laboratory-based experimentation using 
non-human animals, particularly those of the biomedical nature, necessitate an element of social 
invisibility in terms of the physical laboratory space. Any deliberation of fictional representations 
of the physical appearances of the laboratory would therefore benefit from a consideration of the 
conceptual approaches of Timothy Pachirat, a reflection of veiled spaces and uses of the non-
human animal, in Every Twelve Seconds: Industrialized Slaughter and the Politics of Sight. Under 
the term ‘politics of sight’, Pachirat offers a ‘reflection on how distance and concealment operate 
as mechanisms of power in modern society’.275 These ideas are intrinsic to concepts of scientific 
autonomy, an empirical space reserved and protected by its own physical, ideological and 
legislative boundaries, diluted and compromised upon intrusion from the outside. Whilst 
Pachirat’s case study is the industrialized slaughter of cattle in a slaughterhouse in Omaha, he also 
considers the implications of establishing a ‘morally sterile’ and ‘socially invisible’ environment, 
dividing considerations into four metrics: physical, social, linguistic and methodological.276 Like 
Latour, Pachirat offers a sociological perspective of a space ‘considered morally and physically 
repellent by the vast majority […] [but] sequestered from view rather than eliminated or 
transformed’.277 During his considerations of the binaries of visibility and invisibility, including 
their role in attempting to establish autonomy and control, Pachirat observes how nothing 
prepared him for ‘the utter invisibility […] [and] banal insidiousness of what hides in plain sight’, 
and how the facility ‘blends seamlessly into the landscape of generic business parks ubiquitous to 
Everyplace, U.S.A.’.278 Pachirat’s approach offers a number of valuable considerations applicable 
to the laboratory space, as he highlights how institutionalised spaces rely on an existence ‘out of 
sight and consciousness […] shut away behind impenetrable walls of jargon and concrete’.279 
Crucially, Pachirat’s reflections highlight a conceptual opposition within laboratory-based science 
using non-human animals, claiming total visibility in the extraction of universal truths to create 
knowledge whilst employing operational modes that install strategies of invisibility. Usefully, 
 
275 Timothy Pachirat, Every Twelve Seconds: Industrialized Slaughter and the Politics of Sight (London: Yale 
University Press, 2011), p. 3.  
276 Ibid.  
277 Ibid., p. 11.  
278 Ibid., p. 23.  
279 Ibid., p. 241.  
108 
 
these theoretical approaches can be used constructively to then consider how fictional 
reconstructions of the laboratory space acknowledge these same approaches of invisibility and 
visibility to maintain its autonomy and control, whilst still offering an effective reconsideration of 
the non-human animal experience.  
 
Pachirat’s work on the politics of sight is heavily influenced by Foucault’s work on the same 
applications of visibility and invisibility underlying processes of power installed across a variety of 
institutional settings.280 Foucauldian approaches offer valuable considerations of the laboratory 
space through their reflections of conceptualisations of the penal system. Foucault offers a 
reconsideration of the prison as a conceptualised space as developed throughout the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries. In drawing from Foucault’s work, it is not to determine whether human 
prisoners and non-human animal research subjects are to be considered legal equivalents, but 
rather to compare the evolution of two systems of the institutionalised space. Several similarities 
can be drawn between the prison and laboratory, not least as both research subjects and inmates 
are incarcerated without ‘knowledge either of the charges or of the evidence […] knowledge was 
the absolute privilege of the prosecution’.281 Foucauldian theory would propose that both the 
laboratory and prison settings evolved through a combination of immediate circumstance and 
developmental momentum, an element of learning “on the job”. Foucault intriguingly likens early 
manifestations of the prison space to a laboratory, as ‘it could be used as a machine to carry out 
experiments, to alter behaviour, to train or correct individuals. To experiment with medicines and 
monitor their effects […] [t]o teach different techniques simultaneously to the workers, to decide 
which is best’.282 The cognitive behavioural and biomedical researches of the 1970s and 1980s 
had no centralised practice concerning the use of primates, and Rumbaugh still defended 
primatological research at Yerkes in 1981, entreating critics to remember ‘that the field of ape-
language research is very young […] [with] faults inherent in all human endeavours including those 
of science’.283  
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Elizabeth Hess notes the appearance of modern laboratories, particularly the appearance 
of the Laboratory for Experimental Medicine and Surgery in Primates (LEMSIP). She writes that 
‘LEMSIP, along with its inmates, was all but invisible to the outside world […] From the outside, 
the place looked more like an unadorned corporate headquarters than a prison for primates […] 
the bland exterior belied its grim interior’.284 Deborah Blum echoes Hess’ point that ‘[t]here is 
nothing fortress-like about LEMSIP – no barbed wire, no alarms, just a rambling complex of wood 
and concrete-block buildings’.285 The invisibility of the physical laboratory presents a challenge to 
literary representations, though both McAdam and Fowler use narrative strategies that 
encourage transparency of a physical building whose presence may otherwise go entirely 
unnoticed. Unlike McAdam, Fowler utilises her narrative’s external viewpoint to instigate 
considerations of the laboratory as a physical space and its localization within a landscape. 
Fowler’s description of her fictional laboratory is unnervingly familiar, having ‘a country road 
address […] six miles out of town’ and described simply as ‘a compound with a chain-link fence’, 
though it is ‘threaded with the telltale electrical wire’.286 Contrastingly to Hess’ description of 
LEMSIP, Fowler indicates subtle elements of ambiguous fortification: features that would typically 
betray the existence of an institutionalised space. Through hiding her literary laboratory in plain 
view, Fowler looks to offer a modern reinterpretation of the laboratory as a veiled space, a key 
thematic in the traditional literary laboratories of Shelley, Hawthorne and Wells. Fowler endows 
the laboratory with a sense of architectural history, a system of temporal control that implicates 
a past or point of origin against which to consider its current existence.  
 
Access to the laboratory space is provided by Rose’s brother Lowell, whose first venture 
into the laboratory space to seek out Fern is achieved relatively simply, as ‘he crossed the road 
and slipped through the door into the main building’.287 The nondescript external appearance of 
the laboratory is then set against Lowell’s sensory experience of it, noting ‘a strong odour in the 
stairwell, a mix of ammonia and shit […] [i]t was bright enough to see four cages, all in a row, and 
at least a dozen dark, squat figures inside them’.288 Fowler’s narrative strategy offers Lowell’s own 
visceral reaction to entering the laboratory setting, forcing a contrast to how we have experienced 
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Fern in the familial domestic setting. Fern’s own behaviour during this passage accentuates the 
foreign characteristics of the space and its negative influences, as Lowell considers her volatile 
behaviour to be ‘the first time in my life I’d ever been frightened of her’.289 The sensory experience 
of Lowell animates a building which otherwise remains inanimate and exalts systems of control 
and sterilization, as Fowler’s narrative fills it with ‘screaming, coming from all the cages, echoing 
off the walls of the concrete’.290 This sequence invites the reader to contemplate the multi-
sensorial experience of entering such a space, as well as the affective potential in the sights, 
sounds, and smells inhabited there; synonymous with the non-human animal that omit them. 
After his initial encounter, Lowell is forced to rely on updates on Fern from another source within 
the institution as the laboratory autonomy is restored and parameters reset. Whilst Fowler paints 
Lowell in such a way that never openly condones his intrusive activities, the psychological 
ramifications of trying to visit and then visiting such a potentially affective space over time are 
accentuated; as Rose notes ‘he’d struck me as crazy […] maybe crazy isn’t quite the right word […] 
[m]aybe traumatized is better’.291  
 
Fowler’s narrative strategy then renegotiates restrictions of linear temporality to condense 
Fern’s experiences in the laboratory across a period of over ten years. Parry aptly summarizes 
Fowler’s literary strategy, noting ‘the text’s disorderly temporality, its elisions […] and Fern’s 
multifaceted absence, create a fragmented and incomplete story’.292 Through both Lowell’s 
narrative and the inclusions of intertexts throughout the novel, the reader learns that these 
experiences include electrocution, sedation, and insemination for over a decade. All the while 
Fern’s human upbringing remains visible, fragments of her past and cohabitation evidenced 
through attempted use of sign language on researchers and laboratory staff. This strategy 
enforces perceptions of the inaccessible laboratory, a physical space built specifically to close out 
external factions that would threaten exposure and its self-government.  Undeniably, the futility 
of Lowell’s efforts to liberate Fern over such a period of time reemphasizes the autonomous 
features of the modern laboratory space; physically veiled by mechanisms of distance and 
concealment and further safeguarded by appropriated legislations that preserve its sovereignty, 
criminalizing any external bodies who attempt to gain entry. Significantly, the consequence of 
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Lowell’s intrusion is the loss of his own freedom; criminalised for his unauthorized access by the 
legislature that protects the laboratory and forbids visual, audio, and documentations obtained 
in that space. Pachirat observes that these episodes of intrusion and exposure are perceived as 
highly conceptually dangerous as they ‘threaten to surface power relations that work precisely 
through confinement, segregation, and invisibility’.293 The autonomy of the laboratory forbids the 
extraction of knowledge not gathered by empirical means. Eventually, Fowler’s narrative 
discovers Lowell incarcerated himself, after working ‘for decades as a spy in the factory farms, the 
cosmetic and pharmaceutical labs. He's seen things we refuse to see […] sacrificed his family, his 




Moments Missed Inside the Process 
 
The chapter will now look to consider the value in human and non-human animal 
encounters missed inside or during the processes of knowledge production in the laboratory 
space; Latour’s activities of ‘coding, marking, altering, correcting, reading and writing’.295 During 
processes of investigation, scientific methods of temporal control are at their most regimented; 
the ideal is to eliminate all external variables, once again including issues of temporality. The 
temporal logics within the laboratory are wholly artificial, as research schedules are regulated 
week-by-week, day-by-day and hour-by-hour, most likely accommodating the working routine of 
scientists, laboratory technicians and other research staff. Specific periods of time are allocated 
to pursuing identified hypotheses through empirical methodologies prioritised by current 
research trends. Experimentations on non-human animal life within these controlled periods of 
time are regarded as advantageous by advocates of laboratory study, especially over the 
longitudinal observations of field studies where a greater autonomy lies with the non-human 
animal subjects. Any discussions of these processes and the human and non-human animal 
encounters that occur within them will once again benefit from a consideration of Latourian 
theoretical approaches, deconstructing the mechanics of laboratory empirical investigation to 
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identify key conceptual oppositions. Instigating an examination of the strategic abilities of literary 
fiction to consider the non-human animal experience during these investigative moments.  
 
Firstly, Latour cautions against ‘the perception that a fact is something which is simply 
recorded in an article and that it has neither been socially constructed nor possesses its own 
history of construction’.296 This history of construction must not only consider predetermined 
parameters of a specific study and immediate influences of temporality, but it’s historical 
development. Foucault’s The Order of Things is a philosophical endeavour to map out the origins 
of the human sciences and can be helpful in supplementing Latour’s considerations. An influential 
presence in Latour’s own works, Foucault proposes that the human sciences are subtly influenced 
by three fundamental modes of knowledge: biology, economics and linguistics. He suggests these 
modes of knowledge have influenced certain scientific episteme, periods in history that mark 
shifts in the scientific consciousness and goes on to claim that a priori assumptions have occurred 
and still occur during these epistemological movements. These moments in human scientific 
history, or episteme, are therefore essentially compromised as the epistemological foundation of 
subsequent discourses are inescapably linked to the conditions of their possibility within a 
particular epoch. Similarly to Haraway, Foucault maintains the empirical sciences are a social 
construct, prone to the same imperceptible social and cultural influences as any other. 
Foucauldian theory can help to elaborate on Latour’s approaches in such a way that instils a sense 
of constructive scepticism concerning the scientific dogma of empirical objectivity. 
 
 
Issues of Language: Coding, Marking, Altering, Correcting, Reading and Writing 
 
A Beautiful Truth and We Are All Completely Beside Ourselves both employ the same kind 
of constructive scepticism regarding Latour’s core activities of scientific empiricism, especially 
considering they are all reliant on the constructs of human language, and the translational 
limitations of which Foucault heavily criticises.297 When utilised in investigations of the non-
human animal, empirical observations are transcribed into the scientific vernacular for 
documentation to establish a model of knowledge pertaining to that species’ behaviour. Foucault 
 
296 Ibid., p. 105.  
297 An extensive overview of Foucault’s considerations of non-human animals is provided in Foucault and 
Animals, ed. by Matthew Chrulew, and Dinesh Joseph Wadiwel, (Leiden: Brill, 2017). 
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addresses the issue of accurate representation and inherent problems of human language, 
particularly in the scientific vernacular:  
 
Words have been allotted the task and the power of “representing thought” […] [b]ut 
representing in this case does not mean translating, giving a visible version of, 
fabricating a material double that will be able, on the external surface of the body, to 
reproduce thought in its exactitude.298 
 
Foucault’s consideration highlights the inaccuracies and ambiguities of human language as a 
vehicle for discourse, unable to encompass non-human animal experience in its entirety and 
accurately deliver it to ensure precise representations. He argues that the resultant 
representations formed by scientific discourse are no longer fixed in the same “world that gives 
them meaning […] [and exist] in a space of their own’.299 Additionally, and even if these 
observations of empirical investigation of non-human animal life can be recorded accurately, 
Foucault proposes that the conversion of knowledge back from ‘the non-place of language’ risks 
omitting truths that are not prioritised by certain episteme or scientific paradigms.300 Essentially, 
Foucauldian theory suggests that scientific discourse cannot ensure universal access to particular 
knowledges, as it prioritises a level of exclusivity to those within its own community. Therefore, 
the knowledges produced are not only compromised by inaccurate extraction techniques, but 
also the way in which it is recorded, documented, and then translated back from these language 
forms. When applied to empirical investigations concerning the non-human animal, Foucault 
proposes ‘the living being, in its anatomy, its form, it habits, its birth and death, appears as though 
stripped naked’.301  
 
Foucault’s cynicism is constructive here as both McAdam and Fowler also encourage 
sceptical approaches in portraying the abilities of the scientific vernacular to capture the 
complexities of non-human animal life in its entirety. McAdam’s David succinctly highlights 
science’s dependence on these methods, being required to ‘describe [chimpanzee behaviour] in 
 
298 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things (Abingdon: Routledge Classics, 2002), p. 86.  
299 Ibid., p. 86.  
300 Ibid., p. xviii.  
301 Ibid., p. 141.  
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the language of his trade’, then against which ‘data will have to be mapped’.302 McAdam 
punctuates his narrative with moments of anxiety concerning the absolutism of scientific 
discourse, remarking on ‘everybody thinking that everything we make, once made, cannot be a 
fiction’.303 His professional conduct is constantly overshadowed by his inability to define his own 
personal feelings toward the chimpanzees he studies, against which the limitations of the 
scientific vernacular are accentuated further; as ‘[h]e struggles to describe them sometimes, to 
make the larger world feel the way he feels […] His papers and data are dust and chips of ice’.304  
 
David’s entire narrative is directed by a tendency to indulge in visceral emotionality, though 
always shadowed by scientific delineation; behaviours constantly allocated to a systematic 
scientific way of understanding social interaction. In one instance, David recalls an act of 
aggression by Billie who threatens Rosie’s baby; ‘[w]hen I think of friendships I remember Rosie 
having her baby […] Billie moved aggressively toward her. His hair was on end […] Podo and Ghoul, 
as if they had been planning it, stepped directly in Billie’s way […] [w]e have photos of it’.305 For 
David, the concept of friendship between chimpanzees cannot exist unless it is empirically 
evidenced, in this case in the form of photographs, and later fitted neatly into the model of 
knowledge pertaining to ‘cooperation tests’.306 David anticipates the behaviours of the 
chimpanzees to fit into predetermined constructs of human emotion and behaviour, frustrations 
originating from moments where chimpanzee behaviour is no longer categorizable, or instances 
that propose ‘their prior learning had been an illusion […] [and] to put all earlier findings in 
doubt’.307  
 
Although David’s scientific approaches could threaten bias, it is counteracted by the 
accompanying narratives of Mr Ghoul and other chimpanzee characters whose distinct non-
human animal narrative sees David become the more familiar “Dave”. McAdam’s technique in Mr 
Ghoul’s narrative, its unconventional use of syntax to depict the inner voice of the non-human 
character, allows an interpretation of the same encounters as well as other moments occurring 
 
302 McAdam, p. 165.  
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around empirical operating hours. For example, Mr Ghoul reveals valuable moments unobserved 
by scientific investigations and overlooked by David, noting ‘Dave stayed later than everyone 
sometimes and walked with Ghoul to his bedroom’, that ‘[t]hey had parties […] Dave played a 
guitar that made Ghoul want to leave the room’.308 These revelations evidence an indulgence in 
moments of independent interaction between human and chimpanzee, casting uncertainty over 
the scientific categorisations in David’s own narrative. McKay considers McAdam’s strategy to 
‘present multiple sides of the story’ in order to find moments of correlation and interactional 
value.309 Human and non-human animal narratives unite to offer an amalgamated vision of 
interspecies encounters, allowing for a comprehensive consideration of encounters in a more 
complex and multifaceted way, accurate to the complexities of the modern laboratory space to 
instigate a comparison between the potential richness of encounters and the selectivity of 
scientific documents that represent those same moments.  
 
Fowler’s We Are All Completely Beside Ourselves continuously looks to question science’s 
exaltation of human language; demonstrated as Rose cynically notes ‘[l]anguage is such an 
imprecise vehicle I sometimes wonder why we bother with it’.310 Fowler explicitly questions the 
role of human language as not only the principle mode by which to document knowledge of non-
human animal life, but also as the characteristic benchmark against which non-human animal 
cognition is to be measured more broadly. Parry highlights Fowler’s strategy of ‘limitrophy’ or 
‘feeding of the limit of the human’, a concept she borrows directly from Derrida, to suggest We 
Are All Completely Beside Ourselves interrogates the ‘political and ideological grounds upon which 
are built linguistic distinctions of kind between humans and chimpanzees’.311 Parry sees Rose as 
a challenge to ‘the hierarchal, centralised status of language to define the quality of a being’s 
encounter with the world, and disempower traditional emphasis on the linguistic experience’.312 
These considerations are signposted by the inclusion of quotations from Franz Kafka’s A Report 
for an Academy, most notably Red Peter’s proclamation: ‘I can portray those ape-like feelings only 
 
308 Ibid., p. 70.  
309 McKay, p. 237. 
310 Fowler, We Are All Completely Beside Ourselves, p. 85.  
311 Parry, p. 196. 
312 Ibid., p. 209.  
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with human words and, as a result, I misrepresent them’.313 A moment in Rose’s narrative 
highlights Fowler’s enquiry, recalling an instance during her father’s cognitive experiment:  
 
One of the early grad students, Timothy, had argued that in our preverbal period, 
Fern and I had an idioglossia, a secret language of grunts and gestures. This was never 
written up, so I learned of it only recently. Dad had found his evidence thin, 
unscientific, and, frankly, whimsical.314 
 
This passage consolidates Foucauldian and Latourian scepticism to identify subtle influences of 
active scientific episteme that dictate empirical investigation, or Latour’s marking, writing, coding 
and correcting. Fowler highlights the selectivity of scientific empiricism to suggest what is missed; 
Timothy’s idioglossia theory rejected by Rose’s father, determined to be ‘unscientific’ according 
to current empirical trends which originate from the active scientific episteme. Fowler then 
demonstrates that this particular avenue of investigation is thus never explored and, due to the 
absolute confidence in the scientific vernacular, is never recorded and thus never passes into 
existence.   
 
 
Improvisory Moments: Two-Way Affective Encounters 
 
Recently interdisciplinary efforts have endeavoured to revisit and reconsider the laboratory 
as a space that plays host to human and non-human animal encounters, where Latourian 
approaches have greatly influenced new examinations of the laboratory space and the ways these 
encounters are understood outside of the empirical processes reliant on human language. For 
example, Beth Greenhough and Emma Roe interrogate notions of ‘the modern, rational, 
autonomous human’, in order to examine ‘how knowledge of the world is produced as much 
through habitual practices and embodied encounters as through objective and rational thought 
processes’.315 They propose an interpretive approach to consider the potential in ‘improvisatory 
 
313 Franz Kafka, The Complete Stories, (New York: Schoken Books, 1983), p. 253. 
314 Fowler, We Are All Completely Beside Ourselves, p. 100.  
315 Beth Greenhough and Emma Roe, ‘Experimental Partnering: Interpreting Improvisory Habits in the 
Research Field’, International Journal of Social Research Methodology, 17 (2014), 45-57 (p. 47).  
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moments’ occurring around the activities of empirical investigation.316 Examining particularly ‘the 
capacities of human bodies to sense and respond to the non-human agentive world’, Greenhough 
and Roe identify improvisory moments to include everyday habitual practices, empirical and non-
empirical, within the scientific space.317 Borrowing from these conceptualised approaches, how 
can literary fictional strategies look to reconsider the potential in these same improvisory 
moments to consider a more comprehensive picture of non-human animal life in the laboratory? 
Can fictional reconfigurations of the laboratory space represent the influence of the non-human 
animal subject on those conducting the experiments to propose self-reflection and resolve 
tensions between these potential moments of value and the prioritization of the empirical in 
scientific methodologies? 
 
McAdam and Fowler’s novels both look to explore the affective potential of these 
improvisory moments and their impact on both the researcher and research subject as a two-way 
exchange and encounter. McAdam’s A Beautiful Truth represents David having to prompt his 
laboratory staff to maintain species divisions: ‘[h]e reminds his staff repeatedly not to interfere, 
no matter how attached they become. But he lets them intervene sometimes because our 
attachment is another shared inheritance. Empathy comes from being hurt oneself, but it’s still a 
beautiful thing’.318 This fictional strategy elaborates on the notion that outside the allocated 
temporal logics of scientific investigation exist valuable moments worthy of emphasis, in this case 
the scientists’ ability to empathise with the emotional state of a chimpanzee. David himself 
describes his feelings toward the chimpanzee colony: ‘he thinks of them all as his family. He loves 
them and wants to let them be. He wants to leave them alone completely’.319 The previous 
implication of shared inheritance is further complicated by issues of ‘family’ and its connotations 
of both the traditional emotional ties of the familial unit and in terms of species phylogenetics. 
The insinuation obfuscates species lines, otherwise clearly delineated physically at all times within 
the laboratory space. McAdam raises questions concerning ethics and group-membership across 
these lines, prompting the reader to reconsider how they are ideologically determined, 
maintained and their potential to be reconsidered. David’s contemplations therefore come across 
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as confessional, a conscious departure from the principles of scientific empiricism for total 
indulgence in the visceral and something felt rather than articulated. 
 
Fowler also looks to explore the potential in a two-way affective encounter within the laboratory 
space, though differently from McAdam, having no scientific character within the laboratory 
environment. One such example being that Matt, a graduate student working with Rose’s father, 
is deeply affected by his interaction and improvisational moments with Fern that it motivates him 
to follow her into the laboratory space, as ‘he’d stayed [at the laboratory] as long as he was able 
and seen Fern as often as allowed’.320 The affective nature of these improvisory moments were 
certainly true of those who worked with Nim and Washoe, as Roger Fouts recalls ‘[t]he better I 
got to know my new chimpanzee friends, the more they taught me’.321 Indeed, the entire 
narrative of Fowler’s novel orientates around a family ‘shattered by Fern’s departure’ after their 
long-term encounter.322 Rose’s narrative doubts the capacity of memory to recall events 
accurately, never the emotions associated with them as they represent the affecting complexities 
of their relationship.  
 
Conversely, Fowler also introduces the notion of adverse effects resulting from these two-
way encounters. When Fern comes into contact with Dr Uljevik, he ‘put Fern at once into a cage 
with four larger, older chimps […] He said she had to learn her place. She had to learn what she 
was’.323 Fowler reconsiders the potential detrimental effects on both the human and non-human 
animals participants during encounters. During the novel, acts of cruelty or violence carried out 
by either human or non-human animal are tremendously influential, always resulting in species 
lines being assertively re-established and an immediate retreat to the familiar terrain of human 
exceptionalism. Fowler does not suggest that interspecies encounters, whether the experience 
be overtly positive or negative, must occur in particular ways in order to contribute to 
reconsiderations of the non-human animal within the laboratory, but rather reemphasize that 
these moments exist in the laboratory at all. Fowler thus instigates considerations of the potential 
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for the same ‘permeable boundaries and inter-corporeal stories’ that Parry describes in the 
domestic setting, to be also discoverable and valuable in the laboratory space.324  
 
By identifying the existence of improvisory moments inside the processes of empirical 
investigation, a more comprehensive picture of the day-to-day encounters of human and non-
human animal in the laboratory begins to emerge. McAdam’s poignant observation in A Beautiful 
Truth underlines the contributions of literary fiction, as David considers: ‘[e]mpathy comes from 
being hurt oneself, but it’s still a beautiful thing’.325 Along with the novel’s title, McAdam draws 
attention to historic and perennial oppositions between the humanities and sciences; both 
competing for either aesthetic beauty or scientific knowledge as the predominant mode of 
understanding. A Beautiful Truth is an allusion to John Keat’s Ode on a Grecian Urn, that proclaims 
precise definitions of beauty are unattainable and are only to be felt. Keat’s illustrious lines 
‘“Beauty is truth, truth beauty,” – that is all / Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know’, contends 
that there is actually no absolute need but a want for universal truth.326 The poem suggests that 
beauty, and the experience of it, is the only necessary truth required to understand the world. As 
David’s observation of empathy comes from witnessing a compassionate interaction between 
two chimpanzees, beyond the descriptions of scientific vernacular. Actually, it remains something 
felt: a moment of true understanding in a two-way exchange that goes unrecorded in scientific 
endeavours for empirical truth. The broader implication here is that these strategies of literary 
fiction can help to contemplate the potentialities of non-human animal life away from the 
limitations of articulation. By association, this sense of confidence in more aesthetic approaches 
instigate a reconsideration of the ways in which literary fiction can promote the legitimacy of how 
emotions and feeling form our understanding of human and non-human encounters within the 
laboratory space. 
 
Recent interdisciplinary endeavours throughout the humanities have looked to 
legitimately reinvestigate the laboratory setting in terms of ‘how emotions and feelings shape 
spaces and encounters in ways that cannot be easily be captured by the tools of language and 
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text’.327 As such, Greenhough and Roe endeavour to examine the ways in which a genuine 
consideration of emotionality can help form a more comprehensive picture of human and 
non-human animal encounters within the laboratory. They begin by outlining interdisciplinary 
interests in ‘more-than-verbal forms of communications’, continuing on to argue that ethical 
practice in research with non-human animals may be informed and reconsidered through this 
emphasis on somatic sensibilities.328 This implicates a reconsideration of the legitimacy of 
sensory responses as ways by which to consider the legitimacy of ‘animal behaviour and 
demeanour to signal their emotional state’.329 Borrowing from this conceptual strategy, the 
chapter will look to isolate textual examples and extrapolate these same considerations to 
strategies of literary fiction.  
 
In A Beautiful Truth, David looks to attribute credibility to moments of anthropomorphism, 
observing chimpanzee behavioural demonstrations of ‘[f]ear, humour, jealousy and peace. Every 
day he sees empathy, shame, the will to heal, but he fights sometimes to discuss these things 
credibly with those who have no sense of their own bodies’.330 McAdam openly proposes that the 
emotions of fear, humour, jealousy and calm, and the words used to describe them, are not fixed 
but fluid: a kaleidoscope of valuable insinuations relevant to describing the human experience of 
non-human animal life. Once again, here McAdam encourages the idea of moments that can be 
felt or sensed, instances that are overlooked by the specific criteria of scientific observational 
recording. Fowler reiterates this, as the first portion of We Are All Completely Beside Ourselves 
places infant human and chimpanzee life literally and figuratively side by side. As Rose regards a 
notebook filled with ‘photos from the baby books’ of both herself and Fern, she also notes 
‘[w]e’ve paired them so that the embodiment of emotions in child and chimp can be contrasted 
[…] I can’t see much difference in the picture of me happy and the picture whose label says 
EXCITED. It’s easier with Fern’.331 By subverting the empirical intention of Rose’s father’s ‘mood 
studies’, Fowler presents the potentialities of greater emotive complexity in non-human animals. 
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The critical analyses of A Beautiful Truth and We Are All Completely Beside Ourselves 
evidenced throughout this chapter demonstrate the ways in which contemporary literature 
reconstructs the laboratory so as to prompt a reconsideration of the non-human animal 
experience within this significant scientific setting. Concentrating on inherent issues of 
temporality and the systems of autonomy that establish the laboratory as a hermetically closed-
off, self-governing space existing separate from the wider social world, the chapter argues that 
contemporary literary strategies can conversely open up the laboratory, exposing and critiquing 
the specific epistemological logics operational there. Through such an approach, the laboratory 
can be viewed within a broader historiography of its own development that challenges 
preconceptions of it as an objective and purpose-built physical and conceptualised space, in turn 
re-complicating non-human animal existences caught within cultural shifts in laboratory practice. 
These shifts implicate a dominant methodological custom that exalt particular modes of scientific 
knowledge production, creating distinct kinds of knowledge. These literary approaches have the 
potential to read the fictional laboratory as an environment that plays host to valuable and 
affecting interspecies encounters, occurring both during and outside of empirical investigations 
dictated by the setting. Having established the nature of the laboratory space more broadly, the 
following two chapters now concentrate on specialized scientific sub-divisions of laboratory 
investigations to demarcate and distinguish between the methodological and conceptual nuances 
existent within sub-fields of scientific enquiry. Though based within the laboratory setting, they 
represent two completely different scientific situations that determine the experience of the non-















‘The pits were designed, of course’:  
Representing the Experimental Non-Human Animal 
 
 
The apparatuses described in this paper were designed to produce depression or 
despair in monkeys, i.e., the devices were created to induce measurable, quantitative 
psychopathological traits in subhuman primates. We do not mean to imply that 
depression in monkeys is analogous to depression in human beings, even though we 
believe it is.  
     – Stephen J. Suomi and Harry Harlow332 
 
 
Comparative psychology is the study of the evolutionary origin of psychological capacities 
of non-human animals in order to recognise and apply those same developmental models to 
correlative human behaviour.333 Comparative developmental psychology is the study of specific 
cognitive behavioural systems during ontogenetic development, allowing for a comparison 
between subsequent models of non-human animal development and those of humans.334 These 
two sub-divisions of experimental psychology and their particular epistemological operational 
modes will provide the scientific basis of this chapter. Just like so many branches of the empirical 
sciences that utilise non-human animals, comparative and developmental psychology were born 
from the influential works of Charles Darwin, developed further by his student George Romanes 
and fellow pioneering ethologist Pierre Flourens, becoming an amalgamation of biology, 
psychology, anthropology, ecology and genetics.335 In terms of non-human animal participation, 
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a relatively small species group have and continue to dominate the arena, whilst historical 
methodological approaches have varied significantly throughout. These groups include pigeons, 
rats, mice and primates due to practical logistical advantages such as accessibility to populations, 
breeding, maintenance, housing, and feeding, as well as their cognitive and biological similarities 
to humans. The cognitive and behavioural developments under observation include learning, 
environmental orientation, attachment, and cognitive responses to stimuli such as hunger, fear 
or isolation.  
 
Stephen Suomi and Harry Harlow’s apparatus guide for inducing depression or despair in 
rhesus macaques is representative of a significant period in the history of laboratory comparative 
and developmental psychology using non-human animals. The legitimisation of psychology as a 
valid science along with the technological advancements of the post-war era resulted in its 
explosive development throughout the 1950s and 1960s.336 Scientific fascination with human 
cognition and developmental behaviour found non-human animals substituted as surrogates in 
order to explore anything from learning ability to social development. During this same period, 
Harry Harlow conducted his now notorious experimental investigations on infant rhesus 
macaques. Through explorations into the effects of attachment deprivation, maternal separation, 
and isolation, Harlow looked to emphasize the importance of maternal affection, bodily contact, 
and intimacy in the cognitive and social development of human infants.337 Harlow’s work, in 
particular, is drawn on throughout this chapter to exemplify experimental scientific approaches, 
and to provide methodological contexts against which literary reflections on them will be 
analysed. Subsidiary comparative psychological and experimental studies will also feature to 
accommodate the multi-species nature of this specific epistemological mode, particularly rats and 
monkeys. Focusing on short-term laboratory-based non-human animal research, the chapter will 
isolate and consider conceptual oppositions identified within these studies to facilitate a broader 
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The key objective of this chapter is to examine the ways in which fictional literary strategies 
and representations offer effective re-evaluations of the non-human animal experience when 
utilised within the empirical modes prevalent in comparative and developmental psychology. By 
analysing Lydia Millet’s ‘Love in Infant Monkeys’, Karen Joy Fowler’s ‘Us’ and Ursula Le Guin’s 
‘Mazes’, contemporary fictional texts that explore the production of knowledge using non-human 
animals within this particular epistemological setting, the chapter explores how literary fiction 
contributes toward reconsiderations of the non-human animal experience in short-term, multi-
subject empirical investigations. How do these three fictional texts respond to the epistemological 
implications particular to these sub-divisions of scientific experimentation? The methodological 
designs of which cause non-human animals to be simultaneously more numerous and yet also 
more distant, making their presences quieter.  
 
The experiential existence of non-human animals in the experimental setting, as with all 
empirical designs utilizing non-human animals to produce knowledge, are inherently linked with 
issues of temporality. However, logics of temporality work differently in this particular scientific 
mode, an empirical setting that operates through methodologies reliant on far higher levels of 
temporal regulation. Unlike the longitudinal cognition and language studies evidenced in Chapter 
One and Chapter Two, the short-term experimental investigations conducted on non-human 
animal subjects rarely live beyond the experiment itself. Rather, they exist within the stringent 
predetermined temporal parameters of a socially constructed empirical methodology that 
adheres to a strict timetable of investigation, commonly comprising of a large multi-subject group. 
The challenge for fictional representations is how best to negotiate temporal logics in a way that 
can represent the experiential existence of the non-human animal accurately but also to ensure 
valuable reconsiderations. Issues of autonomy, systems of separation, and logics of value are also 
more influential in this particular epistemological mode, defining the nature of human and non-
human animal encounters within physical demarcations of the laboratory space. These key 
conceptual features are outlined in greater detail later in examinations of how short-term 
experimental researches influence the experience of the non-human animal overall. This enables 
a framing of the different kinds of knowledges created there and make visible other, less obvious 
human and non-human animal encounters engendered by the process. Fundamentally, it helps 
to identify epistemological characteristics particular to short-term comparative experimentation 
against which to compare fictional strategies interested in representing non-human animal life in 
this empirical mode.  
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To better consider the epistemological constructs at work within comparative and 
developmental psychology experimentations, the works of psychologist and philosopher Vinciane 
Despret offer a reflective review of empirical designs specific to this mode of laboratory research 
and the encounters between human and non-human animals that occur there. Despret’s work is 
particularly useful as it offers key methodological perspectives by which to analyse and re-
evaluate conceptual oppositions inherent in the scientific method, acting as an intermediary by 
which to approach fictional reconsiderations of the same epistemological features. This approach 
is especially helpful when considering the short-term nature of comparative and developmental 
psychology experimentations, as encounters are brief and without lengthy moments occurring 
around the empirical investigation itself. The working hypotheses of the investigations do not rely 
on a relationship being established between researcher and non-human animal subject, and 
therefore isolation and separation are prominent systems of management. Furthermore, 
Despret’s examinations of the laboratory space reiterate that scientific sub-divisions ask certain 
kinds of questions, being perhaps methodologically similar but actually subtly different under 
umbrella terms related to non-human animal experimentation. Despret’s helpful theoretical 
approaches will be outlined later in the chapter. Logically then, a brief outline of the 
epistemological features of comparative and developmental psychology will enable a more 
comprehensive exploration into literary fictional representations of the same empirical mode of 
producing knowledge on non-human animals.  
 
 
Epistemological Features of Comparative Psychology 
 
During the mid-twentieth century, advocates of comparative and developmental 
psychology began employing the non-human animal as a way by which to test cognitive function 
with the promissory future of identifying correlative features in human cognitive development 
and behaviour.338 The non-human animal became an analogy of the human psychological sample, 
exacerbated by a scientific and political climate that favoured empirical investigations into human 
intelligence and learning.339 A point of contention then and now amongst psychologists concerns 
the use of comparative methodologies to compare differences and similarities between species, 
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including humans, that are not always biologically or psychologically translational. Nevertheless, 
mid-twentieth century enquiries into human health saw non-human animal subjects set as the 
default sample against which to test potential hypotheses before applying the models of 
knowledge produced to human cognitive and behavioural frameworks.  
 
The hypotheses of comparative and developmental psychology experimentation differ 
according to their subject focus and can be anticipated with varying degrees of precision and 
success. Biological experiments can trust in greater accuracy at the hypothesis stage, confirming 
or negating the effects of predetermined procedures regarding internal or external biological 
materials involving the non-human animal. When simplified, biomedical investigations would 
pose an initial question with the answer being either yes or no. For example, biomedical 
researcher Albert Sabin, working during the same period, asked: ‘can rhesus monkeys offer a 
biological replica against which to investigate the poliomyelitis virus in humans?’. The answer was 
yes, or more expansively that weakened modes of the virus ‘produced no cytopathogenic effect 
on monkey kidney epithelial cells’.340 The avenue of enquiry is thus closed as working hypotheses 
are satisfied. Conversely, in comparative psychology investigative questions are more open-
ended. For instance, the research design of Harry Harlow’s research into maternal attachment 
was set up to ask the question: ‘can rhesus monkeys be used as a psychological substitute in order 
to teach us about love in humans?’. Harlow’s conclusion was that ‘[m]onkeys are much simpler 
than people […] for this very reason they give us a clearer picture of the basic love systems, the 
nature of variables underlying each, and the problems and perils of transition from one system to 
another’.341 Harlow’s answer was yes, that ‘[t]he well adapted rhesus may be used in an 
experimental design requiring completion of 50 to 100 trials a day […] a finer robot than any 
electrical engineer will ever devise’, but this conclusion only confirms the non-human animal 
psychological model, prompting considerations of how to then test these psychological 
functions.342 Harlow’s investigations remained ever speculative, as psychological phenomena are 
more unquantifiable compared to biological materials; hypotheses are more difficult to test and 
resolve. Each result works perpetually toward a definitive, yet ultimately unknown, conclusion. 
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Therefore, hypotheses of comparative and developmental psychology are guided by a principal 
objective, but empirical processes are in a constant state of refutation, conjecture, alteration and 
reapplication.  
 
It is the ambiguous and ever-changing nature of research methodologies in comparative 
and developmental psychology experimentation that led Harry Harlow to his infamous researches 
into depression, social isolation and maternal attachment in infant rhesus macaques. 
Undoubtedly, the reasons for Harlow’s infamy have changed over time, appropriated by the 
dominant scientific paradigms of the period and arbitrated today by the particular moral and 
ethical sensibilities they implicate. From initial research at the University of Wisconsin from the 
early 1930s, his work and reputation both inside and outside the field of science has shifted from 
the highly revered to widely condemned. As Blum highlights, Harlow’s successes during the 1960s 
meant ‘Professor Harlow was suddenly consulted on a starting range of child-rearing techniques; 
not just love’.343 Yet only a little while later, ‘Harlow was suddenly accused of being a scientist on 
the wrong side of truth […] in the shifting culture of the 1970s, it was mother love that was the 
real problem. His pro-parenting stance had turned him into a politically incorrect scientist’.344 By 
the time of his death in 1981, Harlow’s work was seen as wholly unethical, as modern scientific 
practices involving non-human animals then looked to redefine and renegotiate issues of ethical 
treatment and care. Today, his work is often evoked in relation to issues concerning the ethical 
treatment of non-human animals in the laboratory space as well as broader animal rights activism. 
Resonations of Harlow’s work today remain clear in terms of its advancement of the wider field 
of psychology, though his methodological approaches are ultimately disapproved regarding in his 
treatment of non-human animals. Harlow’s infamy is therefore valuable in terms of its enigmatic 
nature, offering a variety of opinions and conceptual considerations of his work, including those 
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Introducing the Fictional Texts 
 
The three selected fictional texts will be employed into two significant strands of analysis 
in the chapter. Lydia Millet’s ‘Love in Infant Monkeys’ will be examined as part of a specific case 
study focusing on Harlow’s work using non-human animals in experimental comparative 
developmental psychology and the distinct empirical logics that operate there. However, this is 
situated within a broader study of epistemological features inherent to the experimental 
laboratory setting that then incorporates and analyses the literary strategies of Fowler’s ‘Us’ and 
Le Guin’s ‘Mazes’. By arranging the fictional materials this way it allows for a more comprehensive 
overview of this specific mode of scientific investigation and the conceptual oppositions identified 
within it; each fictional representation is interested in different empirical features of the 
experimental situation that utilizes the non-human animal. The amalgamation of these three 
fictional texts in this manner will ensure a more encompassing cross-section of fictional strategies 
looking to contribute to discussions concerning the epistemological nature of experimental 
scientific investigation. Additionally, and essential to the core investigative objectives of the 
chapter, all three texts are fictional interventions in understanding scientific empirical systems of 
knowledge production concerning non-human animals within the experimental setting. 
 
Lydia Millet’s Love in Infant Monkeys is a collection of short stories that contains a fictional 
representation of Harry Harlow in its titular story, named after Harlow’s article of the same title 
featured in the scientific journal Scientific American in June 1959. Millet’s story collection pairs a 
wide range of fictional reiterations of celebrities and public figures with non-human animals, both 
tending to provoke sympathy yet remaining fundamentally unknown. The collection is a series of 
literary commentaries on the way in which both groups, the celebrities and their non-human 
animals, are subject to various public narratives, becoming literal fictions of their own created 
through observation, speculation, and projection that which they then transform into. These 
fictional strategies of interspecies encounter provoke a consideration of our relationships with 
the non-human animal, signifying that proximity engenders feelings of intimacy, but potential 
capacities for cognitive experience remain ultimately unknowable. The collection finds Millet 
proposing that fiction, the space of imagination, is where remarkable and affective revelations 




Millet’s short story ‘Love in Infant Monkeys’ is a fictional speculation about Harlow’s 
cognitive developmental psychology experimentations. The text affects how we understand 
scientific methodologies of short-term cognitive developmental studies by dramatizing the 
affective potential in conducting such emotively drastic experimentations on the human 
experimenter, in such a way that may alter an individual psychologically, emotionally, and 
influence interpersonal relationships. Millet contrasts Harlow’s apathetic treatment of his non-
human animal subjects with a dramatization of subconscious emotional turmoil in order to 
examine the ways in which the scientific setting implicates certain emotive approaches toward 
the non-human animal and consider why these specific terms of encounter are so doggedly 
maintained. ‘Love in Infant Monkeys’ focuses on a specific set of epistemological features of the 
experimental setting that includes issues of temporality and autonomy, in addition to 
methodological systems of separation between human and non-human animal bodies. Millet 
exploits numerous paradoxes present in Harlow’s investigation to frame her fictional 
reconstruction; Harlow ultimately wanted motherly love to be taken seriously but objectified 
motherhood in order to achieve it. These paradoxes in Harlow’s empirical investigations will be 
outlined in the following section.  
 
Fowler’s story ‘Us’ is a fictional reimaging of the mutual interspecies history that exists 
between humans and rats, with the experimental setting as the most significant point of 
convergence for modern-day encounters. In terms of how Fowler’s text affects our 
understandings of the scientific methodology of the chapter, ‘Us’ contextualises scientific 
practices by prompting a reconsideration of broader scientific trends of appropriation and re-
appropriation of the rat into empirical investigative design and, conversely, question future 
research directions. Fowler offers a fictional reinterpretation of the experimental situation that 
highlights the anthropocentric nature of scientific empiricism in order to propose alternative, 
biocentric approaches to extract mutually valuable knowledges on non-human animal life, 
focusing on logics of value as epistemological features in the experimental setting. Le Guin’s 
‘Mazes’ dramatizes the physical intimacies of human and non-human animal encounters to 
highlight overlooked capacities for greater understanding during these moments. Similarly to 
Fowler, Le Guin dramatizes anthropocentric approaches of empirical sciences to encourage a 
reconsideration of the scientific methodologies associated with comparative psychological 
experimentation. Le Guin depicts the experimental setting to contemplate the potentialities in 
moments that occur between human and non-human, including the reciprocation and 
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articulation of bodies, as well as explorations into other kinds of intelligence. Whilst the 
epistemological logics featured within these two particular fictional texts perhaps overlap at 
points, when considered alongside Millet’s ‘Love in Infant Monkeys’ all three fictional texts will 
coalesce to form a more comprehensive overview of the experimental setting that would 
otherwise not be possible should they be featured independently.  
 
 
The Ambiguities in Harry Harlow’s The Nature of Love  
 
In relation to the key investigative purposes of this chapter this section has two primary 
objectives. Firstly, to demonstrate the nature of the scientific climate that led to Harry Harlow’s 
comparative psychology experimentations on non-human animals to investigate maternal love, 
affection, and attachment and later the nature of depression and social isolation. Secondly, to 
identify certain paradoxes evident in his work, as well as the subtle ambiguities in his application 
of emotive terminologies in his empirical investigation, such as love and affection. These two 
objectives are complimentary to endeavours to identify and isolate valuable human and non-
human encounters within an empirical setting that threatens a species distance that quietens non-
human animal presences. Such instances will then be contrasted against the fictional literary texts 
that look to negotiate these same conceptual challenges to offer an effective reconsideration of 
this particular epistemological mode that produces knowledge on non-human animal life in the 
laboratory.  
 
At the time Harlow commenced his research, the field of psychology had only relatively 
recently solidified its position as a legitimate science and looked to establish the standard against 
which to model infant care and cognitive development during the post-war era. The reductionist 
works of behavioural psychologist John B. Watson sought to prove that love and similar emotions 
were ‘as amenable to manipulation as any other basic behaviour […] observable and measurable 
and controlled by the mastery of science’.345 In his paper Studies in Infant Psychology published 
in 1921, Watson remarked: ‘the young human animal is looked after from every material 
standpoint in a way that would have made our frontier ancestors, who simply let their babies 
 
345 Blum, Love at Goon Park, p. 38. 
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grow, doubt our sanity’.346 Watson had gained international renown for his experiments on “Little 
Albert”, the application of classical psychological conditioning established by the positive and 
negative reinforcement of emotive cues, tested on rats and applied to a human psychological 
surrogate, a 9-month-old boy named Albert.347 Now regarded to be one of the most controversial 
experiments in the history of psychology, for obvious reasons as well as Watson’s clumsy post-
experiment deconditioning, the result was the emergence of scientific guidelines for standardized 
parenting practice, what Blum refers to as ‘the concept of scientific motherhood’.348 The resultant 
guides, leaflets and books warned against overindulgence of parental touch, intimacy, and 
affection, which remained the dominant paradigm until the late 1940s. 
 
Later in the early 1950s, British psychologist John Bowlby argued that love and attachment 
were in fact primary emotions, not secondary drives of primary stimuli like hunger, thirst or 
pain.349 Bowlby’s work culminated in a commission by the World Health Organisation to 
investigate links between mental health and homeless children following World War II. Published 
in 1951, Bowlby’s report insisted that ‘what is believed to be essential for mental health is that 
the infant and young child should experience a warm, intimate, and continuous relationship with 
his mother (or permanent mother-substitute) in which both find satisfaction and enjoyment’.350 
Bowlby’s clear reprioritizations of love and affection in maternal relationships resonated deeply 
with Harlow, who looked to then contribute to the ‘compassionate momentum’ in the empirical 
crusade for motherly love and affection.351  Harlow’s intention is clear in his presidential address 
during the 66th Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association in 1958, in which he 
presented the results of his comparative developmental experiments on love and maternal 
attachment, entitled ‘The Nature of Love’. Harlow’s address begins: ‘[l]ove is a wondrous state, 
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deep, tender, and rewarding […] it has been written better by poets and novelists’.352 Harlow’s 
admission here is particularly potent as it admits a human emotive capacity that evades scientific 
determinations and is better interpreted by tools available to those in the humanities. Harlow’s 
indulgence in emotive language precede the contradictions that will be evidenced throughout his 
hypotheses and research aims: to understand something so emotively complex and exquisite 
through scientific means that are wholly emotionally destructive.  
 
Harlow directly rejects Watson’s dominant scientific motherhood theory during the 
introduction of  ‘Love in Infant Monkeys’, claiming that evidence up to this point was ‘lost in a 
jumble and jungle of confounded variables’353 and thus wrongly conclusive that ‘[t]he mother is 
associated with the reduction of the primary drives – particularly hunger, thirst, and pain – and, 
through learning, affection or love is derived’.354 The following year Harlow published ‘Love in 
Infant Monkeys’, which also begins ‘[t]he first love of the human infant is for his mother […] 
sometimes regarded as a sacred or mystical force’.355 Harlow’s use of the term “love” becomes a 
refusal to conform, an acknowledgement of its complex nature as an emotion that eludes sub-
delineations of attachment. Lauren Slater aptly observes that Harlow’s core motivation was ‘to 
talk about love […] [h]is experiments were long meditations on love, and all the ways we ruin 
it’.356 
 
These analyses of Harlow’s work are beneficial to the broader investigative purposes of this 
chapter due to paradoxes evident between his ultimate research goals and his scientific 
methodology. As Harlow looked to crusade against refraining to show effusive love to your infant, 
he wanted to also endorse value in moments of close affection, bodily contact and intimacy 
between mother and infant. However, in order to respond to and ultimately displace the 
dominant scientific motherhood paradigm, Harlow was required to reply in kind; using 
comprehensive scientific evidence and data gleaned from the cognitive models found in infant 
rhesus macaques. In order to disprove or “cure” one form of emotional violence, Harlow needed 
to perform acts of emotional violence himself, absolutely believing that the ends justified the 
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means. As Slater concisely surmises, Harlow believed that ‘to understand the human heart you 
must be willing to break it’.357 Herein lies the paradoxical nature of Harlow’s scientific legacy, that 
his work ultimately humanized parent-infant relations through processes of dehumanization. 
Harlow’s relentless pursuit of a positive conclusion, though the everyday implications of his 
methodology are wholly adverse and doubtlessly affecting, throws into doubt Harlow’s overall 
detachment from the process. Indeed, it is here that literary fiction finds Harlow and his use of 
non-human animals so intriguing as a way by which to reconsider the non-human animal in this 
empirical setting. Can one remain wholly detached from such emotional violence? 
 
The contrast between Harlow’s ultimately humanitarian research aims and ethically 
questionable methodologies in his use of non-human animals subjects is not at all a new 
revelation. A former graduate student of Harlow’s, John P. Gluck, summarises manifold views of 
him as ‘ethically thoughtless, as an animal husbandry advocate, as a creative innovator […] as self-
absorbed, as generous, and as a sadist experimentalist’.358 Gluck goes on to identify Harlow as a 
‘thoroughgoing experimentalist with an unsentimental view of animals’359 and ultimately ‘the 
plight of the experimental animals could be obscured by the abstract goals of the experiment’.360 
Harlow’s emotional sadism is self-evident, as Blum records him saying ‘[t]he only thing I care 
about is whether the monkeys will turn out anything I can publish. I don’t have any love for them. 
Never have. I don’t really like animals’.361 Again the paradox is reaffirmed, with Harlow being both 
‘the man who had redefined the bond between mother and child’, and, as another former 
graduate William Mason describes, the man who set out to ‘[m]ake these monkeys psychotic – 
take them and destroy them […] the work was really violating ordinary sensibilities’.362 Certainly, 
Harlow’s written accounts support his sarcastic callousness. In his article ‘The Monkey as a 
Psychological Subject’, a retrospective consideration on the choice of using rhesus macaques in 
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The lemur fortunately was not one of the nocturnal species, and he cooperated to the 
full extent of his limited capacities […] In spite of the fact that he failed to solve any 
but the shortest delays, he was a well-mannered animal who accepted his position as 
imbecile of the primate order with perfect grace.363 
 
This humorous summation as to why the lemur was eventually excluded during initial 
experimentations reveals a characteristic of Harlow’s writing, something Gluck refers to as his 
‘rhetorical disguise’.364 Gluck recounts that Harlow’s speeches and writing ‘were salted liberally 
with alliterations and rhymes. Poetry, science, and brutally directed descriptions were fused 
together’, evidence of Harlow’s thought process away from the strict protocols of scientific 
objectivity that scientific writing otherwise promotes.365  
 
 
Vinciane Despret and the Articulation of Bodies 
 
Vinciane Despret’s work concerning the experimental setting offers a series of valuable 
theoretical approaches adept at critiquing epistemological features in order to better identify 
conceptual oppositions, which can be utilized to compare literary investigations of the same. For 
example, Despret identifies the taboo surrounding the anecdotal practice that Gluck identifies in 
Harlow’s writing, a liminal or intermediary form between direct observation and official scientific 
materials. Within the laboratory, Despret observes that ‘an anecdote is generally defined, in this 
area, as an uncontrolled observation; that is to say, it is not accompanied by the “right” 
interpretive key’366, and leads to what scientists consider to be a ‘disastrous multiplication of 
possible motives’.367 Yet Despret instead proposes an extant mode of information relay that 
‘constitutes a body of tacit knowledge that is never mentioned within official reports but is freely 
used during the course of actions, often in the form of comical stories’.368 Whilst scientific dogma 
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would warn against any implications of anthropomorphic tendencies, Despret goes on to propose 
that actually ‘anthropomorphism is always there, for what could be more anthropomorphic than 
an apparatus that requires an animal to deny his own habits’.369 Taken together, Despret’s 
considerations here liberate the logics of scientific empiricism to imply that anecdotal evidence 
holds value as a form of making sense of non-human animal behaviour; a mode of articulating 
and communicating experience.  
 
More broadly, Despret’s considerations also include the influence of the experimental 
situation, resulting in non-human animals responding to other questions wholly different from 
those which investigators believe they are asking, even unknowingly providing the answers.370 
Despret proposes that ‘animals certainly respond to a question, but it is not the one we pose to 
them’371 as scientific methodological designs only ever ‘reduces the problem to its simplest 
expression’, limiting non-human animal capacities for articulation and other potential exchanges 
of valuable knowledge.372 As empirical methodologies of the experimental situation enforce more 
systems of separation and physical distance between human researcher and non-human animal 
subject, Despret’s deliberations on experimentational designs and the different kinds of 
interactions they implicate are particularly valuable. She considers ‘the real world of a laboratory, 
as exceptional as it is, in which beings of different species work together’, and the ways in which 
the experimental setting influences and shapes both human and non-human animal participants 
and subsequent encounters that occur there.373 Despret argues that this real world, consists of 
inter-species social relationships and intelligences born out of the habitual practices and regular 
presences dictated by empirical investigation.374 She highlights the capacity for inter-species 
adaptation within the experimental laboratory, or a mutual change in human and non-human 
animal behaviours to accommodate and negotiate epistemological systems of empirical 
investigation. She examines the potential of bodily proximities, articulations, and responses 
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between researcher and subject to propose ‘[b]odies are articulating, and become articulated’ 
during encounters.375 
 
Despret also examines the anthropocentric tendencies of scientific empiricism to suggest 
that hypotheses and their resultant methodologies have often already established the limitations 
of the cognitive or behavioural capacities of the non-human animal. By highlighting instances of 
closed-minded obstinacy within scientific experimentations, Despret advocates for more liberal 
approaches that permit degrees of ingenuity and initiative on the part of non-human animal 
subjects to determine investigative avenues. She notes ‘[l]aboratories might perhaps acquire 
more interest if scientists considered them as places of exhibition […] In place of routine and 
repetitive protocols, scientists could instead substitute inventive tests through which the animals 
could show what they are capable of when we take the trouble of giving them propositions that 
are likely to interest them’.376 Through subverting scientific empirical practices in this way, 
Despret contends there to be greater value in the models of knowledge extracted within this 
particular epistemological setting. Like Haraway, Despret asserts science and its researches to be 
socially constructed. She emphasises innate scientific predispositions to satisfy dominant social 
and cultural influences that ultimately dictate broader research trends and determine their future 
direction, whilst also considering the wider implications for the non-human animal experience 
caught within those investigative modes and empirical strategies. The theoretical approaches 
briefly outlined here evidence a series of valuable reconsiderations by Despret concerning key 
epistemological features of the experimental setting. These approaches represent a mode of 
rethinking experimental empirical science that will be employed to compliment, facilitate, and 
challenge fictional literary representations in order to accentuate the alternative ways in which 
this mode of knowledge production can be reconsidered. Firstly however, Despret’s approaches 
will contribute toward a conceptual analysis of the specific empirical practices and procedures of 
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Short-Term Experiments: Temporality, Autonomy, and Bodily Separation 
 
This section briefly outlines the key epistemological features of short-term experimental 
researches using non-human animals, or how this specific empirical mode works to produce 
knowledge, processes that the three literary fictions look to elaborate on. Using Harlow as a 
demonstration throughout the chapter, the practicalities of fictionally representing the non-
human animal in this scientific setting will be shown to be intrinsically tied to fundamental, inter-
reliant systems of temporality, autonomy and the separation of bodies. Short-term comparative 
experimentation implicates a different form of temporality and so it is understandable that 
instances of fictional representation would look to present themselves in a different way. In 
experimental practice, there are limited opportunities for one-on-one encounters between 
researcher and research subject as no mutual reciprocation is needed to create knowledge, there 
being more points of separation installed in a multi-subject investigation to avoid what Harlow 
considered to be the ‘jumble and jungle of confounded variables’.377 These investigations often 
rely on collective samples to produce statistical data and determine a general trend. Also, 
experimental comparative psychology researches depend precisely on the absence of moments 
for close bodily interaction and encounter between the human researcher and the non-human 
animal subject, as well as between the non-human animals themselves, for fear of contaminating 
results and the ambiguous nature of whatever cognitive phenomena is under investigation. All 
these epistemological features result in the individual non-human animal presences becoming far 
quieter in the experimental setting. This term is used to describe the situation of non-human 
animals within distinct epistemological systems of the experimental setting that deliberately or 
inadvertently restrict or reduce encounter opportunities between human researchers and non-
human animal subjects. Encounters include forms of interspecies interaction, communication, 
and bodily and emotive exchange that would otherwise be permitted in other scientific fields in 
which methodological designs utilize the non-human animals to produce knowledge.  
 
These wholly reductive processes present a problem for those looking to create a fictional 
representation of the non-human animal in this setting and under these epistemological logics. 
Scientific documents and materials are the only evidence of the non-human animal in the 
laboratory space save for infrequent professional autobiographies or memoirs. Fiction writers 
must consider how to negotiate or reanimate these systems of temporal filtration and separation, 
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complicated by abstractions of data to collective samples. Does the myopic nature of empirical 
investigative design truly demonstrate the infant monkeys’ everyday experience is as truly void 
as results suggest? Or is it the fact that this vacuum of affective emotions is exactly what the 
experimentations are looking to investigate and are mistaken as quotidian reality? These 
epistemological implications show how our imagination or ability to empathise struggles to reveal 
what it might be like to be a non-human animal subject in this empirical setting and so literary 
reconfigurations must offer alternative approaches to prompt effective reconsiderations.  
 
 
Narrative Strategy in Lydia Millet’s Love in Infant Monkeys 
 
Millet’s narrative strategy in ‘Love in Infant Monkeys’ is to not depict one single non-human 
animal character, as an extended representation of a single infant exploring what it is to be or 
feel like an infant monkey who ‘had known no mother’ would not be the most effective 
depiction.378 Instead, Millet opts to fictionally represent the experimenter Harlow, in order to 
encapsulate the broader experience of the non-human animal occupying the same laboratory 
space. This allows Millet to reprioritize and re-autonomize non-human animal presences within 
an empirical setting that exalts one-way methodological systems of encounter, unlike the two-
way interactions of long-term cognition and language studies. Millet’s narrative approach 
accommodates and adapts to the nature of short-term, multi-subject experimentations where 
human and non-human animal proximities are further removed and more distant. Through this 
narrative approach, Millet can encapsulate multiple non-human animal presences that are 
otherwise caught within empirical designs that continuously enforce systems of separation, 
isolation, and de-stimulation. This method by which to rethink the experimental setting is 
contrary to Despret’s more confrontational, animal-centric approach that connotes the 
artificiality of scientific empirical design and the situational circumstance it places the non-human 
animal into. She considers: ‘the rhesus monkey literally tortured by Harlow could hardly find 
means to resist the apparatus and the questions that are addressed to him/her’, deciding that 
actually ‘it is the animal that articulates the system’.379 In comparison, Millet’s narrative strategy 
therefore initially intimates an element of conformity and compliance with the empirical logics of 
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experimental researches, a strategy that could threaten a sense of distance from the non-human 
animal.  
 
Harlow believed his own rhesus macaques to be free of any contamination, claiming ‘we 
are better monkey mothers than are real monkey mothers thanks to synthetic diets, vitamins, 
iron extracts, penicillin, chloromycetin, 5% glucose, and constant, tender, loving care’.380 The 
inclusion of emotive love and affection at the end of this inventory highlights Harlow’s 
characteristic tendency toward sarcasm. However, it is also heavily ironic as methodological 
investigations of maternal love and affection rely entirely on their absence in order to, in 
accordance with the protocols of scientific empiricism, ‘make Harlow feel entitled to talk about 
love’.381 In his book Love in Infant Monkeys, Harlow demonstrates how non-human animals 
presences are quieter in the experimental setting, recording: ‘[w]e placed eight newborn 
monkeys in individual cages, each with equal access to a cloth and a wire mother’.382 These eight 
non-human animal subjects form the collective sample that will produce the empirical outputs of 
Harlow’s investigation into love and maternal attachment, ultimately showing ‘contact comfort is 
a decisive variable in this relationship [between mother and infant]’.383 In terms of quotidian 
experience, the subjects are completely isolated from one another at all times with only the 
artificial cloth and wire surrogate mothers to interact with as the methodology prescribes. 
Interestingly, there is a willingness on Harlow’s part to gender the cloth and the wire, maintaining 
a sense of maternal presence during investigations whilst also implying that it is possible to be “a 
mother” who entirely lacks softness. Results are presented as collective data, usually in graphs 
along with a summarised account to accompany the statistics, for instance: 
 
Strong preference for cloth mother was shown by all infant monkeys. Infants reared 
with access to both mothers from both (top chart) spent far more time on the cloth 
mother (coloured curves) than on the wire mother (black curves). This was true 
regardless of whether they had been fed on the cloth (solid lines) or on the wire 
mother (broken lines). Infants that had known no mother during their first eight 
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months (bottom chart) soon came to prefer cloth mother but spent less time on her 
than the other infants.384 
 
The everyday realities of the eight infant macaques are reduced to selected observed behaviours 
prioritised over others in accordance with the objectives of the investigation and indicated here 
as lines on a graph. As Despret observes, Harlow’s results demonstrate ‘a vital need to touch 
something soft […] this vital need that needs to be studied, dissected, and measured’.385 These 
ninety words encapsulate the experience of these eight non-human animal subjects specifically 
in regard to maternal attachment, or more precisely the lack of it. During this time, the infant 
macaques were subjected to other studies into fear, open-field anxiety, curiosity, and early 
mothering tests, all of which are also translated into data and presented as graphs. They are 
always alone, yet ‘[t]here are still many more things to take away […] to evaluate the effect of 
their withdrawal’.386 The linear temporal logics of the scientific investigation are filtered, fixated 
on moments prioritised by the experimenter and the quotidian experiences of the infant monkeys 
are lost having been never recorded and thus never outputted. 
 
Millet’s fictional reconfiguration focuses around a period in Harlow’s life that followed his 
investigations into motherly love and the ‘big-city world of baby care expertise’, following his 
explorations into isolation and depression.387 The first section of the story quickly establishes his 
professional position, that ‘[w]hen it came to the treatment of research animals, Harry was 
squarely in the mainstream. Only his willingness to speak bluntly was avant-garde’.388 Millet’s 
narrative is then interceded by a succinct paragraph of Harlow’s methodological approaches:  
 
One way to prove the hypothesis was to take a newborn monkey away from its 
mother and never give it back. Put it in a bare box, observe it. Anxiety first, shown in 
trembling and shaking; then come the screams. Watch it huddle, small limbs 
clutching. Make careful notations […] Repeat experiment with numerous infants. 
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Make notations […] Observe the birth of infants. Observe that the longest-isolated 
mothers kill infants by chewing off fingers and toes or crushing heads with their teeth. 
Notations […] Observe: Time after time, baby monkeys return. Bad mother is better 
than none.389 
 
Millet’s subtle implementation of free direct discourse in this particular sequence could be read 
as establishing the narrative setting “inside” Harlow’s mind, a dramatization of his own internal 
monologue through a stream of consciousness technique. Reminiscent of James Joyce’s seminal 
Ulysses, a stream of consciousness technique allows Millet to generate a mindscape of Harlow’s 
psyche in which deliberate and logical thought intermingles with immediate visceral reaction and 
emotionality. It is a significant attempt by Millet to literarily represent ‘the evanescent events of 
interior experience’, as Harlow’s conscious and unconscious perceptions co-exist simultaneously 
to implicate multiple interpretations that work to dissolve tendencies toward the logics of 
scientific empiricism.390 Such a technique could threaten to distort reconstructions of the 
experimental laboratory space and the non-human animal presences within it, but actually 
Millet’s deployment specifically looks to negotiate around the epistemological logics at work in 
this particular empirical setting.  
 
Certainly, Millet’s narrative strategy compartmentalises the linear temporalities of the 
empirical investigation and those of the non-human animal experience implicated within it, a 
mode of condensation that allows Millet to employ the epistemological features of this scientific 
setting dramatically. By frequently punctuating Harlow’s stream of consciousness narrative with 
systems of empirical observation and documentation, Millet reemphasizes the scientific 
objectives of the investigation in order to contrast them against the emotive effects that the 
fiction then looks to reprioritise. Methodological designs and empirical observations are 
reinterpreted, simplified, and reduced to their basic function and affecting consequence, resulting 
in a sardonic take on Harlow’s investigative process. The satirical short, succinct diction employed 
in Millet’s narrative depreciates the nature of scientific empiricism in this instance, questioning 
its overall aims and the moral implications of its chosen methodology. It also forces a 
reconsideration of how far empirical investigations need to be taken before hypotheses and 
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predictions are deemed satisfied. Millet employs this brusque mechanomorphic dialogue 
throughout the narrative, as ‘Harlow got in the car. Drove. Wasn’t far. Hated faculty parties, 
hardly ever went to them: frivolous. Took him away from his work’.391 The result is Millet’s 
suggestion that in fact Harlow may be mechanomorphic too and proposes elements of 
misappropriation and misapplication, rendering him a character on the periphery of the social 
world and wholly unfamiliar outside of the investigative setting.  
 
The narrative commences at the laboratory after-hours, outside of the temporal logics of 
the laboratory’s operating hours, though crucially the non-human animals remain within the 
temporal logics of the experimentations. Here Harlow is depicted as a self-exiled recluse whose 
default position is to be at the laboratory and all the while indulging his functionable alcoholism. 
Millet’s strategic decision to employ a first-person narrative is interesting as it must approach any 
depictions of the non-human animal experience indirectly, without losing key epistemological 
characteristics of the empirical setting. To this end, Millet’s narrative finds non-human animals 
are only ever glimpsed at, seen in passing, and dubbed simply as ‘the experiments’.392 She writes:   
 
Walking along the row of vertical chambers, he gave cursory glances inside – one, 
two, three subjects in a row had given up trying to climb out of their wells of isolation. 
The pits were designed, of course, to make it impossible to escape. One subject 
scrambled and fell back, a weak young female. She looked up with her great round 
black eyes. She was afraid, but still plucky. Still game to try and get out, changer her 
situation. The others were abject at the bottom of their separate holes […] Plucky got 
you nowhere if you were a lab monkey.393 
 
The circumstances of the non-human animals are obviously and deliberately miserable, always 
interpreted through Harlow’s indifference and relentless pursuit of scientific truth. The narrative 
then flits between the objective and subjective, describing the young macaque as ‘plucky’ in the 
face of ‘designed’ despair. As Harlow looks into the pit: ‘[s]he squeaked at him. Well, not at him, 
technically. She did not know he was there; she could not see him. She could see no one. She was 
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alone’.394 Harlow’s rhetorical slip is quickly corrected as his stream of consciousness narrative 
resorts to the empirical once again. Millet thus creates the impression that Harlow’s scientific 
objectivism is dominant and yet wavering at times; confused with personal emotive responses to 
the subjects themselves though always corrected and righted. Millet’s narrative strategy here 
insinuates an element of restriction in terms of the perceptive capabilities of the experimenter, 
an idea that correlates closely with Despret’s thought: ‘researchers compartmentalize the 
research; the animals do not stop prompting them to decompartmentalize it’.395  
 
Millet’s reincarnation of Harlow is one fraught with irony through his use of rhetorical 
devices or anecdotal evidence to buoy his empirical scientific reasoning. In his own writings, 
Harlow made clear that anecdotal evidence is indeed unscientific, being too quick or easy to 
evidence something science would consider genuinely revealing during encounters between 
human and non-human animals in the laboratory space. The inoperability of anecdotal evidence 
as scientific data rests on it being non-replicable; considered unreliable or empirically useless. But 
then what kind of vehicle is an anecdote and what does it accomplish for Harlow? He must have 
considered rhetorical renditions to be good articulations of something, as demonstrated in  his 
recollection of Tommy, a sphinx baboon, who ‘was intellectually endowed, but testing was 
difficult […] because this baboon fell head over heels in love with one of our testers’.396 Harlow 
dismisses the potentially distortive properties of anecdotal evidence, adopting the writing style 
in order to help communicate interactions with a non-human animal in a more affecting and 
memorable way. Importantly, it is for the same reasons that Harlow has remembered this 
particular subject himself. Consequently, the anecdote becomes something more credible; a 
collation of actions, behaviours, and interactions that relays information and implicates a deeper 
set of perceptions at play.  
 
As the narrative progresses Harlow leaves the laboratory to attend a staff party, but only 
on the premise that it allows him the ‘[c]hance to talk to Steve [Suomi] again about the 
chambers’.397 During the party sequence, Millet confuses appropriations between Harlow’s 
scientific investigative approaches and social interactions; any change in his cognitive behaviour 
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is difficult to identify as he moves from inside to outside the laboratory setting. Certainly, Harlow’s 
point of reference for each social interaction during the party is determined by their role at the 
laboratory or research interests, remaining uninterested in individual’s names or their attempts 
to socially or emotively connect with him. For instance, he speaks to ‘a new female grad 
student’398, ‘fat payroll’399 and a ‘girl from East Germany who was interested in the nuclear-family 
experiments’.400 The undertones of Harlow’s narrative reveal an aspect of Millet’s narrative 
strategy that blurs the lines of gendering and objectification; especially outside the context of 
empirical scientific investigation. Millet offers an ironic dramatization of the story’s opening: 
‘Harry Harlow had a general hypothesis: Mothers are useful, in scientific terms. They have an 
intrinsic value, even beyond their breast milk. Call it their company’.401 By the time we meet 
Harlow in Millet’s narrative, he does not differentiate between females, whether they be human 
or non-human animals, but instead applies his working empirical hypotheses and methodology to 
all he encounters. 
 
The paradoxical nature of Harlow’s prioritising motherhood as having “intrinsic value” but 
only ever “in scientific terms” is a key thematic throughout the narrative. Millet reiterates 
Harlow’s ultimate goal is proving that maternal touch and affection are vital for human infant care 
and development, though it remains something always far-off and remote from himself. Referring 
to the sympathy exhibited by the grad student for his wife’s illness, Harlow cynically thinks ‘[t]he 
free love ones were maternal […] Save it up for the kiddies, he thought. Wasted on me’.402 The 
disingenuous self-sacrifice and self-aggrandisement on the part of Harlow suggests that in order 
to assure the future of love, touch, and intimacy as a scientifically validated behaviour, he must 
give them up himself. This is coupled with a sense of misogynistic misanthropy in his regard of the 
student and other female colleagues he encounters, as well as a blatant arrogance in his 
premature application of knowledge gained from his empirical investigations. Certainly, for 
Harlow what is true for his detained female rhesus macaques under examination is true of all 
females across all species. His detached and observational tone is reminiscent of the female 
macaque observed in the experimentation earlier. Harlow’s empirically succinct interpretations 
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of obvious displays of care and concern during these interactions throughout Harlow’s internal 
narrative is Millet’s proposition that something must affect the researcher during encounters that 
look to deny such fundamental emotions. In doing so, Millet prompts a consideration and 
comparison between Harlow’s eventual results presented in the scientific vernacular and his 
actual, intimate personal experiences. Essentially, her point is that although the scientific method 
exalts a methodology that ensures the elimination of variables that would contaminate subject 
and findings, there is an element of contamination that moves in the opposite direction: a 
subliminal two-way affective encounter. What this means in terms of the representation of non-
human animals in the experimental scientific setting is the potential to rebalance systems of 
autonomy during human and non-human encounters: a way that fictional reconstructions can 
work against and negotiate around empirical systems that otherwise look to quieten non-human 
animal presences through methodological approaches of separation and isolation.  
 
 
Anecdote, the Articulation of Bodies and Affective Encounters 
 
In ‘The Body We Care For: Figures of the Anthropo-zoo-genesis’, Despret puts forward the 
notion of unnoticed behavioural by-produce occurring during and between empirical encounters 
in the experimental setting; unprioritized and unused by investigators. A brief outline of this 
conceptual approach will enable an identification and evaluation of how these same subliminal 
forms of encounter and exchange are explored and attributed value in the three literary texts. 
Referring to bodily encounters, Despret suggests that both human and non-human animal ‘are 
cause and effect of each other’s movements. Both induce and are induced, affect and are 
affected’.403 She then goes on to examine how human and non-human animal bodies 
‘articulate’404 to one another, and articulations can be read if investigative entities remain 
‘available’ or open during encounters.405 Though Despret’s conceptual approach encourages the 
potential for other modes of interactions between researcher and non-human animal subject in 
this epistemological environment, it also reemphasizes a key problem for Millet. How can fictional 
representations of human and non-human animals in the scientific space look to explore notions 
of affection, wholly reliant on bodily encounters, when the fundamental basis of the empirical 
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investigation relies absolutely on their absence through systems of separation? Millet achieves 
this in two ways: the first being Harlow’s awkward foray into the social realm at the faculty party 
to depict the emotive consequences of his research, and the second culminating in the nightmare 
sequence toward the end of the story. In regard to Despret’s articulation of bodies, it would seem 
Millet’s narrative strategy threatens to omit the non-human animal presences entirely, but it 
actually renegotiates the realities of their solitary confinement, or bodily distance, and provokes 
a reconsideration of their quotidian experience. Through such a strategy, Millet can free both 
Harlow and the rhesus macaques of the temporal and methodological trappings of the laboratory 
and experimentations. 
 
Millet’s narrative proposes that aspects of Harlow’s empirical experimentation, and thus 
the experience of the rhesus macaques, could have affected or been transferred to him 
subliminally. Intriguingly, there is evidence of these affective encounters and articulations of 
bodies in Harlow’s personal writings and is especially apparent in his article ‘The Monkey as 
Psychological Subject’, a retrospective on the choice of the rhesus macaque as his experimental 
non-human animal subject. In the article Harlow recalls ‘the finest animal in the collection […] a 
13-year old, almost unbelievably tame and gentle orangutan, Jiggs’.406 Harlow describes Jiggs as 
‘calm and deliberate, and he took his work seriously’, a clearly anthropomorphised recollection.407 
Harlow recalls a tool-using cebus monkey named Murphy, describing ‘an unusually tame and 
affectionate little monkey who bit only women and children’.408 Of these recollections, Harlow 
notes that ‘[o]ne can, of course, question the validity of the report because it is not substantiated 
by objective record other than written word’.409 Herein lies the limitation of the value Harlow 
attributes to anecdotal evidence, as any unscientific documentation of these supplementary non-
human animal behaviours would have been ‘a matter of grave risk to the reputation of any 
ambitious young scientist’.410 Harlow admits to the conscious omission of anecdotal evidence, 
disregarded due to science’s methodological terms of conduct. This demonstrates a conscious 
decision that knowingly or unknowingly directs empirical research trends and the particular 
knowledges they produce in one particular direction whilst turning from or repudiating another; 
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prompting a broader consideration of the nature of the non-human animals experience within 
this epistemological environment.  
 
Later in the article, Harlow recalls ‘an adult spider monkey, Grandma […] the only animal 
with a tail that could think’.411 He outlines Grandma’s constant curiosity, as well as the 
unprecedented use of her tail to complete and solve tasks; he continues: 
 
But there is an even more remarkable tale about Grandma. High above her indoor 
living cage and obviously out of arm’s reach was an electric light with a pull chain, and 
Grandma used to wile away the evening hours by grasping the chain with her tail and 
turning the light on and off […] [the night watchman} rushed upstairs to catch the 
intruder, and the light downstairs went on. He rushed downstairs and the light was 
off – and no one was there […] [t]he watchman had had enough, but Grandma 
continued to always be curious.412 
 
Though littered with Harlow’s trademark sarcasm, the extract provides a genuine glimpse into the 
experience of the non-human animal; it describes an interactive encounter occurring outside of 
the recorded parameters of a scientific observation. The episode remains forever anecdotal, 
written down and published after Harlow had achieved his fame and status, his anthropomorphic 
indulgences now of little to no risk to his professional reputation. Harlow does not elaborate on 
Grandma’s behaviour, never considering her actions to be incited by boredom, fear, anger, or 
even perhaps desperation. Nevertheless, she still exists in these anecdotal moments along with 
other non-human animal presences. Nevertheless, Harlow eventually determines that rhesus 
macaques ‘are almost devoid of personality, in the common sense meaning of the term’.413  
Harlow’s scientific objectivism ultimately triumphs and explanations for his appropriation of the 
rhesus macaque into his comparative psychological experiments for over twenty years are made 
apparent.  
 
Millet’s fictional reincarnation of Harlow includes comparable subliminal moments of 
affective encounter to force a consideration of what it takes to carry out empirical investigations 
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so devoid of positive emotive reassurances. Millet’s fictional adaptation of Harlow is perhaps 
idealistically hopeful that something did affect him, but equally prompts readers to consider how 
such deconstructive experimentations could not affect the one conducting them. Millet’s 
reconstruction guarantees Harlow is never denoted as the standard emotive response, depicted 
through his social imbalance and obsessive cognitive mannerisms. As shown in the party 
sequence, Millet’s narrative blurs the boundaries between the laboratory and social world to 
insinuate there is a psychological cost paid by Harlow as he deconstructs the emotions of love and 
affection in such a seemingly detached or empirical way. Though Harlow’s methodology may 
seem empirically sound to him and himself seem appropriately removed, Millet suggests that the 
empirical procedure must contain moments of affect and emotional exchange; such is the nature 
of such drastic experimentations. During the emotive climax of the story, Millet employs a dream 
sequence in which the powerful, universally emotive symbol of “the mother” visits Harlow in a 
reoccurring nightmare. Having occupied Harlow’s consciousness for most of the narrative to this 
point, Millet employs a singular representation once again, this time being the image of the 
mother and the infant. This strategy enables Millet to simultaneously embody all of the non-
human animal subjects in Harlow’s experimentations, both past and present, and personify 
abstract concepts of maternal care and affection. Such a strategy removes the temporal 
implications of the scientific environment being deliberated and moves the encounter to the 
metaphysical space of Harlow’s dream where active epistemological logics that situate researcher 
and non-human animal subject are dissolved in order to be then reconsidered. 
 
Harlow returns to the laboratory and finds the young female rhesus monkey no longer 
trying to escape, instead it is a ‘[h]unched little figure, staring. Nothing there. It had gone’.414 
Millet’s narrative then shifts into the third-person omniscient as Harlow falls into the reoccurring, 
alcohol-fuelled nightmare. The pragmatic and punctuational undertones that characterise the 
narrative up to this point are replaced by a more extended and visceral style, mirroring the 
liberation from empirical systems and Harlow’s empirical tendencies. However, even in his 
subconscious Harlow at first struggles to process the non-empirical implications of the dream:  
 
In the nightmare, which he’d had in other forms before, he stood beside his beautiful 
boxes, the boxes of his own design […] He mistook each infant monkey for a beloved 
soul. In that way the nightmare was confusing. He saw each infant in the heart of its 
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mother, precious, unique, held so close because the mother was willing to die for 
it.415  
 
The extract demonstrates an expression of internal guilt in a subconscious form, a somewhat 
conventional premise in its fictional exploration into the potential for unconscious psychological 
effects as a result of conversely conscious, rational scientific behaviours. Harlow’s rational 
scientific mind is still present in habitual form, demonstrated by the egotistical mention of his 
“beautiful boxes” and his mistaking or confusing the infant rhesus macaques as uniquely and 
emotionally precious. Similarly, the spectres that visit him are continuously referred to as “the 
infant” and “the mother”, still named according to their role within his experimentations. 
However, outside of the temporal reality of the laboratory space, the mother and infant are 
reunited and the affective intensity of the narrative increases as the maternal bond between 
mother and infant is reconstructed and restored only to be ruined again. Millet’s literary strategy 
works in the opposite way than key empirical processes Despret interprets Harlow’s research to 
rely on, that ‘[t]his experiment of separation does not stop with separating beings from one 
another but consists in destroying, dismembering, and, above all, removing’.416 Rather than 
accentuate the same deconstructive processes outlined by Despret, Millet actively works against 
them to restore what was lost during the experimental investigation.  
 
Millet transposes the temporal logics of the scientific setting in the narrative, causing 
Harlow’s experimentations to become the traumatic event within the chronology of both the 
mother and infant’s lifetime, rather than being subjects existing within the linear temporalities of 
the investigation. Subsequently, perspectives of Harlow’s experimentations change as it becomes 
the cause of the emotional distresses under observation. The traumatic experiences of mother 
and infant are portrayed as being due to something being lost, something that now exists and 
existed before the logics of the investigation and not artificially prevented as Harlow would like 
to believe. Despret’s conceptual approaches supports this notion, as Harlow’s only concern is to 
use the infant rhesus monkey ‘in order to measure the effects of an apparatus designed to create 
despair’.417 Millet inverts the terms of the experiment fictionally, displacing mother and infant out 
of the laboratory’s jurisdiction into the metaphysical dream sequence. By dissolving the 
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epistemological logics of the laboratory space, Millet encourages the reader to reinterpret the 
abstract terms “mother” and “infant” in closer accordance with their own understanding of 
maternal bonds between human mothers and their infants; rather than the detached 
demarcations presented by Harlow’s narrative and regiment scientific empiricism.  
 
The physical constraints of the laboratory space are also delimited during the dream 
sequence, modifying systems of separation and the proximity of bodies. Harlow no longer looks 
down on the rhesus monkeys without them knowing he is there, instead he now faces the mother 
who is ‘fully aware of what was happening to her and her baby’.418 Harlow observes: 
 
In the nightmare it was always the mother monkey he faced, not the infants. The 
mother, with her wild, desperate eyes. He felt what he could think of only as her 
passion, like a heat emanating. The mother was crazy with love, mad with a singular 
devotion. All she wanted was the safety of her infant. She would chew off her feet for 
it. She would do anything […] When he took the baby from her arms, her panic rose 
so high it could rise no higher; if she knew how to beg she would beg till the end of 
the world, scream until her throat split. Give me my baby back.419 
 
For Harlow the mother is now an unsettling presence that exists beyond the actualities of the 
investigation and is synonymous with the infant. The narrative shift is catalysed by the visceral 
reactions of the mother’s separation fundamentally affective and emotionally reactive, disarming 
Harlow of his empirical behaviours. Through creating the nightmare sequence Millet’s fictional 
strategy allows for the construction of a scenario where Harlow is no longer bound or 
authoritatively reaffirmed by the empiricism of the laboratory space. There is a deliberate 
narrative shift toward emotiveness, as Harlow struggles to comprehend both the intensity and 
variety of emotions felt by what he refers to as the mother’s “passion”. Harlow no longer 
translates the mother’s instinctive responses but feels them; no longer conjecturing but instead 
knowing that simply ‘[s]he would do anything’.420  
 
 





Millet’s fictional strategy corelates closely with the conceptual approach of Despret’s 
‘theory of emotions’, which argues that value exists in emotional responses during encounters in 
empirical spaces.421 Despret challenges the ambiguous interpretation or cautionary consideration 
of emotions in terms of scientific value, surmising that ‘[a]n emotion is not what is felt but what 
makes us feel’.422 Millet demonstrates these same implications through the affecting depiction of 
the screaming mother. Despret suggests scientific attempts to define emotions are ‘on the one 
hand assuming they explain how the world affects the mind, and on the other hand, how the mind 
affects or construes the world’.423 Despret proposes that the role of emotive responses, or 
affective behaviours, should be legitimately considered during human and non-human animal 
encounters because of the potentialities that they complicate. At the end of the story, Millet’s 
narrative returns to Harlow’s psyche to offer a final consideration of the nightmare sequence and 
the mother’s affective distress and turmoil; Harlow himself recognising that he ‘knew the feeling 
of loss that would last till she died. He knew it the way he knew a distant country. They had their 
own customs there’.424 Harlow is apparently reaffirmed as the unaffected and disaffected outcast 
returning to the familiar territory of scientific pragmatism. However, the imagery employed in 
these last two lines completely transposes Harlow’s position from being simply consciously 
disregarding of emotive behaviours or affective responses, to someone who is completely 
incapable of empathy entirely. The inference laid out suggests that Harlow has experienced past 
trauma, but his determination to understand or produce knowledges regarding complex and 
multifaceted concepts such as love, isolation, and despair ultimately make them unobtainable. 
When considered altogether, Millet’s narrative proposes a fundamental paradox in Harlow’s 
endeavour: the closer he comes to knowing emotions in empirical or scientific terms, the further 
away he gets from being able to delineate and understand them emotively himself.   
 
Within the broader argument of this chapter, the importance of Millet’s fictional 
speculation of Harlow’s experimentations into isolation and depression as well as their projected 
consequence on his own psychological state lies in its particular strategic approach toward issues 
of temporality, autonomy, and systems of separation that characterise experimental researches. 
Millet offers an approach that negotiates the practicalities of multi-subject non-human animal 
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experimentations to rebalance these epistemological systems enforced through experimental 
methodological design, exploring other means of valuable interspecies communications that 
occur during encounters to frame her literary reconsiderations. However, there remain other 
issues of autonomy that are unaddressed by Millet, her primary focus being systems of autonomy 
relevant to the physical experimental setting and methodological apparatus that dictate non-
human animal’s corporeal situation. Further conceptual considerations pertaining to issues of 
autonomy involve scientific empiricism more broadly, including its treatment of different kinds of 
non-human animals appropriated for experimental researches. These different issues of 
autonomy are intrinsically linked to another key epistemological feature of the experimental 
setting: the logic of value. Karen Joy Fowler’s ‘Us’ and Ursula Le Guin’s ‘Mazes’ are two other 
fictional examples that are more interested in these other epistemological concepts. Together 
with the fictional contributions of Millet’s ‘Love in Infant Monkeys’, an analysis of these two texts 
will form a more comprehensive overview of non-human animal experience in the experimental 
setting and a more complete consideration of key epistemological logics at work there.  
 
 
Literary Strategies: Karen Joy Fowler’s ‘Us’ and Ursula Le Guin’s ‘Mazes’  
 
Karen Joy Fowler’s ‘Us’ offers a particular literary strategy by which to reconsider the non-
human animal in this epistemological space, focusing particularly on the perennial use of rats in 
human scientific research. Fowler’s short story takes form of a narrated historiography of human-
rat encounters, opposing the rats’ collective narrative ‘we’ and ‘our’ referring to the ‘you’ and 
‘your’ of the human race. This stylistic technique enforces a sense of species distance in the 
narrative, despite the bodily proximities of researcher and non-human animal subject. Here, 
Fowler’s technique acts to fictionally reinforce species lines in such a way that allows for an 
eventual reconsideration of their existence and continued maintenance. Through this, Fowler is 
able to emphasise anthropocentric characteristics of empirical approaches and their use and 
treatment of non-human animals to question why systems of separation and demarcation are so 
dogmatically upheld. Therefore, the narrative allegorically traverses the entirety of human-rat 
history in order to weigh it against the utilisation of rats for modes of empirical investigation and 
consider its future direction. Fowler presents the two histories as indivisible from one another, 
stating ‘[w]e’re in this together, always have been’.425 Certainly, historian Jonathan Burt reiterates 
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the authenticity behind Fowler’s approach, noting ‘[the rat’s] significance goes beyond its ranking 
and is out of proportion to its size. The rat is, as some writers have phrased it, a twin of the human, 
and their mutual history is dark’.426 Fowler’s dual-species narrative is therefore not an overly 
unique consideration, but implemented fictionally it encourages a reconsideration of wider 
ethical implications pertaining to such widespread use of rats throughout history and 
subsequently in empirical designs today. 
 
Certainly, as with Millet’s portrayal of Harlow’s infant rhesus monkeys, an extended 
fictional representation of an individual rat would not effectively encapsulate the entirety of the 
non-human animal experience or all the forms of encounter effectively in this environment. 
Again, implications include issues of temporality and are intrinsically tied up with logics of value; 
concepts particularly poignant in short-term empirical investigations as Fowler concisely 
paraphrases: ‘our job is to sicken and die, but only in useful ways’.427 In Fowler’s narrative, the 
temporal logics specific to this form of scientific investigation are removed, leaving her free to 
present a broader view of human and non-human animal encounters in this epistemological 
setting. She moves past the temporal confines of the too short short-term experiment, beyond 
the limited lifespan of the non-human animal and chooses the historical; the life history of a 
species. In doing so, Fowler can highlight and directly question empirical motives, the paradigms 
that scientific investigation using rats looks to challenge and replace, as well as our overarching 
relationship with a species whose very existence has been appropriated by the terms of its 
usefulness. However, does such a narrative strategy threaten to in fact overgeneralise the 
experiences of the individual non-human animal in favour of prioritising reconsiderations of the 
cultural or scientific movement in question? In the case of Fowler’s narrative, it would suggest 
yes, that the importance and meaningfulness of the rat is gleaned from historical shifts 
throughout the species history, rather than considerations of the individual non-human animal. 
It is therefore beneficial to compare Fowler’s with another fictional strategy, one that employs a 
narrative favouring the individual non-human animal, to explore how the two different 
approaches negotiate issues inherent to short-term, multi-subject experimentations.  
 
Ursula Le Guin’s ‘Mazes’ is another short story told from the perspective of a single 
laboratory rat employed in a variation of cognitive behavioural experiments. The first-person 
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narrative finds its narrator considering the behaviour and actions of the experimenter who is 
blatantly human but referred to throughout as the “alien” or “creature” whose ‘elaborately 
perverse cruelty marks all its behaviour’.428 The narrative involves a series of recollections by the 
non-human animal narrator, now on the verge of death due to human negligence regarding its 
nutrition and being repeatedly put through a series of empirical tests and apparatus; particularly 
a maze run. The narrative contains a semi-anthropological quality, culminating in a sense of both 
cultural distance and of missed opportunities for communication and interaction; a mistranslation 
during an articulation of bodies between two species potently reminiscent of Despret’s bodily 
articulation approach. The story culminates in one last attempt on the part of the narrator to 
communicate through bodily cues, during a moment outside and away from empirical tests and 
scientific apparatus. In this moment, the rat recalls ‘[t]here were no words, yet there was 
communication […] It told me it was sick of torturing me, and wanted me to help it […] But I was 
too weak to speak clearly, and it did not understand. It has never understood’.429 The 
misinterpretations are anticipated to continue even after the narrator’s death, as ‘[n]o doubt [the 
experimenter] will come in to watch me die; but it will not understand the dance I dance in 
dying’.430 Le Guin’s rat never achieves any kind of communication, such is the inflexible nature of 
scientific observation portrayed in the story. Like Fowler, Le Guin’s alternative fictional strategy 
looks to negotiate issues of literary representation specific to the non-human animal in short-
term empirical investigations, though through an entirely different strategy. 
 
Le Guin’s singular, first-person narrative approach is seemingly the complete opposite to 
Fowler’s collective consciousness yet both strategies offer unique advantages in their 
representation of the non-human animal. Le Guin forms a sense of close proximity between 
human and non-human animal bodies, against which she then proposes lost potential in moments 
due to the obliviousness of scientific observation regarding anything outside empirical 
methodology and hypothesis. Whilst Fowler, through taking a broader view of the human and 
non-human animal relationship concerning scientific use of the rat genus, seemingly moves away 
from the bodily intimacies of the laboratory. Instead, Fowler allows for the consideration and 
evaluation of wider-ranging empirical priorities by including both a mutual historiography and 
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projected future, against which the present treatment of rats can be evaluated by the reader. 
However, despite these different techniques, both narrative strategies include a sense of 
deliberate distance installed between investigator and subject: Fowler’s “you” and Le Guin’s 
“alien” or “creature”. Both approaches treat the human as something other and ultimately 




The Logics of Value and Issues of Autonomy 
 
As stated, Fowler and Le Guin’s inclusion of rats in the laboratory space raises a key 
conceptual consideration unique to short-term experimentation regarding the smaller, more 
readily available non-human animals: the logic of value. Experimental non-human animal subjects 
such as monkeys, pigeons, mice, and rats are not prone to the same restrictions as other larger 
specimen like chimpanzees, certainly in terms of availability. Logistical advantages regarding 
housing, feeding, and financial costs appeal to investigators, particularly those constantly altering 
hypotheses and methodologies, requiring a numerous and constant stream of non-human 
animals. Additionally, the categories of smaller non-human animals are subject to different, less 
stringent levels of legislative protections within the laboratory space, falling within a demarcation 
of ethical and moral consideration and treatment determined appropriate to their species 
classifications. This therefore renders the subject pool potentially infinite, as there is no finite 
resource dependent on access to certain, expensive, and remote non-human animal populations. 
In comparative developmental psychology, investigations continue beyond the lifespan of 
individual non-human animal subjects. Instead, results are gleaned from a collective of less-
durable, shorter-lived contributors. These nuances in empirical logics of value reemphasize the 
fundamental conceptual opposition between different models of knowledge production of non-
human animal life in the laboratory. Long-term, single-animal studies value the animal more as 
investigations are appropriated chronologically into the lifespan of the subject according to 
learned behaviours and cognitive development; one non-human animal subject tests multiple 
hypotheses to produce multiple results. Conversely, the short-term, multi-animal investigations 
value the non-human animal differently as multiple research subjects contribute to a collective 




The logics of value introduce the notion that sub-fields of empirical science treat the non-
human animal as objects of the experiments rather than subjects of the experiments, a key 
conceptual opposition. This is intrinsically tied together with issues of autonomy, though the level 
of independence that this term insinuates are decidedly relative as it is impossible for non-human 
animals to ever enjoy full independence in this setting. That said, what levels of autonomy are 
permitted to the animals in these different settings? Primate language studies require a two-way 
system of information transfer between the human researcher and non-human animal subject. 
Employing interspecies teaching and learning of linguistics and symbology to proceed toward the 
research goal. A level of autonomy therefore rests with the non-human animal subject for the 
production of knowledge to occur. Other more exploratory modes of research, such as 
investigations into brain trauma for instance, have no such reliance on approaches of 
cooperation; actions are performed by the scientist on the non-human animal subject. Here 
autonomy remains solely with the human; the scientist applies the stimuli, through direct physical 
action or alteration of environment, and then observes the results. Taking these two particular 
examples into consideration, the chimpanzee subjects in the language experiment have greater 
autonomy, as they are the less objectified in comparison to those in the trauma studies. Again, 
this is a paradoxical consideration, as the chimpanzees are still charged with the task of learning, 
reciprocating, and influenced by species-specific notions of scientific and financial value. How 
then do Fowler and Le Guin represent the laboratory rat, whose role in the annals of science is 
most certainly as object and not subject, in such a way that rebalances these systems of value and 
autonomy to provoke an effective fictional reconsideration in this setting? 
 
Fowler’s narrative begins with an historical evocation of a past when human culture 
accepted rather than abhorred rats, emphasizing appropriations according to dominant social 
paradigms. Burt highlights that general attitudes toward the rat shifted alongside advances in 
human expansion to become ‘symbolically refashioned in the nineteenth century as it threatened 
the new thresholds of cleanliness that accompanied the building of sewers and other sanitary and 
medical advances. As rats came up out of the sewers, they were a visible embodiment of the filth 
that society was placing out of sight’.431 To achieve this sense of shift, Fowler’s rats possess a 
collective memory, recalling a time when ‘[y]ou thought we brought you luck, called us clever, 
resourceful, and resilient […] Inquisitive, industrious’.432 Fowler employs a paraphysical fictional 
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strategy, wholly different from Millet’s use of the metaphysical unconscious in the form Harlow’s 
dream sequence. The collective dynamic of Fowler’s narrative promotes the use of memory, a 
mental process excluded from or inexplicable by conventional scientific psychology. Fowler’s 
stylistic strategy moves the narrative away from the domain of the empirical, allowing for a 
discussion of scientific processes without systems of lineal temporality or other logics that the 
laboratory space would otherwise dictate. At the same time, Fowler is then able to navigate the 
multiplicity of roles played by rats in the empirical sciences throughout its history, better 
capturing the multifaceted nature of their involvement that accommodates the fact that it is 
‘almost impossible to get a summary overview on the countless experiments carried out with rats 
in the twentieth century’.433 By resorting to the medium of historiography, Fowler not only 
reiterates the scale of use, but also the human cultural shifts that appropriated those uses; as 
Burt highlights, ‘almost all experience of the rat is mediated through particular cultural responses 
to it […] [including] elements that make up the scientific construction of the rat’.434 Intriguingly, 
Fowler does not indulge in historiographical vernacular, but instead uses the form as a frame on 
which to build her fictional narrative.  
 
The narrative then mirrors the change in human attitudes toward the rat, as Fowler’s rats 
consider ‘[w]e’ve learned that it’s best to please you. You like us tame better than wild, docile 
better than savage […] but not in the sewers […] you want us to look as little like the rats that 
carried the plague as possible. Those rats are still in your nightmares’.435 The story maps out the 
shared diasporic migrations of both human and rat species, with rats thriving ‘on those areas of 
human activity which are themselves deemed to be the most problematic, such as war and 
imperialism’.436 Fowler prompts a consideration of mutual human-rat experiences, these being 
the devastations of disease, domestication, production of scientific knowledge, and implicating 
the potentialities of human-rat encounters. Fowler’s consideration of the modern-day human-rat 
relationship finds the laboratory become the narrative setting; playing host to inter-species 
encounters. Indeed, Fowler’s rats are acutely aware of their uses and knowingly look to ensure 
the future of their species by consciously fulfilling their expectations:  
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You like us fast and clever in mazes, but not in the sewers. We like the dark, but you 
don’t so we’ve learned to sleep in the light […] We don’t bring disease. We fight it. 
Now we are your partners in the great and final battle on the frontiers of medical 
progress.437 
 
Yet again, the collective consciousness in Fowler’s narrative allows for a broader reconsideration 
of the non-human animal experience in short-term experimental sciences. Fowler places modern 
empirical treatments within the timeline of the rat genus, forever being appropriated and re-
appropriated for use in scientific investigations. This encourages the reader to look beyond the 
individual laboratory rat and consider the moral and ethical dilemmas now applicable to an entire 
species and observe the paradoxes apparent in the hypotheses tested. For example, Fowler’s rats 
consider, ‘[o]ur desire to please you has wreaked havoc with your data, which displeases you. You 
prefer data to animals. This is a maze with only one way through’.438  
 
 
Reincarnations of the Laboratory Rat 
 
Undoubtedly, rats have played an immeasurable part in the progression of science; a 
perennial presence throughout its history right from its earliest point of genesis. The use of rats 
correlated with their domestication throughout the eighteenth century for social activities such 
as rat-baiting and as fashionable pets. This drastically increased accessibility and, coupled with 
selective breeding of particular species characteristics, cemented the role of the laboratory rat 
throughout the next century. Rats became widely available, which in turn also secured the survival 
of domestic populations; as Fowler aptly comments, ‘[d]omesticity works both ways’.439 Referring 
to the multiapplication of rats in the empirical sciences, Burt notes:  
 
Science treats the rat as vermin but also presents it as the hero/heroine of science 
(perhaps we should say that the former enables the latter). This is a long history of 
victimhood, doomed heroism or martyrdom: the rat has been dissected, vivisected, 
electrocuted, given diseases, drowned, genetically manipulated, controlled at a 
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distance by radio signals, and sent into outer space […] [if] the rat shadows the 
human, in science this is  much more tightly conceived substitution […] the rat has to 
be created, or recreated, by science. The commonplace that the rat is an ideal 
experimental animal contains within it the fact that science has created this ideal, 
while in turn also constructing itself, literally so in the case of laboratory equipment 
and housing, around its creation.440 
 
Burt proposes the continuous creation and recreation of the “rat”, constantly appropriated and 
re-appropriated into the episodic methodological paradigms of the empirical sciences. This 
feature is included in Fowler’s narrative, as ‘[rats] have become data. Our path is standardized 
breeding, standardized handling. Genetic variation has been minimised’.441 More specifically, rats 
have made innumerable and immeasurable contributions to empirical discoveries throughout 
almost all sectors of human science; including neuroscience, cardiovascular medicine, 
transplantation, genetics, nutrition, virology, effective treatments for diabetes, parasitic 
infections, and cognitive behaviour to name but a few. Since 1901, of the 106 Nobel Prizes 
awarded for Physiology or Medicine, 31 investigations relied on rats to conduct research and 
create data.442 These alone consist of ground-breaking discoveries into human conditions, notably 
the treatment of tuberculosis, identification of carcinomas, adrenal hormones, regulation of 
cholesterol metabolism, signal transmission in the nervous system and development of MRI 
image generation.443  
 
Today, technological advancements in genetics mean that laboratory rats are now 
eugenically modified for key physiological features. For instance, the artificiality created sub-
species of Zucker fatty rat is used as a genetic model for obesity and hypertension444 or the Royal 
College of Surgeons rat which is used as a classic model of recessively inherited retinal 
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degeneration.445 These synthetic sub-species are the result of the creation of ‘a variety of genetic 
stocks’ from which scientists can select the ideal subject.446 More recently, on 1st April 2004, the 
complete genetic sequence of the Brown Norway rat was presented to the scientific community, 
with which scientists could isolate, remove, or replace selected genomes to produce a perfect 
laboratory rat by which to test specific hypotheses; known today as knockout rats.447 These are 
most well known for their uses in stem cell researches today. The rat has been used in empirical 
investigations for over two hundred years, to such an extent that they are now synonymous with 
science and the laboratory in the public imagination.  
 
Accordingly, the modern-day rats featured in Fowler’s narrative become biologically altered 
by humans; as ‘the more of your DNA we carry, the more fragile we are. Your filthy presence 
threatens us with fatal infections. We hope you see the irony’.448 Fowler moves from the 
intertwining of the historiographical to the biological in order to question the accountability of 
science, portraying a futuristic, symbiotic fusion of two species, or ‘team players […] surrogates’, 
that blur biological lines in order to fulfil the promissory that ‘[s]omeday we’ll save you from 
disease and maybe, finally, from death itself’.449 Fowler’s narrative approach prompts a 
consideration of the broader epistemological implications at play and the empirical motivations 
that guide the use of non-human animals in research. Fowler’s modern, scientifically ideal rat is 
‘The International Genetic Standard Rat’ whose ‘[g]enetic variation has been minimized in the 
attempt to eradicate the noise of individual personality. The ideal laboratory rat is an apparatus 
in today’s modern lab, a test tube’.450 By presenting the story in this way, an interconnected 
history of two species, Fowler looks to propose a reconsideration regarding the fundamental 
reasons for scientific research. Indeed, this is highlighted early in the story as Fowler’s narrators 
observe a characteristic of human empirical approaches, ‘[n]o one else so often mistakes a mirror 
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for a window’.451 This consideration allows for a wider-reaching and all-encompassing view of the 




The Reciprocation of Bodies: Empirical Selectivity and Missed Opportunities 
 
In both Fowler and Le Guin’s stories, reasons for the sense of species distance are given to 
be the empiricism of the sciences. The blinkered view of scientific protocol and practice ultimately 
dictate and restrict opportunities for other modes of producing knowledge concerning non-
human animal life, as well as the nature of encounters and exchanges. For instance, Le Guin’s rat 
recalls:  
 
So when I was taken up and put down, amidst all this strangeness, in a maze […] it 
was a moment of strength and hope […] It seemed pretty clear that I had been put in 
the maze as a kind of test of investigation, that a first approach toward 
communication was being attempted. I tried to cooperate in every way. But it was 
not possible to believe for very long that the creature’s purpose was to achieve 
communication.452 
 
This passage resonates with a conceptual approach put forward by Despret, who proposes all 
non-human animals under investigation ‘must still solve [the trial] in the terms that interest the 
researchers’.453 Certainly, the single purpose of the maze is to test how quickly the rat can move 
through it; an ability requiring a level of intelligence deemed to be important by the operating 
hypothesis of the investigation and tested through what is considered to be an empirically sound 
method. During this empirical investigation, supplementary behaviours are deemed irrelevant or 
invaluable so long as they do not contribute to either securing or displacing current scientific 
paradigms concerning navigation abilities in rats. Despret’s consideration subverts the conditions 
of the empirical investigation in order to reprioritise the experience and uninterest of the non-
human animal. Despret instead poses the emblematic question ‘[w]hat are rats interested in 
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during experiments?’.454 Accordingly, Fowler’s rats note ‘[t]he walls of our world are opaque, 
because you don’t like it when we look at you […] In your eternal light, we ask ourselves 
philosophical questions. What happens next? […] What are you like in the wild?’.455 Like Le Guin, 
Fowler’s narrative reemphasizes the artificiality of the experimental laboratory space and the 
prescribed nature of encounters that occur there. Both narratives are built around the notion that 
not only does the laboratory exalt systems of control over internal and external variables, but it 
also mandates a particular mindset pertaining to the extraction of knowledge and this extraction 
only happens in particular ways.  
 
Despret supports this suggestion in her examinations of an experiment conducted by 
Robert Rosenthal on students working with rats in the laboratory space, where artificially placed 
preconceptions of a student’s rat subject suggested they had been bred for either ‘brightness’ or 
‘dullness’.456 The students’ preconceived biases subsequently affected student expectations and 
influenced the scientific data produced. Despret takes Rosenthal’s observational findings further, 
proposing a two-way interaction in fact takes place here:  
 
[The students] put their trust in their rats, emotional trust, trust that is conveyed in 
gestures, in students’ bodies, in all these rats’ bodies that were manipulated, 
caressed, handled. Fed and encouraged: the students succeeded in attuning their rats 
to their beliefs […] these beliefs brought into existence new identities for the students 
and for the rats […] this practice proposes new ways to behave, new identities, it 
transforms both the scientist and the rat.457   
 
Despret is suggesting that scientific empirical systems effectively produce the same truth that 
they seek to find, though occurring at the level of bodies and identities. This is something that 
Fowler includes in her fictional reconstruction; an existent mutual regard and reciprocation of 
bodily responses. Fowler’s rats notice the scientific tendency toward refutation and conjecture, 
or ‘[v]icarious trial and error (VTE) is what you called the hesitant, looking-about behaviours we 
 
454 Ibid., p. 89. 
455 Fowler, ‘Us’, p. 20.  
456 Robert Rosenthal, ‘On the social psychology of the psychological experiment: the experimenter’s hypothesis 
as unintended determinant of experimental results’, American Scientist, 51 (June, 1963), 268-283 (p. 270).  
457 Despret, ‘The Body We Care For’, p. 122. 
163 
 
evidence before moments of decision’.458 Fowler evidences the Rosenthal effect in her narrative 
strategy, through the inclusion of a rat strain determined to be psychological: ‘[t]ell a student he 
has a Berkeley rat, and whoever he has will try to perform accordingly. While you were noting our 
VTEs, we were noting yours’.459 Here, Fowler proposes the inter-species reciprocation of 
behaviours; the generation of learned habits through repetition and repeated practice, the result 
of mutual cohabitation and environmental interactions.  
 
Fowler removes the epistemological restrictions of a one-way empirical system to consider 
what is being learned by both human and non-human animal participants. She elaborates: ‘[w]e 
prided ourselves on our performance, our abilities, our discipline. Now recent studies suggest that 
the single factor most predictive of our success is you’.460 Completing her critique of scientific 
methodology, Fowler’s rats query the same favourability toward the maze as a scientific 
measurement tool, ‘[i]t surprises us that, among your many sporting events, you don’t include 
the mazes; you seem to be such enthusiasts’.461 Again, this emphasizes the artificiality of the 
apparatus and exaltation of particular intelligence and behavioural criteria over others; 
reemphasizing a sense of performance during time within the maze and a disregard for moments 
outside it. Fowler condenses linear temporalities concerning the history of the maze experiment 
to implicate and question scientific methods of knowledge production more broadly: 
 
For years there was evidence, unscientific and anecdotal […] you said the rats had no 
interest in the mazes. They responded only to food cues […] Later, we could be set 
back inside at any random point and still find our way easily. You began to talk about 
our cognitive maps, the scientific ways in which we worked, as if we were testing out 
hypotheses.462 
 
However, between researcher and subject, and between bodies, Despret proposes there exists 
the ‘cause and effect of each other’s movements. Both induce and are induced, affect and are 
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affected’.463 The blatant frustration of Le Guin’s rat is born from the experimenter’s permanent 
predisposition toward intelligences that are deemed to be scientifically important and are only 
empirically discernible: the intelligence to move through the maze successfully. Subsequently, the 
rat’s other kinds of intelligences go completely unnoticed or are wholly misinterpreted, occurring 
outside the observational parameters of empirical testing. In Le Guin’s narrative, these systems 
are juxtaposed and exaggerated by the corporeal closeness and proximities between human and 
non-human animal bodies; as the rat considers: ‘[t]he alien has never once attempted to talk with 
me. It has been with me, watched me, touched me, handled me, for days: but all its motions have 
been purposeful, not communicative […] totally self-absorbed’.464 Such a literary strategy 
therefore challenges scientific methodologies that promote separation to consider whether even 
brief moments of proximity between bodies can truly exist without moments of value or affective 





The objective of this chapter was to analyse the ways in which literary strategies available 
to contemporary authors can represent and offer effective reconsiderations of non-human animal 
experiences within the epistemological logics of short-term comparative developmental 
experimentation. The methodological designs used within this sub-category of laboratory-based 
investigation cause non-human animals to be both more numerous, being multi-subject 
investigations, and more distant, complicate by systems of separation installed to ensure non-
contamination. As demonstrated in the chapter, the result is that non-human animal presences 
become quieter in this empirical situation. This chapter argues that Lydia Millet’s ‘Love in Infant 
Monkeys’, Karen Joy Fowler’s ‘Us’, and Ursula Le Guin’s ‘Mazes’ represent three different literary 
strategies that critique and rebalance the stringent modes of temporal regulation, systems of 
autonomy, and the logics of value, that are all profoundly influential on the non-human animal 
experience within the experimental setting. The chapter contends that the value of its critical 
approach lies in its ability to frame different kinds of knowledges produced in this epistemological 
setting and make visible other, less obvious, but still highly valuable, human and non-human 
animal encounters occurrent there. The thesis now moves to consider another sub-division of 
 
463 Despret, ‘The Body We Care For’, p. 115. 
464 Le Guin, p. 59. 
165 
 
laboratory study where scientific methods of temporal control and systems of autonomy used on 
non-human animals are implemented in their most regiment form: invasive practices that utilise 



































‘The human body writ small’: Revitalising the Non-Human 
Animal in Invasive Scientific Practices 
 
 
The love of a dog for his master is notorious; in the agony of death he has been known 
to caress his master, and every one has heard of the dog suffering under vivisection, 
who licked the hand of the operator; this man, unless he had a heart of stone, must 
have felt remorse to the last hour of his life. 




The historical use of non-human animals in invasive scientific practice is extensive and, 
broadly speaking, split into two categories: vivisection and dissection. Vivisection is the practice 
of surgical exploration on a living or conscious non-human animal to view active internal biological 
systems, whilst dissection is performed to examine a research subject post-mortem. As Darwin’s 
mention evidences, even for the founding father of biology and evolutionary science, vivisection 
was always a polemical topic right from its earliest point of genesis. Certainly, vivisectional 
practice on non-human animals instigated one of the most volatile periods in modern empirical 
science, as ‘[i]n the nineteenth century a focus on physiological processes in action, and the 
advent of germ theories of disease and their claims to universality for disease causation, led to 
renewed interest in extrapolating from animal models to understand human physiological and 
pathology’.466 Emergent anthropocentric sensibilities so prevalent in the sciences saw vivisection 
justified, adopted and practiced widely by those within the developing medical professions. 
However, simultaneously, it was answered by the rise of the antivivisection movement, a diverse 
collection of opponents who challenged it on both moral and religious grounds. The gruesome 
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consequences inherent to a newly developing practice ensured that the immoralities of 
vivisectional practice were still being fiercely contested well into the succeeding century. 
 
During this time, the vivisection debate drew in those operating outside the empirical 
sciences, transcending the strictures of science to become intertwined with upheavals of gender 
systems and social class-related activism, resonating particularly with proponents of concurrent 
emergent humanist literary movements. Consequently, many of the most influential figures of 
the mid-nineteenth century rallied to join the opposition to vivisection, including Charles Dickens, 
Robert Browning, Leo Tolstoy, Lewis Carroll, Mark Twain and George Bernard Shaw.467 C. S. Lewis, 
a particularly notable proponent of antivivisection, wrote:  
 
It is the rarest thing in the world to hear a rational discussion of vivisection […] Now 
vivisection can only be defended by showing it to be right that one species should 
suffer in order that another species should be happier […] The victory of vivisection 
marks a great advance in the triumph of ruthless, non-moral utilitarianism over the 
old world of ethical law; a triumph in which we, as well as animals, are already the 
victims, and of which Dachau and Hiroshima mark the more recent achievements.468 
 
Lewis positions the inherent immoralities of vivisectional practice alongside those that drove the 
Holocaust and the nuclear event on Hiroshima. Similar parallels were drawn in other humanist 
critiques of post-war modernity, notably Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno’s philosophical 
work Dialectic of Enlightenment, first published in 1944. They proposed a growing irrationality of 
reason during the mid-twentieth century, accelerated by notions of domination, to become 
‘[w]hat human beings seek to learn from nature is how to use it to dominate wholly both it and 
human beings […] Power and knowledge are synonymous […] The disenchantment of the world 
means the extirpation of animism’.469 Traditional cultural perceptions and representations that 
had originally attributed a living soul or spiritual essence to the non-human animal were quickly 
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superseded by epistemological modes exalting mechanomorphic deconstruction. If nature was to 
be accessible to systematic, scientific interpretation, then traditional notions of animism had to 
be eradicated. Horkheimer and Adorno suggest that this philosophical shift, this irrationality, was 
born from humanity’s fear of the unknown, that ‘[h]umans believe themselves free of fear when 
there is no longer anything unknown’470, and the result being that ‘[f]or domination’s bloody 
purposes the creature is only material’.471 The popularity of invasive science on non-human 
animals during the modern era thus correlates alongside a wider idealism that, for humanist 
opponents, symbolised the decline of nonreligious human morality.  
 
Simultaneously, the sciences withdrew further into the isolationism that characterises them 
today, widening the distance between themselves and, not only the humanities subjects, but the 
general public. The exclusivity of a self-sustained and self-regulated sub-culture permitted those 
expertly trained within the empirical sciences, with their own customs and vernacular, to obtain 
a level of independence specific to their own practices and protocols. Historian Debbie Tacium 
highlights, ‘[i]t was becoming more difficult for individuals, no matter their level of education, to 
straddle the barrier between scientific, experimentally acquired knowledge, and literary 
philosophy’.472 It is important to note that practices of vivisection, in the traditional sense, are 
rare today, and those that are performed on Sauropsida (reptiles, birds etc.) and Mammalia are 
always conducted under anaesthesia to minimalize pain and discomfort, with various exceptions 
for other non-human animal classes. The term “vivisection” is now used pejoratively to 
encapsulate all invasive procedures on live non-human animals, regardless of procedural duration 
or severity.  
 
Post-mortem dissection remains the most prevalent invasive procedure on non-human 
animals, in both laboratories and educational institutions at all levels. Whilst still vociferously 
challenged by non-human animal rights groups and anti-dissection proponents, dissection is 
determined to be the more humane way by which to perform biological investigative procedures. 
Many within their own field believe the sciences should be vigilant in identifying alternative non-
human animal learning methods instead of relying on more traditional methods that favour their 
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biological consumption.473 However, those looking to enrol in modern biological and biomedical 
practices are still expected to familiarise themselves with the practice of dissection. Writing on 
dissection as a developmental practice, biologist Thomas Lord wrote ‘[s]tudents in the 
experimental laboratory are involved not only in theoretical learning, but in manipulative-skill 
learning. They handle the structure, feel its weight, probe its consistency, and explore its 
constitution […] wonder about a structure’s unity and marvel at a structure’s complexity’.474 
Despite Lord’s invocation of the term ‘structure’, the particulars of his example promote a sense 
of intimacy between human and non-human animal bodies, albeit when the subject is deceased.  
 
 
Introducing the Fictional Texts 
 
Sylvia Torti’s Cages and Allegra Goodman’s Intuition will provide the literary materials of 
the chapter, with both novels including fictional reconstructions of modern vivisection and 
dissection, respectively. In terms of how these texts affect how we understand the scientific 
methodology that shapes the chapter, both consider the affective potential that remains after the 
non-human animals are no longer animate or living within human and non-human animal 
encounters. Cages and Intuition explore scientific systems of power and autonomy within the 
laboratory space: how paradigms are argued and contested to permit exclusive freedoms and 
advantages to those operating within a structure that exalts opportunistic individualism. 
Particularly, they explore how these processes reverberate within interpersonal relationships and 
how empirical science rewards those who adhere to its strict methods of advancement. 
Consequentially, human presences are foregrounded, and non-human animal presences are 
backgrounded in the literary material, though the laboratory remains the mutual environment in 
which significant events occur. 
 
Torti’s Cages, published in 2017, is based within a modern-day U.S. laboratory in Salt Lake 
City, Utah. The empirical aims of the laboratory are to investigate and discover the biomechanics 
of birdsong, therefore determining the nature of cognitive learning and stored memory in the 
 
473 Jonathan Balcombe, ‘Dissection: The Scientific Case for Alternatives’, Journal of Applied Welfare Sciences, 4 
(2001), 117-126.  
474 Thomas R. Lord, ‘The Importance of Animal Dissection’, Journal of College Science Teaching, 19 (May, 1990), 
330-331 (p. 330). 
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avian brain. This would then be applied to human cognitive models of memory. The third-person 
narrative is split between the novel’s three protagonists: research lead David, post-doctoral 
student Anton and laboratory technician Rebecca. Themes within the novel include human 
pursuits toward a sense of belonging, each of the three characters having been emotionally 
outcast in some way, and the capacities of memory to inform and influence past and present 
realities, offered through the tripartite romantic relationship that occurs. David, the most 
established scientific figure in the novel, is experiencing a period of dormancy in terms of 
professional achievements, his past breakthroughs had been a ‘remarkable success […] He’d been 
the first to poke through a bird’s skull and insert fine wires into single neurons, a technique that 
allowed him to survey a new landscape, mark the places on the brain that could, and did, acquire 
a type of language’.475 In an attempt to reinvigorate his research and its production rate, avoiding 
more ‘dead birds and dead ends while the expiration date on his remaining grant advanced’, David 
hires Anton, a European post-doctoral student.476 Anton represents the next-generation of bio-
scientist and looks to modernise David’s research approaches, at the same time safeguarding his 
own professional legacy by secretly pursuing his own avenues of empirical enquiry. Lastly, 
Rebecca represents a non-scientific presence in the laboratory space, arriving there from outside 
the profession, voicing her moral and ethical concerns for the treatment of the non-human 
animals throughout. The invasive nature of the procedures conducted on non-human animals in 
the novel is predominantly vivisection; birds are sedated, operated on and brought back to 
consciousness following human interference with their internal biological systems.  
 
Torti herself occupies a unique position that spans both fictional and empirical realms, 
being a Professor of Biology at the University of Utah. Intriguingly, there exists a scientific 
publication that mirrors the surgical practices portrayed in her fictional reconstruction, funded by 
the U.S. National Institute of Health, drawn from later in the chapter. Torti acknowledges the 
novel to be ‘the product of a decade-long conversation with Franz Goller, who gave me space in 
his birdsong laboratory’, a research associate cited on the scientific publication.477 The implication 
is that there is an equivalent scientific basis to Torti’s novel that offers up the opportunity for a 
direct and precise comparison between scientific realism and strategies for its fictional 
reconstruction. 
 
475 Sylvia Torti, Cages (Tucson: Schaffner Press, 2017), p. 17. 
476 Ibid., p. 20. 
477 Ibid., p. 297. 
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Allegra Goodman’s Intuition, first published in 2006, is based at the Harvard tributary 
Philpott oncological research institute in Boston, Massachusetts during the mid-1980s, whose 
overarching biomedical investigative aims work toward effective treatments and potential cures 
of cancer in humans. The third-person, omniscient narrative is divided amongst numerous 
characters, both within and without the scientific profession. The story revolves around Cliff 
Bannaker, a talented post-doctoral student at the institute, and his discovery of a potential cure 
for cancer: his R-7 antiviral formula. Cliff’s tumultuous discovery causes both personal and 
professional loyalties to be forged and broken and his anticipated breakthrough reverberates 
throughout the wider scientific community, offering Cliff and the institute a chance for global 
renown and recognition. The story culminates in a review of Cliff’s investigation by an external 
regulative body, who find him guilty of poor scientific practice which in turn affects the legitimacy 
of his results and he is thus finally made redundant. Crucially, Goodman’s novel is a fictional 
reconsideration on the exclusivities, material excesses and expectant behaviours that make up 
the empirical scientific profession, as well as the subtle nuances and motivations that exist in 
terms of individual aspirations and the idiosyncrasies of interpersonal relationships within an 
institution. This conventional broader novelistic framework of exploring human values remains 
significant in terms of making sense of non-human animals in this specific laboratory setting, as 
the ownership of knowledge drives events in the novel, created with the participation of non-
human animal subjects. The chapter analyses not only how participations still take place when 
the non-human animal occupies an inanimate state, but are complicated further when human 
invasiveness is representative of both human relationships and individual personal aspirations. In 
terms of invasive procedures on non-human animals, the novel includes the post-mortem 
dissection of mice purposely infected with cancerous cells and, subsequently, the development 
of carcinomic tumours.478 Unlike in Torti’s Cages, Goodman includes no non-scientific character 
within the laboratory space through which to deliberate the wider ethical implications of using 
non-human animals in this way. Consequently therefore, Goodman’s narrative strategy threatens 
to leave the non-human animal presences in the novel as peripheral.  
 
 
478 An outline of both historical and current scientific uses of mice is provided in Nadia Rosenthal and Steve 





So as to remain focused on the key enquiry of the thesis, how literature can intervene in 
considerations of what it means to conduct experiments on non-human animals, it is essential to 
understand that the thematic priorities of both texts affect the non-human animals featured. For 
example, unlike in Colin McAdam’s A Beautiful Truth, in which the foregrounded thematic is 
transparently what it is to conduct scientific experimentations on non-human animals, Torti and 
Goodman are not so blatantly interested in these same subjects. The justification for choosing 
two such examples of literary material is precisely their inclusion of invasive surgical practices on 
non-human animals, with their unique systems of value already relegating non-human animals to 
positions of materiality. Therefore, these fictional laboratories must be read in such a way that 
works against these processes of backgrounding, employing conceptual approaches that can re-
centre the non-human animal presences and inform effective literary examination.  
 
 
Jane Bennett’s vital materiality framework 
 
As previously denoted, Torti and Goodman include human and non-human animal 
encounters in which the non-human animal presences are inevitably quieter, determined by the 
logics of value that govern surgical and invasive scientific practices. The implication being that the 
non-human animals exists predominantly as biomaterial, placing them within systems of 
autonomy that reflect their materiality, threatening to invalidate their participation altogether. 
As the non-human animals featured are literally and metaphorically made quieter, eventually 
becoming inanimate after the killing moment, other more imperceptible forms of affection must 
be identified and considered. Elizabeth Johnson is one example of recent animal studies that 
considers the wider and spatial relations of surgical encounters, a conceptual approach that 
‘expands the present’.479 As new terms of the encounter are renegotiated, the new existences of 
the non-human animal can help rebalance systems of autonomy and incorporate new material 
realties. To unlock these potentialities, the conceptual approaches of political theorist Jane 




479 Elizabeth R. Johnson, ‘Of lobsters, laboratories, and war: animal studies and the temporality of more-than-
human encounters’, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 33 (2015), 296-313 (p. 296).  
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Bennett borrows heavily from the abstract framework of Latour’s Actor Network Theory, 
along with the familiar approaches of Despret and Haraway.480 She formulates the theoretical 
concept of ‘vital materiality’, or, more broadly, the mutually affective agencies existing in actor 
networks consisting of humans, non-humans and inanimate matter.481 Bennett’s fundamental 
methodology focuses on and around political equalisation, looking to ‘experience the relationship 
between persons and other materialities more horizontally’, and thus avoiding complicative 
systems of human autonomy and power inherent to hierarchies of being.482 Crucially, Bennett’s 
approach can accommodate the inanimation of Goodman’s dead mouse body to endow it with a 
different kind of agency during the human and non-human animal encounter: the ability to still 
affect and be affected.  
 
Similar to Latour’s terminology actor network, Bennett employs assemblages as the name 
by which to describe a group of objects of different or similar types found in close association with 
one another. Whether they be human or non-human, animate or inanimate, all objects must be 
considered to be actors, existent beyond the principles of materiality and equal contributors 
‘irreducible to the culture of objects’.483 Assemblages can vary greatly in terms of size, depending 
on the number actors or actants (a source of action) that in turn form multitudes of 
interconnective points between them. Network parameters are thus advisable to avoid becoming 
lost in the potentially endless combinations of connective points at both micro and macro-levels 
of application. Bennett accommodatingly outlines the fundamental principles of her theoretical 
approach using her own example of an assemblage, a collection of extraneous objects observed 
caught in a drain:  
 
[T]hey were all there just as they were, and so I caught a glimpse of an energetic 
vitality inside each of these things, things that I generally conceived as inert. In this 
assemblage, objects appeared as things, that is, as vivid entities not entirely reducible 
 
480 Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007).  
481 Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (Duke University Press, 2010).  
482 Ibid., p. 10.  
483 Ibid., p. 5.  
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to the contexts in which (human) subjects set them, never entirely exhausted by their 
semiotics.484 
 
Bennett liberates each object, equalised now into contributory actors, from the influence of 
anthropocentric tendencies to place everything within systems of understanding that places the 
human at its centre. Within Bennett’s assemblages, ‘[a]gentic capacity is now seen as 
differentially distributed across a wider range of ontological types’.485 Furthermore, the actors 
and actants in these assemblages consist not only of the physical, but also the metaphysical and 
imperceptible, multiplying the potentialities in literary material where the non-human animal 
presences are backgrounded.  
 
 
The Three Rs and the Ambiguity of Animism 
 
The ethically dubious nature of invasive scientific procedures on non-human animals has 
necessitated a series of stringent protocols and codes of practice regarding, particularly, 
applications of pain and humane killing. From its earliest formation, protective legislation has 
been informed by William Russell and Rex L. Burch’s ‘Three Rs’ (3Rs) principle, first published in 
their work The Principles of Humane Experimental Techniques in 1959, which outlined the 
improvement of experimental procedures through the tripartite concepts of replacement, 
reduction and refinement when using non-human animals in the laboratory.486 The sociographical 
context of the 3Rs is fundamental in gaining an understanding of the ambiguities that will later 
emerge, as science historian Robert Kirk highlights: ‘[t]he moral outlook of The Principles of 
Humane Experimental Technique derived from an earlier ethos wherein humanistic and scientific 
values occupied a shared culture’.487 Kirk summarises, ‘the original formulation of the 3Rs can 
only be properly understood in the context of a scientific humanism that was inherited from the 
 
484 Ibid., p. 5.  
485 Ibid., p. 9.  
486 W. M. S. Russell and R. L. Burch, The Principles of Humane Experimental Technique (London: Methuen, 
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487 Robert Kirk, ‘Recovering the Principles of Humane Experimental Technique: The 3Rs and the Human 
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Victorian period and already in sharp decline at the time of their constitution’.488 The sciences and 
humanities subjects had yet to separate into the two epistemological cultures that characterise 
them today, of which the early twentieth-century antivivisectionist movement was a propellant 
force. The result being that the 3Rs are an amalgamation of both scientific and humanist principles 
that go some way to explain its inherent ambiguity and the range of social science and humanities 
interpretations that have revisited these principles more recently.489 Therein lies the potential for 
humanist resonations throughout the doctrine, implemented in laboratories worldwide, to 
reverberate within fictional reconstructions of the same empirical space and explore the 
paradoxical notion of care within this specific scientific environment.490  
 
The 3Rs principle relies on demarcations relating to pain and fear, considered along with 
other emotive response under the generalized term distress. These in turn are all determined as 
characteristics of inhumanity and placed in direct opposition with appropriated definitions of 
humanity. It is here that fundamental ambiguities begin to emerge, a result of Russell and Burch’s 
convoluted merging of scientific and humanist approaches. Consequentially, this has divided 
opinion on the meaning of the 3Rs, as some believe ‘[Russell and Burch’s] concepts of inhumanity 
and humanity do not themselves express value judgements but are strictly descriptive and 
empirical. The terms refer to objectively verifiable and measurable aspects’.491 Whereas others, 
as Kirk highlights, believed definitions of humanity ‘entailed a humane disposition towards 
animals premised upon kindness and benevolence, which in practice required action to diminish 
suffering and distress. Rather than being a tightly normative value, humanity was a general 
descriptive term’.492 Further issues arise in restrictions pertaining to the imperceptible, as some 
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interpretations allow only measurable, physical emotive responses to incite consideration. The 
implication is that negative mental states or psychological trauma in non-human animals, are 
canopied under insufficient explanations of pain and distress. These same ambiguities are 
transferred to subsequent legislative outcomes, each being informed by different interpretations 
of these identified emotive criteria, the result being misapplication and circulation, and that ‘there 
are currently in use a number of significantly different definitions of the 3Rs’.493 
 
The ambiguous nature of Russell and Burch’s principles increases further when considering 
the prioritization of specific moral foci, particularly anticipatory strategies for preventing pain and 
fear. When considered in more detail, this moral and ethical ordering highlights two intrinsic 
conceptual features of the 3Rs that leads to additional interpretive complications. Firstly, the 3Rs 
consistently look to ensure that the prevention of pain and fear are absolutely its primary 
objective, the implication being that death is somehow deemed less morally contemptable. 
Indeed, so long as non-human animals are killed by the correct method, it is regarded as a more 
acceptable endpoint as it carries no potential for extended pain or emotional trauma. Secondly, 
the various methods it proposes to be preventative are actually only ever limitative; certain kinds 
of pain and fear are permissible as preventative measures ‘cannot be allowed to compromise the 
goals of conducting sounds science and achieving scientific and medical progress’.494 These two 
ambiguous features raise a fundamental question: why are preventions of suffering absolutely 
the criterion by which to assess and appropriate the use of non-human animal in the laboratory? 
Why is suffering the only issue that concerns the 3Rs principle? These are the kinds of 
fundamental questions that literature aims to address, not only in order to highlight the limited 
moral breadth of scientific empiricism, but also to explore the potentialities of prioritizing other 
approaches, such as freedom, empathy and compassion.  
 
Today, the 3Rs still inform the majority of western legal systems regarding the physical and 
psychological care of vertebrate non-human animals, though exceptions exist. Two prominent 
such examples are the U.S. Animal Welfare Act of 1966 and the United Kingdom Animal Welfare 
Act 2006, which ensure that research facilities and laboratories are recurrently monitored by 
regulatory bodies dedicated to maintaining these predetermined standards of care outlined by 
governmental law, retaining the 3Rs at their heart. However, within these various laws and 
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permissions exist degrees of nomothetic ambiguity regarding the non-human animal during 
surgically invasive procedures, as the protective influence of the legislation differs pertaining to 
the unconscious non-human animal body. A brief outline of two such protective legislations, those 
specific to surgical and invasive practices, is therefore beneficial to the purposes of this chapter 
investigation.  
 
In the U.S., non-human animals are protected by the Animal Welfare Act signed by 
President Lyndon B. Johnson in 1966, who was greatly motivated by his own personal affection 
for dogs. As such, the bill was introduced primarily to clarify and outline the extent of legal 
liberties concerning pet owners and domestic animals. The Animal Welfare Act Amendments of 
1976 and The Improved Standard for Laboratory Animals Act of 1985 saw the further clarification 
of laws ensuring the humane care, housing and treatment of laboratory animals specifically. These 
expanded legal protections to include all warm-blooded animals in laboratories, provisions of 
veterinary care and introduced procedural measures that eliminate or minimize the unnecessary 
duplication of experiments on animals. Legislation relevant to research facilities and laboratories 
is updated and maintained by the Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee (IACUC), a 
regulatory body ‘qualified through the experience and expertise of its members to assess the 
research facility’s animal program, facilities, and procedures’.495 However, it is interesting to note 
that even today ‘[t]here are no federal requirements to report the number of these animals used 
in experimentation or the types of procedures conducted on them’.496 
 
In the United Kingdom, non-human animals are broadly protected by the Animal Welfare 
Act 2006, introduced to collate and consolidate numerous past pieces of protective rights 
legislation into one procedural law. However, this legislation is made legally redundant regarding 
non-human animals in the laboratory space, who are instead protected by the prior established 
Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986, which specifically standardizes practices including care 
and treatment of non-human animals for scientific use. The Act has undergone several 
amendments since its genesis, both to the benefit and detriment of the non-human animals under 
 
495 United States Department of Agriculture and Plant Health Inspection Service, ‘Animal Welfare Act and 
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its legal jurisdiction.497 For example, in 2013 the legislation was revised to extend protection to 
cephalopods (octopus, squid etc.) in scientific experimentation, but also increased access to non-
human animals during their foetal and embryonic development, protecting only the last third of 
their gestation or incubation period rather than half as was previously determined. Again, as in 
the U.S., the Act consciously employs the same Three Rs principle in the administration of its law, 
regulated and maintained by an independent ethics panel formed by the Secretary of State.  
 
These two instances of protective legislation attempt to lawfully determine the exact 
nature of invasive, surgical procedures on the non-human animal. The U.K. Animal (Scientific 
Procedures) Act 1986 defines a ‘regulated procedure’ to be any action ‘carried out on a protected 
animal and may cause that animal a level of pain, suffering, distress or lasting harm equivalent to, 
or higher than, that caused by inserting a hypodermic needle according to good veterinary 
practice’.498 In the U.S., the consultative Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals, a 
collaboration of peer-reviewed, approved ethical procedures, outlines the nature of surgical 
practice:  
 
In general, surgical procedures are categorized as major or minor and in the laboratory 
setting can be further divided into survival and nonsurvival. Major survival surgery 
penetrates and exposes a body cavity or produces substantial impairment of physical 
or physiologic functions […] Minor survival surgery does not expose a body cavity and 
causes little to no physical impairment […] Minor procedures are often performed 
under less-stringent conditions than major procedures but still require aseptic 
technique and instruments and appropriate anaesthesia […] In nonsurvival surgery, 
an animal is euthanized before recovery from anaesthesia.499 
 
This approach is also echoed in U.K. legislation, which determines surgery to be any regulated 
procedure that employs the ‘use of an anaesthetic or analgesic, decerebration and any other 
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procedure for rendering an animal insentient’.500 Both examples of legislative material continue 
to define terminologies such as euthanasia, both minor and major operative procedures, painful 
procedures, recoverable and non-recoverable procedures, as well as distress and discomfort 
amongst other various sub-categorizations. Returning to the focus of this chapter, the ambiguities 
present in both sets of legislation offer pose a particular representational challenge for 
contemporary authors when considering specific protective legalisation that justify these same 
invasive procedures. Particularly, how can they represent practices in such a way that still 
encourages a constructive reconsideration of the human and non-human animal encounters that 
happen without losing the impression of their particular legal situation that determines the very 
nature of their experiential existence.  
 
 
Representations of Legislative Protection in Cages and Intuition  
 
Certainly, Torti’s Cages and Goodman’s Intuition incorporate the legal realities of invasive 
practices on non-human animals into their narrative to ensure a sense of realism is maintained 
throughout. Both establish external, regulative presences that inform and ultimately determine 
the empirical activities of each fictional laboratory. In Cages, David’s laboratory relies entirely on 
permissions granted by a national regulative body which determines the necessity of its practices 
and dictates procedure to perform invasive procedures on birds. Indeed, David’s past successes 
are due to the fact he ‘successfully lobbied Congress for funding, making the case that although 
the brain was composed of a hundred billion neurons, it could be and would be understood’.501 
David recounts of his appeal to Congress:  
 
They promised to cut open the skull and tease the meaning from pink fatty tissue. 
Studying neurons […] would allow them to create navigational maps much like early 
explorers did for Africa, the Amazon and the Arctic, maps that would help people find 
their way inward, from behaviour to nerve to gene, helping them grasp the most 
elemental understanding of themselves and the sentient world. If nerves were like 
yarn, they said, they could loosen the skein, untwist the knots, find the beginning. 
 
500 Animal (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986, p. 2.  
501 Torti, p. 19.  
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Congressional support was bipartisan: the brain and its diseases had no political 
enemies.502 
 
Torti’s invocation of colonialist vocabularies, coupled with those provocative of animal husbandry 
and materiality through the wool or textile imagery, suggest a policy that looks to acquire full 
political control over a territory which will be occupied, subjected to invasive treatments and 
ultimately exploited. It implies that the legal freedoms permitted to scientists allow for the 
possession or ownership of the non-human animal body, both alive and dead. Torti’s reductionist 
undertones to the bird’s internal cognitive systems are contrasted with connotations of macro-
level exploration, discovery, ownership and all the hallmarks of global fame for the investigators, 
having ‘[t]heir work published in Science and Nature and every paper was celebrated with 
champagne’.503 
 
Goodman’s Intuition employs a similar sense of dependence on appeasing the external 
regulatory bodies, emphasising the legal and thus experiential situation of the non-human 
animals involved through association. Two characters in the novel encapsulate this sense of 
accountability: laboratory directors Marion Mendelssohn and Sandy Glass. At the beginning of 
the novel both characters look to discourage Cliff in his development of the R-7 virus strain, which 
at the time appears unprofitable in terms of both results and financial spending. Certainly, Sandy 
regards Cliff’s experimentation as so wholly stagnant he implores him to ‘end the wholesale 
extermination of our lab animals’.504 Marion echoes his anxieties, stating they do not have the 
money, though ‘she didn’t mean funds for the mice themselves, which cost about fifteen dollars 
each, but the money for the infinite care the delicate animals required’.505 Marion and Sandy’s 
concern for Cliff’s moribund research stems from their wider interest for the laboratory’s finances 
and the future of its various other tributary projects. Like Torti’s David, Marion is conscious of 
external pressures:  
 
She knew as well as [Sandy] that their old grant from the National Institutes of Health 
was ending, that last year’s research gambit had failed […] She knew they had to put 
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together a resoundingly good grant proposal for NIH by April first or contemplate 
folding. The Philpott Institute was governed by strict Darwinian principals. 
Investigators broke even or went bankrupt, losing staff and space and equipment to 
their rivals.506 
 
Goodman’s interpolation of the scientific and cultural term Darwinian is provocative, applying its 
weighty connotations of competition, survival, and reproductive dominance those within the 
empirical sciences and the field itself. It also proposes a degree of natural progression and 
development, ironically so as it is most certainly directed by anthropocentric approaches and 
artificially developed empirical scientific dogma. Certainly, the non-human animals always remain 
objects in the empirical design outlined by David, being simply scientific apparatus to be ordered, 
stored, and used, with their materiality justified by regulatory legislations. In Intuition, and when 
Cliff’s investigations into the R-7 strain hint at a promissory future concerning effective 
treatments in human health, concerns about the number of and manner in which laboratory mice 
populations are used are of no more concern; justified by inherent logics of sacrifice.  
 
Goodman highlights the individualistic nature of each research project. Each empirical 
methodology determines the experience of non-human animals in terms of resident lab-based 
populations, feeding and care programs, preceding and during their use as biomaterials. Even for 
invasive surgical procedures conducted post-mortem, the non-human animal exists before the 
terminal event itself and fictional reconstructions of the laboratory space can again manipulate 
issues of temporality to accommodate these considerations. For example, Goodman allows the 
reader to follow Marion into the laboratory from the outside in:  
 
[S]he made her way toward the numbered doors where the Philpott’s mice were kept. 
Each door had a window tinted red. From the outside looking in, each holding area 
looked like a little room in hell […] The animals needed rest, and the red windows 
shielded them from the hall lights at night […] She had worked with many strains of 
mice in her time and knew their particular traits […] some thin, some fat, some drug 
addicted, some healthy, some sick by design.507 
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Goodman fictionally animates the laboratory population of mice, expanding their temporal 
existences to include the time before the predetermined endpoint, deemed useful by empirical 
science, to propose a fuller experience than suddenly appearing as biomaterial. As noted by 
Goodman’s narrator, these experiences involve deliberate alterations of their internal biological 
systems, including the application of cancerous tissues, but nevertheless they exist beyond the 
purposes and rigid scope of the biomedical study. Critically, Marion does not consider the entire 
experiences of the mice, instead being simply ‘an attentive and compassionate investigator, 
almost fond of her small charges, proud and careful of them – not as if they had rights or souls, 
but as a craftsman might treat precious tools’.508 Goodman implicates two different and opposing 
kinds of value systems here: the transcendental versus the instrumental. Whilst initially Marion 
seems only concerned with final results and epistemological outputs of the biomedical empirical 
design at work, Goodman’s insinuations of craftsmanship propose future results are ensured 
through the maintenance and care of her tools. These represent the instruments by which she can 
access and translate biological information into scientific materials. All the while, Marion’s actions 
are justified by the legal ratification of invasive practice on non-human animals in the laboratory 
space, allowing for the reduction of the mice into biomatter at the cellular level by which tangible 
and ultimately valuable results can be produced.  
 
Torti’s fictional laboratory is susceptible to the same influences of regulatory bodies and 
dominant research trends in the certain scientific field being explored, as David himself is usually 
‘banging the keyboard of his computer writing another paper or grant proposal’.509 David’s choice 
of empirical enquiry meant that at the outset ‘he would be studying communication, not cancer. 
There was less money for research on birds than mammals because the genome in birds hadn’t 
been sequenced as it had been in mice […] no way to knock out sections of the genetic code and 
test hypotheses’.510 Torti is acutely aware of the influence of dominant paradigms that dictate 
research paths and the subsequent effect this has on the experiences of the non-human animals 
they involve. These types of methodological favouritisms, in terms of the popularity of some non-
human animal species over others, mean that certain research pathways are afforded more in 
terms of finances, facilities and, subsequently, permitted greater investigative invasive freedoms 
than others. Indeed, following Anton’s potential breakthrough in locating where memory is stored 
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in the bird’s internal biological system, Torti’s laboratory is permitted greater resources to pursue 
the lead: 
 
David had hired a small army of undergraduate students and the lab had gone from a 
quiet place to a crowded, drumming space that worked around the clock. The lights 
were on most of the time and the birds sang day and night […] Anton went home only 
to shower and often forgot to shave.511 
 
The fundamental change in the birds’ experience is disregarded as the subsidiary result or 
biproduct of increased rates of production, a greater volume of output and valuable results that 
regard the responses of the birds to be the same as under normal conditions. This in turn affects 
lab-based populations, as David now requires ‘[t]hirty of everything. Zebra finches, Bengalese 
finches. The rest I will have to collect in the wild’.512 As well as an obvious interest in the 
practicalities and moral questions underpinning trade in non-human animal species for 
experimentation here, Torti’s narrative sees a significant shift in the quotidian experience of both 
birds already in captivity and those sourced from the wild, creating new encounters between 
greater numbers of birds and humans through imposed proximities. 
 
Certainly, the potential successes of Anton’s investigation change the nature of the day-to-
day practices of the laboratory, and the quotidian experience of the non-human animals adapting 
to accommodate them. The nature of their laboratory’s research already affords David, Anton 
and Rebecca other kinds of encounters than in other institutions, as ‘[t]heirs was the only 
laboratory at the institute that studied birds, the only one that smelled of dust and seed’.513 
Already, the sounds and smells of David’s laboratory have been established in the narrative, the 
sensory experience of the space fictionally recreated. Torti goes on to emphasize the idea that 
the fundamental methodologies of each empirical space wholly dictating the nature of the space 
and the experience of the non-human animal. She achieves this by fictionalising another 
laboratory within David’s own institution that Rebecca visits:  
 
 
511 Ibid., p. 213. 
512 Ibid., p. 219. 
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The other neuroscientists studied mice which were kept in the basement. David had 
taken her down for a tour and she’d seen the rooms, each with hundreds of twelve by 
twelve-inch cages. Bred to express one gene or another, only their blood, cells and 
DNA mattered. Once the right strains were achieved, the mice were guillotined and 
frozen or ground in a blender. Liquid samples of blended skin or neat slices of brain 
could then be brought up to the laboratories for analysis.514 
 
Though only given brief mention in the narrative, Torti here employs a fictional strategy that 
introduces the parallel existences of other spaces, each with a different empirical design which 
affects the non-human animal experience. By having Rebecca walk into and observe an adjacent 
laboratory space, Torti draws attention to the different temporal logics at play that determine 
non-human animal existences, from laboratory lighting fixtures to the physical proximities of 
cages, and even time of death. Torti’s representation of these separate laboratory spaces 
delineate a shift between different spatial logics and implicate the experiential existence of the 
non-human animal located in each situation. Therefore, the non-human animals can be viewed in 
comparison with the specific value systems outlined in the except above, where some biomaterial 
features matter more than others, highlighting the selectivity of different scientific investigations, 
different configurations of a similar cultural terrain, and emphasizing the influence of 
methodological practices on the experience of the non-human animals themselves. Unlike David’s 
laboratory, where its key methodological feature is that the birds must remain able to sing, the 
adjacent laboratory needs only non-human animal biomaterial, and so its principles of care and 
maintenance are entirely different. Therefore, in this second space, encounters orientate around 
nutrition, physical welfare and, crucially, perennial termination to achieve viable results. Mice are 
selected based on accessibility to species populations, housing, financial costs, reproducibility and 
legal determinations of viable species killing. As David notes, ‘you don’t need to see or hear a 
mouse’.515 Though, more accurately, the investigators do not need to see or hear a mouse only 










The Ratification of Pain, Discomfort, and Death  
 
Protective legislation determines the nature of both physical and psychological pain and 
different levels of severity in order to justify and legally ratify its application during invasive 
surgical experimentations, where the non-human animal is being experimented on in vivo. The 
U.S. Animal Welfare Act determines these definitions according to conclusionary research works 
conducted by a variety of external, intercollegiate advisory bodies. One such example is the 
Committee on Recognition and Alleviation of Pain in Laboratory Animal Research, which defines 
pain in vertebrates to be ‘[a]n unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated with 
actual or potential tissue damage, or described in terms of such damage’.516 The guidelines go on 
to attempt the quantification and qualification of different levels or experiences of pain, or ‘pain 
descriptors’, including momentary pain, ‘postprocedural/postsurgical’ pain, persistent pain and 
chronic pain.517 The latter is determined to be the most difficult to manage, often without relief 
and may require that the non-human animal be euthanised.   
 
Strategies for pain management ‘often begins with general (surgical) anaesthesia, but also 
include local anaesthetics, analgesics, anxiolytics, and sedatives […] Pain management goals range 
from total elimination (as, for example, during general anaesthesia for a surgical procedure) to 
pain that is tolerated without compromising the animal’s well-being’.518 It is noticeable that these 
demarcations only consider application of initial sources of pain, without considerations for the 
periods following surgical procedures, pain experienced during the recovery stage. Curiously, the 
committee acknowledges ‘that pain in animals is difficult to assess, most because of a lack of 
methods to validate and objectively measure it […] behavioural indices and careful extrapolation 
from the human experience should be used to assess pain in research animals’.519 Indeed, this 
particular deliberation takes on a rather ambiguous, as well as ominous, dimension when 
considering invasive surgical practices.  
 
 
516 National Research Council, Recognition and Alleviation of Pain in Laboratory Animals (Washington DC: The 
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The ambiguities particularly surrounding the ratification of pain or distress arises due to the 
inherent principles upon which it is based, these being entirely appropriated by scientific needs 
and human definitions of usefulness, being ‘[w]hen laboratory animals are subjected to 
conditions that do cause pain or distress, then ethically – at least from a utilitarian perspective – 
the benefits must outweigh the costs’.520 Who then defines the benefits and their opposing costs? 
Those with the relevant expertise and knowledge of using animals in the laboratory, the same 
consultancy boards and agencies employed to outline and regulate the protective legislation. This 
is not to simply propose that the decisionmakers are biased always toward the benefits of 
scientific investigations. Rather it is to suggest that the lives of non-human animals are considered 
differently by those within the scientific discipline compared to those outside it. Undeniably 
scientific objectivism means there exists a level of professional necessity regarding the processes 
of inducing pain in the non-human animal. This could potentially lead to an underestimation of 
the ‘shocks, burns, lesions, crashes, stresses, diseases, mutilations, and the general array of slings 
and arrows of the laboratory environment’.521 
 
Protective legislation also regulates when and how non-human animals are killed. Usually, 
this is determined to be toward the end of the scientific experimentation, dependent on the 
physical state of the subject, signalling the end of its in vivo participation. Though procedural 
specifics are ultimately determined by external consultative panels, the U.S. Animal Welfare Act 
determines that ‘[a]nimals that would otherwise experience severe or chronic pain or distress 
that cannot be relieved will be painlessly euthanised at the end of the procedure or, if 
appropriate, during the procedure’.522 The U.K. Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986 also 
resolves that ‘[w]here a protected animal has been subjected to a series of regulated procedures 
for a particular purpose […] [or] at the conclusion of the series is suffering or likely to suffer 
adverse effects […] the person who applied those procedures […] shall cause the animal to be 
immediately killed by a method appropriate to the animal’.523 These terminative processes are 
dubbed ‘humane endpoints’, an appropriated term to justify the killing of the non-human animal 
 
520 Ibid., p. 11.  
521 Deborah G. Mayo, ‘Against a Scientific Justification of Animal Experiments’, in Ethics and Animals, ed. by 
Harlan B. Miller and William H. Williams (New Jersey: Humana Press, 1983), pp. 339-361 (p. 339). 
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subject.524 The legislative freedoms pertaining to terminations and death of non-human animals 
are operational characteristics of invasive surgical practice that feature throughout both 
Goodman and Torti’s novels, and so a brief overview of legislative protections permitted to the 
laboratory situation facilitates a more effective consideration of the literary reconstructions of 
the same processes. Crucially, these endpoints are misleadingly indicative of the end of the non-
human animals involvement in invasive surgical practices, however endpoints influence and 
dictate the entire non-human animal experience up to and during the moment of termination, as 
well as the treatment of their bodies afterwards. 
 
Humane endpoints are identified as ‘the earliest indicator in an animal experiment of severe 
pain, severe distress, suffering, or impending death’.525 Subsequent legislative materials 
centralise and standardise practices to carry out terminal processes, offering ‘an excellent 
overview of the methodologies to determine humane endpoints yet still achieve study aims’.526 
Naturally, these regimented practices vary in terms of application, being entirely dependent on 
the nature of the empirical investigation and are interpreted accordingly. The humane endpoint 
in any given scientific experimentation is therefore assessed individually, being either approved 
or refused by an external ethics committee. The act of humane killing non-human animals is 
summarised to be ‘the act of inducing death without pain […] as rapidly as possible and with a 
minimum of fear and anxiety’.527 Examples of humane killing methods include overdose of 
anaesthetic suitable for the species by either injection, inhalation or immersion, dislocation of the 
neck, decapitation or concussion ensuring the destruction of the brain, and exposure to high 
concentrations of carbon dioxide.528 However, many instances of protective legislation fail to 
demarcate clearly between those non-human animals that dies before an experiment begins, and 
those that die during or after.  
 
 
524 National Research Council, Recognition and Alleviation of Pain in Laboratory Animals, p. 2.    
525 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Guidance Document on the Recognition, 
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Logically, post-mortem dissection requires the non-human animal to be killed before the 
experiment begins, in order to access biological tissue, organs and fulfil the purposes of the 
broader empirical design. These early terminations occur more frequently in some research areas 
than others. For instance, humane endpoints in cancer research depend on the type, size and 
aggression of certain cancers or tumorous growths within the non-human animal. Surgical 
procedures that would only incite severe blood loss or haemorrhaging are deemed non-
recoverable and therefore humane endpoints are established early, before the invasive surgical 
procedure itself begins. The U.K. Co-ordinating Committee on Cancer Research guidelines 
propose that ‘[c]onsiderable care should be given to the judicious choice of end point for tumour 
growth, bearing in mind the objectives of the experiment and the underlying biology’.529 
Toxicology research also relies on post-mortem investigations on non-human animals. Though 
legislation is again ambiguous concerning early terminations, as ‘although predictive models for 
some toxic end points, such as mutagenicity, already exist, more mechanistically complex end 
points – such as acute, chronic, or organ toxicity – are more difficult to predict’.530 Research into 
other, more severe types of toxicological substances would also provoke considerations of human 
safety and therefore further dictate the endpoints of non-human animals subjects.  
 
The nomothetic ambiguity of the legislation for standardised and regimented endpoints for 
non-human animals in the laboratory space means that, ultimately, the scientific investigation 
always retains priority. Certainly, if the pain and suffering experienced by the non-human animal 
is deemed to reach a level considered unethical or immoral, it is only ever by the standards 
established by the relevant advisory bodies, only then are they terminated. Conversely, should 
the aim of the scientific investigation rely precisely on the existence of pain and suffering, or 
exposure unto death, then the protective laws become malleable. Both the U.S. and U.K. 
legislature for non-human animals are subject to discretionary permissions by the Secretary of 
Agriculture or Secretary of State respectively. For example, the U.S. directive states that ‘[n]o 
animal will be used in more than one major operative procedure from which it is allowed to 
recover’, unless ‘[i]n other special circumstances as determined by the Administrator on an 
 
529 United Kingdom Co-ordinating Committee on Cancer Research, ‘Guidelines for the Welfare of Animals in 
Experimental Neoplasia’, British Journal of Cancer (1998), 1-10 (p. 3). 
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individual basis’.531 Therefore, should the empirical investigation rely on repeated trauma or 
surgical investigations, permissions can be granted to ensure the continuation of the scientific 
research. Ultimately, instances of nomothetic protective legislation are being continuously 
appropriated to each empirical design, whilst also acting to satisfy wider human moral or ethical 
quandary. 
 
The inclusion of two examples of protective legislation of non-human animals in the 
laboratory space is not to finally determine its efficiency or validity of scientific idealisms. These 
issues occur well beyond the remit and expertise of this study, certainly as ‘[t]he historical 
controversy surrounding animal research is far from being settled […] key arguments have not 
differed since the rise of antivivisection in nineteenth-century England’.532 Instead these 
legislative materials give us an insight into what happens to the non-human animal body; 
processes intrinsically tied to the legal ratification of pain, suffering and implementation of death. 
These constructs dictate the ways and when killing of non-human animals occurs, totally altering 
the fundamental complexion of human and non-human animal encounters within the laboratory 
space. Can meaningful encounters still occur post-mortem? If so, how does this occur when the 
non-human animal contributor is dead? Importantly, how can literary representations negotiate 




Reanimating the Inanimate Non-Human Animal in Cages 
 
Sylvia Torti’s Cages features fictionalised instances of vivisection on birds and incorporates 
scientific determinations for the regulation and ratification of pain or discomfort into the fictional 
strategy. Torti’s scientific basis of the novel takes from her own historical primary research aims, 
to ‘present data on the relationship between beak movement and sound properties in zebra 
 
531 Animal Welfare Act, p. 23. 
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finches’533 in order to ‘ask questions about the selective pressures involved in song evolution’.534 
The non-human animal participants of the investigation are summarised in the methodology: 
 
Ten adult, male zebra finches (Taeniopygia guttata) were used as subjects. Individuals 
were housed at 22°C on a 14:10 light:dark cycle and supplied with seed, water and 
vegetables ad libitum.535  
 
Naturally, this is the only mention of the quotidian experience of the zebra finches outside of the 
experimental practices and procedures, not being the empirical focus of investigation. It is 
assumed that the ten non-human animal subjects are all identical in every way, both physically 
and cognitively. Though ambiguities remain, as the ultimate fate of the participants after 
experimentation is not divulged, nor is there any mention of unsuccessful surgical procedures on 
animals that may not have made the final selection. However, it does offer an initial, broad 
impression of living conditions, and the absolute control of scientific determinations of non-
human animal care and the regulation of potential variables. It provides a basic daily framework 
on which Torti builds her reconstruction. She expands the temporal existence of the finches 
beyond the remits of the empirical narrative, within a reimagined laboratory space that is then 
populated by fictional characters against which to construct human and non-human animal 
encounters.  
 
The first instance of invasive surgical practice in the novel is performed on a zebra finch, 
referred to by David and Anton as Red 31. The empirical basis of the procedure is to determine 
the biological functions of bird’s singing capabilities, much like Torti’s own investigation. During 
the preparation stage, Anton notices that ‘David hadn’t yet removed the food dish from the cage, 
which violated protocol he’d been taught […] Full stomachs didn’t go well with anaesthesia’.536 
This certainly aligns with Torti’s own procedure, as ‘[b]irds were deprived of food and water 1 h 
prior to surgery, and surgeries were performed under isoflourane anaesthetic’.537 Anton has 
 
533 F. Goller, and M. Mallinckrodt, and S. D. Torti, ‘Beak Gape Dynamics during Song in the Zebra Finch’, 
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therefore learned his scientific behaviours, a code of practice that is intrinsically tied in with peer-
reviewed predeterminations of what are acceptable levels of pain and discomfort induced in non-
human animals. These learnt protocols dictate Anton’s actions during the human and non-human 
animal encounter, differing depending on whichever investigation is being carried out. Due to the 
invasive nature of the procedure conducted on Red 31, Anton does not remove the food dish to 
prevent discomfort, but to avoid what is deemed to be bad science in this particular scenario. Any 
notion of Anton acting on empathetic sensibilities is somewhat neutralised by his performing the 
surgical procedure in the first place, his motivations based on being ‘[c]onvinced that the bird was 
going to perform’.538 The loaded term perform proposes an element of predetermined 
expectation and anticipation on the part of the investigator; a form of personal motivation 
suggestive of investigational bias. Furthermore, David also shares in Anton’s scientific 
conditioning, increasing a sense of ethnological distance between both characters, the laboratory 
that they inhabit, and the reader.  
 
Upon being anaesthetised, Red 31 begins the transition from sentient subject to material 
object, the procedural purpose being to fit it with ‘thermistors that would measure airflow 
through the two halves of the syrinx, the bird’s version of a larynx’.539 Torti’s narrative describes: 
 
David rinsed and dried himself with industrial paper towels before he slipped his hand 
into the cage and encircled the male zebra finch with his palm. He positioned the bird 
on the surgery table, his hands gently holding its head while it jerked into aesthetic 
sleep […] David sat down, rolled the chair toward the table and focused the 
microscope onto the bird. Anton positioned himself at his side and together they 
began to work.540  
 
Within the laboratory, the surgical table becomes a space within a space, an area permitted 
specialized freedoms to conduct invasive surgical practices on non-human animals. Presurgical 
routines paradoxically exalt methods of sterilisation and decontamination in order to perform 
deliberate contaminations of the sedated and exposed non-human animal body. The act of 
anaesthetisation eliminates any immediate concerns of inducing pain and discomfort, as the bird 
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is unconscious it is assumed it cannot feel. Permissions to anaesthetise the birds are allowed by 
predetermined procedural guidelines, or learnt scientific behaviours, that favour anaesthesia in 
this particular example of surgical practice. Perhaps rather illogically, for David and Anton to study 
the biomechanics of birdsong, an entirely aesthetic phenomenon, the birds must be subjected to 
anaesthetic; the elimination of consciousness or bodily sensations.  
 
Paradoxically, David’s success and reputation rests on his ability to surgically interfere with 
internal mechanisms of birds, without impeding their biological function to sing in order to 
measure their auditory feedback. Essentially, he requires the ability to manipulate the non-human 
animal body in such a way that does not affect the non-human animals biological systems, 
maintaining normal behaviour as far as possible. David’s particular experimentation is interesting 
in that the invasive nature of its methodology is only to test auditory capacity, rather than test 
treatments of cancers or other infectious diseases. Indeed, Anton is only at the laboratory 
because of David’s high success level, or rates of survival, during the post-procedural stage. 
David’s notoriety is born from this, that ‘[d]espite the nerves [David] cut, the red, blue and green 
wires he threaded across their skulls, just below their skin, or the electrodes inserted about their 
hearts, or on their rumps, [the birds] sang’.541 Here, Torti highlights the paradoxes apparent within 
an empirical investigation looking to quantify and qualify the sensory value of a principally 
aesthetic singularity, being bird song. Through placing such conceptual opposites together, the 
physical imposition on sensorial ability, Torti offers a fictional scenario by which to reconsider the 
moral implications within the scientific principle of the ends justifying the means. 
 
At the end of the procedure, the finch dies due to an unspecified adverse effect of the 
surgical implantation. Prior to dying, the bird’s body is reformed as ‘David positioned the probe 
in place and began to sew up the bird’.542 Shortly afterwards, ‘David looked down at the bird again 
[…] He pulled the bird from the anaesthesia funnel. Anton stepped back. Rebecca rushed toward 
them. The bird lay limp on the table’.543 Ultimately, the implanting of foreign materials to the non-
human animal body causes it change into something other, contaminated by devices of human 
empirical design and so arguably not a true representation. The physicality of the vivisection 
procedure contrasted against the cerebral death of the bird proposes an ambiguous insinuation 
 
541 Ibid., p. 40.  
542 Torti, p. 41.  
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to factors unseen, or unprioritized, by scientific pragmatism. Torti suggests that pain and trauma 
cannot be quantified and qualified in such a way as to always guarantee survival, that something 
more than the physical is irreversibly altered during the procedure. Certainly, David is totally 
confused, remarking to the others: ‘I’ve done that surgery a thousand times […] It doesn’t make 
any sense’.544 What does not make sense to David is that Red 31, according to empirical science, 
was indistinguishable from past subjects and presented no new variables to justify the 
unsuccessful outcome.  
 
Its death installs Red 31 with an ambiguous individuality, having directly contradicted the 
surgical methods developed to ensure survival and thus the continuation of the experiment. This 
is something that empirical practices look to nullify as an influential variable, as it would threaten 
the validity of both the investigation and make redundant universal practices that rely on 
duplicity. Due to his scientific empirical sensibilities, David never considers there to be an issue 
with the centralised technique by which to perform this mode of invasive surgery, as it has been 
determined to guarantee survival. Instead of going against the founding principles of reliable 
refutation and conjecture, David blames the finch, not the peer-reviewed, legally ratified 
procedural methodology. Torti’s fictional strategy here intervenes to propose David is incorrect, 
the fiction working to re-autonomize the finch as having the ability to disrupt scientific systems 
of knowledge production through an element of animism that is unobtainable in terms of 
scientific determinations and control. For David, the cause lies with an imperceptible agency of 
the individual finch, it being simply ‘[i]nfuriating how quickly a zebra finch could go’.545 Through 
this fictional scenario, Torti challenges empirical notions of replicability in the non-human animal, 
the idea that no two experiments are ever truly duplicable.  
 
Indeed, both David and Anton remain loyal to their learnt empirical methodology after the 
death of Red 31, as to them ‘[e]very death marked the premature end of an experiment, but some 
were particularly unfortunate, coming only days before the critical follow-up data had been 
collected’.546 Even after death, the non-human animal only exists within the temporal logic of 
each empirical investigation, each untimely demise marking only the termination of a particular 
thread of enquiry and end of a resource. In contrast, Rebecca is the only character without any 
 





empirical predisposition, and looks to try and understand the ambiguity in the death of Red 31, 
remarking ‘[m]aybe it didn’t want to be studied […] maybe it chose to [die]’.547 A comparable 
ambiguity exists in Torti’s own experimentation, mentioned only briefly in the scientific 
publication following the beak immobilization experiment, or the surgical restriction of beak 
movement: 
 
Beak manipulations provided additional and strong evidence for the contribution of 
beak movements to sound modification. Only one bird sang enough for quantitative 
analysis of beak gape during manipulations.548 
 
Ambiguities stem from the fact that only one zebra finch sang following the beak immobilization 
experiment, the reasons for which cannot be purely biomechanical, as the singing finch proves 
the centralised surgical practice does not hinder singing ability. The empirical ramifications are 
that this avenue of enquiry is limited to single-subject results, rather than attaining a collective 
cross-sectional sample from which more comprehensive results pertaining to behavioural species 
trends can be gleaned. In terms of the non-human animal, the implication is that there are reasons 
as to why the other finches did not sing, introducing a variety of new potentialities that propose 
new modes of agency that rebalance systems of autonomy present in the encounter. For example, 
the finches perhaps did not sing due to intense pain or discomfort, post-surgical trauma, cognitive 
changes, environmental influences, awareness of foreign materials in their biological systems but 
rather, after everything, because they just did not feel like singing. The methodological 
ambiguities that arise in Torti’s own experimentation correlate closely with those present at death 
of Red 31 in the novel, during which Torti employs a fictional strategy by which to explore new 
potentialities pertaining to new modes non-human animal agency.  
 
Certainly, Rebecca looks to charge the finch with the same sense of agency, restoring a 
fractional autonomy within a process where otherwise power lies only ever with the human 
scientific investigator, posing the question that maybe the bird ‘[c]hose to die’.549 She argues that 
the bird, conscious of its own mortal situation and the fundamentally alien nature of the surgical 
alterations made to its being, made a deliberate choice. Naturally, this is rejected by David and 
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Anton as anthropomorphism, David chastising her for ‘a common mistake, projecting human 
emotions and agency onto animals’.550 Rebecca is then left alone, as she ‘rubbed the black surgical 
table with soap and then followed with alcohol. She picked up the zebra finch, and put him on a 
paper towel on the counter’.551 Rebecca’s quasi-ceremonial cleaning of the surgical table signifies 
the end of the experiment. Her actions embody the scientific ideal that each investigative 
procedure exists within brief, self-contained temporal existences, separated from other 
procedures occurring before and those that follow, in order to ensure empirical objectivism and 
accuracy. For Rebecca, being the laboratory technician, her encounter with the finch continues 
beyond the official termination of the procedure and the surgical table, a space where only 
invasive permissions are permitted. Her non-scientific background allows for a reconsideration of 
the bird’s death. For David and Anton, the bird ceases to exist in any capacity at the moment of 
death, as it signifies the end of its empirical usefulness. However, her encounter continues:  
 
Rebecca placed the zebra finch in her palm, its head drooping between her thumb and 
forefinger. His body was still warm, a warmth that was expressly unsettling because 
she knew it was temporary. The hyperactive bird had been stilled and silenced. She 
held him closer and blow on the soft orange cheek feathers and then smoothed them 
down again with the tip of her finger. Why did she feel sad? […] She couldn’t say, but 
she knew death could be a choice.552 
 
Rebecca is the narrative construct by which Torti can leave the reader in the room with the dead 
finch, experiencing its motionless yet still affecting presences. Torti’s is a fictional interpretation 
of how bodies could nevertheless influence and interact in the surgical space once the non-human 
animal is deceased.  
 
Haraway’s When Species Meet is worth introducing here as it elaborates on Rebecca’s 
emotional reaction to the bird’s death in Cages. In When Species Meet, Haraway directly 
challenges human tendencies toward justification and ratification of death, proposing the more 
plausible command should be ‘Thou shall not make killable’.553 Particularly, Haraway offers the 
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conceptualisation of a shared suffering between humans and non-human animals within the 
laboratory space, occurring between researcher and subject. To this end, she propositions a 
reconsideration of legislative ratifications of pain and the act of killing:  
 
[R]eal pain, physical and mental, including a great deal of the killing, is often directly 
caused by the instrumental apparatus, and the pain is not borne symmetrically. 
Neither can the suffering and dying be borne symmetrically […] these practices should 
never leave their practitioners in moral comfort, sure of their righteousness […] The 
moral sensibility needed here is ruthlessly mundane and will not be stilled by 
calculations about ends and means. The needed morality, in my view, is culturing a 
radical ability to remember and feel what is going on […] to respond practically in the 
face of permanent complexity not resolved by taxonomic hierarchies and with no 
humanist philosophical or religious guarantees. Degrees of freedom, indeed; the open 
is not comfortable.554  
 
Haraway exposes the social and technological constructs that justify the human systemized killing 
of non-human animals. She continues to highlight the importance of remaining conscious, facing 
the undesirable realities of killing; always without excuses.  
In When Species Meet, Haraway draws from Derrida’s ontological considerations of non-
human animals, particularly his theoretical explorations into human moral responsibilities.555 
Within his approach, Derrida recognises that the treatment and killing of animals is justified by 
ideologies born from an absolute belief in human exceptionalism. This, in turn, forms an 
unbridgeable gap that forever separates the human and the non-human animal. Haraway 
observes that ‘Derrida remembers that in this gap lies the logic of sacrifice, within which there is 
no responsibility toward the living world other than the human. Within the logic of sacrifice, only 
human beings can be murdered’.556 Haraway draws attention to legal mechanisms that allow for 
the deferral of moral outrage pertaining to the killing of non-human animals, so long as it occurs 
within a demarcated empirical space. She goes on to introduce two key concepts, the logics of 
substitution and scapegoating:  
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[A]nimals are sacrificed precisely because they can be killed […] The substitute, the 
scapegoat, is not Man but Animal. Sacrifice works; there is a whole world of those 
who can be killed, because finally they are only something, not somebody, close 
enough to “being” in order to be a model, substitute, sufficiently self-similar […] but 
not close enough to compel response.557 
 
Haraway charges these two concepts as being wholly indivisible with moral accountability. She 
concludes that if empirical science will use the non-human animal in such ways, then greater 
efforts at a shared suffering must be made, ‘to do the work of paying attention and making sure 
that the suffering is minimal, necessary, and consequential’.558 As the only non-scientific character 
in Torti’s narrative, Rebecca’s response contrasts with those of David and Anton, conversely 
highlighting characteristics of scientific empiricism that prevent or discourage both moral affect 
and emotive response. Rebecca’s emotional reaction to the finch’s demise becomes a moment 
charged with possibility that rebalances systems of autonomy that otherwise view the non-human 
animal as insignificant and materially disposable, encouraging other potential forms of affective 
encounter during these particular modes of human and non-human animal interaction. 
 
 
Revitalising the Deceased Non-Human Animal in Intuition 
 
Intuition also includes fictional instances of invasive surgical procedures, as Cliff looks to 
surgically dissect a mouse showing recovery symptoms, having been infected with the R-7 strain. 
However, unlike Torti’s Cages, instances or invasive practice only occur after the non-human 
animal is euthanised after a period of gestation of cancerous tissue or tumours. The mouse is 
therefore non-sentient during invasive practice, killed through either anaesthesia or the breaking 
of the neck, and reduced down to biomaterial cell cultures and analysed to observe the effects of 
potential treatments. Intriguingly, Goodman installs Cliff with a rather contradictory sense of both 
empirical and empathetic logics. On the one hand, he is observed ‘examining his mice, holding 
them up by the tail […] Those were results he held there by the tail’559, and on the other, ‘[h]e 
hated the thought of breaking the bodies now so wonderfully cured. He had healed these animals 
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[…] An overwhelming, woozy desire came over him to see the mice intact’.560 Initially, Cliff seems 
to regard the mice as both cellular biomaterial and emotive beings all at once, though during the 
surgical procedure that follows, his scientific behaviour ultimately regains dominance. Naturally, 
Goodman is careful to acknowledge the paradoxical implications relevant to issues of empathy 
and care in invasive procedural sciences, as Cliff himself notes ‘[h]e had healed these animals. 
First he’d brought them close to death, and now he’d brought them back’.561 The genuineness of 
Cliff’s empathetic considerations of the mice is therefore questionable, initial impressions diluted 
and muddied by both his apparent narcissistic god-complex and the artificiality of the encounter 
created by the intentionality of the empirical methodology.   
 
Cliff’s killing of the mouse is a textual moment charged with agency on the part of the non-
human animal, a final animation before becoming an inanimate other, or biomaterial. It is 
important to remember that the death of the non-human animal marks the beginning, not the 
end, of empirical processes reliant on dissection. Goodman describes:  
 
[Cliff] took just one mouse and put it in the clear plastic container that served as the 
CO² chamber. A simple hose fed into the isolator from a spigot on the wall. Cliff 
depressed the lever and CO² filled the sealed chamber. The mouse thrashed against 
the walls. Bred for timidity, the little creature still fought death; the animal was alive, 
and it wanted to live. But the thrashing soon ended. The mouse seemed to swell as it 
expired, growing heavier even as it struggled, until, weighted down, life and colour 
drained. The animal lay still, like a gray mouse statue on the bottom of the cage.562 
 
Certainly, the killing of the mouse and its subsequent inanimation changes the conditions of the 
human and non-human animal encounter. Goodman accentuates the wholly inequitable nature 
of the power structure at play within empirical methodologies necessitates these designated 
endpoints. The ferocity displayed by the mouse expresses a desperation to escape its situation, a 
final futile grasp for autonomy within a system dominated absolutely by the human experimenter. 
The fictional moment of actual killing is significant as the mouse’s actions are charged with a 
vivacious, innate desire to remain alive despite being selected for its supposedly timid behaviours. 
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The implication being that death and dying are always inescapable sources of inherent fear, 
entirely evasive to scientific modes of behavioural selection. This is achieved by expanding the 
temporal logics of the moment of killing, supposedly quick and humane, to instead include the 
mouse’s desperate actions immediately prior to death. The result is the chilling proposition that 
there exists a moment when the mouse realises it is mortally threatened and thus knows it is 
going to die. These moments fall outside the legislative protections that instead prioritise the 
prevention of prolonged types of distress and pain. Goodman’s fictional strategy thus offers a 
consideration of the inefficiencies and limitations of centralised terminal practices that extend 
from human-defined degrees of pain and discomfort. By fictionally reconstructing and extending 
the temporal logic of the killing process, a supposedly instantaneous event, Goodman offers new 
reconsiderations for moments of emotive response in the mouse, rather than moving from simply 
alive to then dead.  
 
During Goodman’s terminal event, the conceivable assemblage according to Bennett’s vital 
materiality would therefore consist not just of Cliff, the mouse, and the CO² chamber, but also 
various  invisible actants such as the intentionality of Cliff’s actions, the nutritional energies 
present in the mouse, the electricity that operates the CO² chamber, and, crucially too, legislative 
regulatory frameworks.563 Bennett’s theoretical approach reinstitutes surgical practices with 
multitudinous contributors and possibilities for human and non-human animal encounter, never 
simply a human investigator operating on a deceased mouse body. The broader implication being 
that reconsiderations of fictional reconstructions of this same empirical practice can employ this 
conceptual approach to identify other potential moments in human and non-human animal 
encounters. Goodman’s description thus suddenly becomes a far more multidimensional 
encounter, extending the bodily influence of the mouse beyond the limitations of insentience and 
presenting the opportunity for further mutual affectivity. 
 
Following the terminal event, Goodman’s narrative follows the mouse’s body as it moves 
through the surgical process, in order to explore the potentialities for meaningful encounters. 
Certainly, the recent insentience of the mouse threatens to remove the non-human animal 
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Cliff carried the body gently in his gloved hand to the dissecting room. He turned on 
the examining light and placed the mouse belly-up on the thick polystyrene dissecting 
block with its disposable pad.564  
 
Following Bennett’s theoretical framework, the surgical glove, examining light, dissecting block, 
disposable pad, and the dissecting room are all now implicated as equal contributory actors within 
this particular assemblage, as well as the unperceivable influences that each object implies. When 
moving into the dissecting room, Cliff crosses into a space permitted special dispensation for 
surgical procedures on deceased non-human animals; that is its purpose. The procedural 
expectations of the designated space therefore potentially cause a change in Cliff’s perceptions, 
a reprioritisation of the materiality of the mouse’s body which is then further encouraged by the 
presences of specialised apparatus, such as the dissecting block and examining light. The surgical 
pad resonates poignantly in being single-use, one of numerous disposable resources that includes 
the non-human animal body. However, disposability invariably implies multiplicity, distinguishing 
Cliff’s disposable pad, and thus the mouse that lays on it, as the latest in a chronological sequence 
that potentially stretches back to the creation of the dissecting room. Empirical protocol 
insinuates that the pad and the mouse are indivisible, as one cannot exist in the space without 
the other, and so a legitimate mutual history comes into existence. This subsequentially 
incriminates the dissecting room as a space with a new protracted temporal logic that orientates 
around a species history spanning years. This is entirely contradictory to the purposes of the 
dissecting room, intended to accommodate the short temporalities of resettable, repeatable and 
replicable surgical experiments, thus the empirical exactitudes of the space are compromised. 
The body of mouse R-7 is synonymous with the re-imaginings of past rodent multitudes that have 
passed through the space, as they re-populate the dissecting room at the merging of temporal 
existences.  
 
Bennett’s theoretical framework also reconsiders the emotive influences of each 
interaction between primary actors, isolating behaviours in order to examine motivations behind 
them and legitimising their position within the network as actants. For example, the action of Cliff 
carrying the dead mouse into the dissecting room consists of three primary actors: Cliff, the 
mouse body and the glove. However, another valuable and unperceivable actant that connects 
the three primary actors is the gentleness with which Cliff handles the mouse’s body, opening up 
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an array of new potentialities in the encounter. It would be easy to view Cliff’s gentleness as 
simply to avoid damaging biomaterial rather than any sense of care, evident in his earlier 
narcissistic contemplations. Maybe it is the habitual result of learned scientific practices and 
appropriated behaviours. But is it really that simple? Cliff’s behaviour could be influenced by 
imperceptible cues emitted by the inanimate mouse: the delicacies of its tiny body, the unnatural 
stillness of its being now in death, or even some reverberations of empathy.  
 
What about the surgical glove? Certainly, the glove is representative of scientific insistences 
for cleanliness and decontamination, a synthetic barrier existing between Cliff and the mouse that 
prevents bodily contact and, more broadly, could eliminate potentially affective physical 
encounters. But then again, the glove still allows for moments of real affection, connecting Cliff’s 
hand with the residual warmth of the mouse’s body through its own material. Maurice Merleau-
Ponty offers a productive conceptual approach through his notion of reversibility, or the 
potentialities that arise when one considers that touching is to be touched. He proposes ‘an 
essence beneath us, a common nervure of the signifying and the signified, adherence in and 
reversibility of one another – as the visible things are the secret folds of our flesh, and yet our 
body is one of the visible things’.565 Dan Zahavi elaborates on Merleau-Ponty’s approach even 
further:  
 
The decisive difference between touching one’s own body and everything else, be it 
inanimate objects or the bodies of Others, is that it implies a double-sensation. The 
relation between the touching and the touched is reversible, since the touching is 
touched, and the touched is touching. It is this reversibility that testifies that the 
interiority [felt from the inside of the body] and the exteriority [felt on the skin] are 
different manifestations of the same [body].566  
 
Implementing Merleau-Ponty’s reversibility approach, new potentialities begin to open up when 
considering the role of the surgical glove that still facilitate Cliff’s touching of the mouse. For 
instance, it raises the question as to whether all the internal systems of the mouse ceased 
simultaneously, or could Cliff still feel further resonations of life within it. The glove consequently 
 
565 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, ed. by Claude Lefort, trans. by Alphonso Lingis 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968), p. 118. 
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shifts from a preventative to accommodating force within the bodily encounter between the 
human and the non-human animal. Suddenly, valuable reconsiderations appear that rebalance 
relative systems of power and different kinds of agency in favour of the non-human animal 
participant during these encounters, though always relative to the limitations of autonomy 
imposed by empirical scientific systems on the non-human animal.  
 
Such deliberations provoke a reconsideration of the period immediately after termination, 
as by including the role the inanimate or material it increases the chances for and potentials 
available in other kinds of human and non-human encounter. More accurately, how points of 
interaction between actors transform during the transition of the non-human animal from living 
to dead to accommodate new existences. Fictional strategies can help to explore this notion of 
transition, whether the non-human animal can still exist as an influential presence following death 
or, as their bodies grow cold, they simply become the material they are utilised for. Bennett’s 
conceptual approach would encourage the dead non-human animal remains a significant 
presence, due to its commitment to inanimate political actors. When the new circumstances of 
the encounter are then renegotiated, is there a period of extension where emotive affection, 
present when the non-human animal was alive, resonate after the moment of killing?  
 
Certainly Cliff’s gentleness could be the emotive remainder of when the mouse was alive: a 
behavioural resonance symbolic of affective exchanges between two living beings. Goodman 
demonstrates that Cliff clearly detects something, whether it be consciously or unconsciously, still 
present in the mouse’s body deserving of this particular behaviour. In Torti’s Cages, Rebecca 
experiences a period of extended affection after the death of the zebra finch, as ‘[h]is body was 
still warm, a warmth that was expressly unsettling because she knew it was temporary […] Why 
did she feel sad?’.567 The residual warmth of the deceased finch’s body instigates the sense of 
loss, sadness, confusion, and doubt she now feels for the living non-human animal. The cessation 
of consciousness is the scientific determination of death, and yet, for Rebecca, the bird continues 
to exist in her own psyche, resurrected beyond the confines of its physical body, still able to affect 
her emotionally. However, unlike with Cliff, the death of the finch was not the intended outcome 
and so Rebecca is affected by different degrees of emotionality. It is difficult to imagine that any 
form of human emotionality would instantly shift to appropriate the dead non-human animal as 
simply inanimate matter at the precise moment of death, and so the implication of both fictional 
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strategies is that the non-human animal continues to exist after the moment of death in some 
abstract way, defying systems of empirical absolutism.  
 
After this period of transition following the killing of the mouse, Goodman proceeds to 
describe Cliff’s dissection in meticulous and vibrant detail. She begins with the opening up of the 
mouse’s body: 
 
He took four pins and pinned the mouse down, one pin through each paw. The mouse 
was stretched out now in death, its limbs taut, ears rigid, its two front teeth exposed, 
fierce in rigor mortis. With tweezers Cliff plucked the loose pink skin covering the 
mouse’s abdomen, and then with small sharp scissors he snipper one vertical and four 
horizontal incisions, creating two neat rectangular flaps of skin to open and fold back. 
Cliff spilled no blood doing this […] He looked, instead into a clear, inviolate body. Here 
was the soft maroon heart, the size of a bean. Here the slippery liver, deep purple, its 
four flat lobes fanning out enormously as Cliff picked them up with his tweezers. Here 
the lungs. The kidneys, just the size of lentils. Here were the intestines, curled 
intricately together […] he’d never get them all back in again, packed as they had 
been.568 
 
As the internal biological systems of the mouse are revealed, its internal organs are isolated and 
identified by Cliff, signifying the first stages in a process of scientific reduction that will eventually 
condense the mouse down into cell cultures and statistical biodata. As Cliff proceeds, the mouse 
moves further away from the living non-human animal being that was first placed into the CO² 
chamber, catalysing a perception shift in Cliff that aligns closer to considerations of biomaterial. 
Goodman’s description also includes a secondary commentary on Cliff’s expertise at these 
invasive practices, the insinuation being that his practical success is most likely born from 
rehearsal and repetition over time. Cliff’s surgical abilities therefore evidence a centralised 
procedure regulated by governing regulatory bodies, raising familiar paradoxical issues 
surrounding the regimentation of killing to protect non-human animals: that there is a right way 
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Bodily Manipulations: Unconscious Effect of the Experimenter  
 
The learnt nature of surgical practice introduces a new form of temporal logic that exists 
here, involving Cliff’s professional career and his learning to surgically operate on mice. Viewed 
retrospectively, Cliff’s career becomes interspersed with past operations and thus numerous non-
human animal existences become placed within the temporal logic of his practical development, 
evident now in his competent surgical skill. The R-7 mouse inhabits a dualistic role, both an 
individualised being but also placed within a temporal historiography of all the mice sacrificed and 
contributory toward Cliff’s scientific learning. In Cages, Torti incorporates the same narrative 
device, as David remarks ‘I don’t know what happened. I’ve done that surgery thousand times’ 
following the death of the finch Red 31.569 Similarly to the mouse, the finch is situated at the end 
of a chronology of sacrificed non-human animals that have allowed David to develop his surgical 
skill. The added implication being that both Cliff and David may have, at one time, been prone to 
making mistakes before arriving at their surgical competency. The projected experiences of the 
non-human animal therefore become, contrary to scientific endeavours, more varied and 
unregimented as new potentialities open up due to reconsiderations of possible temporal 
existences. Crucially, the two narrative strategies implicate the human surgeon within the 
temporal existences of the non-human animals, being potentially hundreds of individuals, 
becoming perennial figures present at each individual moment of killing. 
 
Returning to Goodman’s Intuition, as Cliff’s progresses the mouse R-7 is further reduced 
down to the level of muscle tissue, seemingly threatening to remove the non-human animal 
presence entirely. Goodman describes:  
 
Cliff peeled open the flaps of skin and began to pin them to his dissecting pad. Red 
blood vessels threaded the pink translucent skin, the vessels clustering at the mouse’s 
five pairs of mammary glands. Cliff picked at the skin with his tweezers and exposed 
each gland, and each gland in turn was normal size, the pattern of the blood vessels 
normal and undisturbed.570 
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Cliff’s biological observations move from individualised, recognisable viscera to the intricacies of 
muscular tissue and specific facia; the mouse’s body is studied now at the micro-level of empirical 
examination. Delving deeper into the mouse’s biological composition, Cliff’s use of unfamiliar and 
exotic biological terminologies prompts a sense of disassociation; the reader is further removed 
by the exclusivity of knowledges permitted to him through the empirical vernacular. His account 
of vessels and glands, mentioned now in place of the heart and lungs, translates the non-human 
animal body according to scientific determinations and intensifying the sense of ethnological 
distance. The more specific the terminologies, the further away the reader is taken from the 
recognisable non-human animal presences in the encounter. Indeed, the mouse is continually 
being separated and divided into its working parts, literally and figuratively, as Cliff’s empirical 
training applies a mechanomorphic approach to its internal biological system. As the parts are 
named and multiplied however, the assemblage of influential actors adapts to accommodate the 
materials that make up the mouse body, increasing the chance for affective potential in the 
deceased non-human animal.  
 
Upon finding no initial trace of cancerous tissue or tumours, Cliff begins to realise the 
potential in his R-7 vaccine treatment:  
 
Cliff’s heart began to beat faster. Over and over, he traced the faint red lines of the 
mouse’s blood vessel, the map of the animal’s body, the hairsbreadth rivers that 
extended from each mammary gland throughout the skin […] He had never seen 
anything more beautiful or more important than that mouse before him on the table 
[…] The threadlike blood vessels did extend in Cliff’s imagination. They seemed to 
spread into infinite patterns and possibilities, aligning and realigning themselves 
against cancer. Against death […] Here was the way forward. Here was the human 
body writ small.571 
 
Once again Goodman refers back to the cartographic imaginary evidenced earlier and uses the 
loaded-value words beautiful and important to charge the mouse’s body with a sense of 
consequentiality for human systems of knowledge. Indeed, the passage ends with the mouse as 
an analogy of the ‘human body writ small’; the non-human animal body directly charged with the 





narrative strategy, one that moves away from more systematic observations of itemised organs 
or tissue. Goodman emphasizes Cliff’s excitement at his new discovery through intimations of his 
emotional reaction, his provocations of beauty, and hybridization of scientific realisation with the 
potentialities depicted in Cliff’s own imagination. Intriguingly, the lifeless form of the mouse, 
whose biological systems have ceased entirely, is juxtaposed against Cliff’s own visceral bodily 
reaction in the heart palpitations he experiences. Having meticulously isolated and identified each 
of the mouse’s internal organs up to this point, Goodman now accentuates a sense of 
interconnectivity between tissue and emotive response, delivered through her depiction of Cliff’s 
heart racing. Consequentially, the mouse becomes retrospectively charged with the same notions 
of physical emotionality, Goodman proposing a kind of creaturely continuity existent between 
Cliff and the mouse. The association is therefore made that the mouse experienced the same 
kinds of emotive responses when alive, its heart beating quicker during periods of emotional 
exhilaration too. Therefore, the wider implication of Goodman’s strategy is that the internal 
organs and tissues of non-human animal bodies, when dissected, can be fictionally recharged with 
the same emotionality that animated them in life.  
 
There is also another key dualism at play here, following Cliff’s excitement and the 
noticeable transformation of his perspective toward ‘that mouse before him on the table’.572 
Whether Cliff still sees the mouse as a single body, or a summation of cancer-free tissue and 
biomaterials remains ambiguously presented and therefore the mouse assumes a multiplicity of 
existences. The mouse is simultaneously a former sentient being, an inanimate dead body, a 
collection of key organs, a selection of tissue and blood vessel samples, as well as intrinsic cellular 
data and, crucially, Cliff’s own statistics and results. Cliff’s regard of the mouse is certainly 
determined by his empirical behaviours, his scientific imagination starting to ‘spread into infinite 
patterns and possibilities, aligning and realigning themselves against cancer […] as he looked at 
the normal, healthy corpse before him’.573 The oxymoronic phraseology here emphasizes the 
fundamental logics of sacrifice at play, that encounters are driven entirely by the promissory 
futures of human health, or as Cliff remarks, ‘the human body writ small’.574 The mouse is 
undoubtedly the source of Cliff’s impending success, but only ever insofar as it provides the 
biological framework inside which to test his new vaccination. Instead, he is never under any 
 





methodological obligation, other than the specific ethical practices of killing, to consider the 
cognitive or emotive processes that make-up the non-human animal being. Here, Goodman’s 
narrative strategy provokes a retrospective reconsideration of when exactly the mouse ceased to 
be a mouse: at the moment of killing, the post-surgical destruction of its body, the moment it 
entered the laboratory space, or whether it ever actually stops being a mouse at all. Goodman’s 
aim is not to finally identify this moment, but to rather highlight the ambiguities present in 
selective scientific processes that authorise and facilitate permanent alterations to non-human 
animal identities and existences.  
 
Like Intuition, Torti’s Cages offers a fictional exploration of the affective biases of the 
experimenter during human and non-human animal encounters, most prominently through the 
character of Anton. Unlike David who, rather paradoxically, ‘came to neuroscience through a love 
of birds and their song’, Anton’s motivation is just ‘to understand circuitry and wiring of memory’, 
and personally he ‘didn’t like them much. Plain and simple, though they’d been a constant 
presence in his life’.575 Torti elaborates on the preferential characteristic of Anton’s character to 
such an extent that it affects his bodily encounter with the birds. Here, Torti employs a narrative 
strategy that works to invocate scientific principles pertaining to the disavowal of embodied 
connections with non-human animal subjects during experimentations, as Anton notes:  
 
He avoided looking at their eyes and at the sloughing epidermis where their beaks 
met their faces. He didn’t like the scaly feeling of their spindly legs or the way their 
toes sometimes curled around his pinky finger when he held them. He didn’t like the 
feeling of their quickly beating hearts or warm bodies in his hand, and the truth was, 
he resented them deeply when they died.576 
 
Undoubtedly, Anton’s indisposition toward working in close proximity to birds introduces new 
implications regarding the human and non-human animal encounter here. His disinclination 
influences everything from the more intimate, such as body language, behaviour and bodily 
movement throughout points of contact, to the ideology that determines his fundamental view 
of birds as existential beings. Certainly, this opens up numerous potentialities in the experience 
of the birds themselves during these points of encounter. Torti’s fictional strategy here allows for 
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a reconsideration of the ways in which the birds may perhaps be responsive to the subtle 
indications of Anton’s aversion: an abruptness of movement, variations in handling, hesitation or 
even negligence. This resonates poignantly with Despret’s conceptual approach concerning the 
articulation of bodies, a crucial source of evidence for human and non-human encounters in 
invasive surgical practice, being perhaps the only form of reciprocal exchange that occurs there.  
 
Anton’s personal indifference to birds is underlined at a moment of revelation, as he ‘began 
sketching the syrinx, the bird’s voice box, imagining how it might be possible to temporarily keep 
it from vibrating, devising how he might be able to mute a bird’.577 Anton’s own emotional 
detachment allows him to identify this particularly extreme avenue of enquiry that would perhaps 
of otherwise evaded those with a greater inclination toward birds. The nature of the experiment 
is made all the more poignant as it confiscates the bird of something fundamental to its very 
nature; birds being as universally synonymous with singing as they are with flying. Nevertheless, 
his objectivity steers him toward a mechanomorphic reduction of the bird’s physiology:  
 
He looked back at the drawing of the bird’s syrinx again, and suddenly he saw it. If he 
could keep the labia from moving, then theoretically there should be no sound […] He 
jumped from his chair and went to fetch a zebra finch.578  
 
Anton’s investigative decision is immediate, and the existential future of the finch is decided 
instantly due to the ultimate autonomy of the investigator, procedural permissions of the 
laboratory and easy accessibility to resident non-human animal populations. Crucially, Anton 
views the finch as being indistinguishable from other disposable scientific resources and so does 
not hesitate to satisfy his methodological curiosity. Following the surgery, Anton ‘cleaned the 
table and tidied up the instruments. He wouldn’t say anything to David. If it worked, he would 
have to see that this was the definitive test’.579 It is insinuated that if the process is unsuccessful 
and the bird dies, Anton will not mention the procedure to David, consciously denying the 
existence of the finch and exploiting scientific logics of sacrifice. Therefore, the wider implications 
of Torti’s fictional strategy, endowing Anton with a sense of scientific indifference toward the 
 
577 Ibid., p. 56.  
578 Ibid., p. 57.  
579 Ibid.  
209 
 
birds, is to imply that the inclinations of individuals can profoundly influence the experience of 





This chapter has analysed the ways in which in Torti’s Cages and Goodman’s Intuition 
fictionally represent non-human animals within the laboratory setting implemented in invasive 
surgical practices. To provide a foundational understanding of epistemological logics active in this 
specific laboratory situation which could then be compared against fictional representations of 
the same conceptual features and methodological practices, an overview of the protective 
legislation that facilitates scientific ratifications of pain and killing of non-human animals was 
included. This established, analyses then turned to the ways in which contemporary literary 
strategies can re-autonomize and reanimate non-human animal presences following the point of 
inanimation and killing, stages representing the relegation of the non-human animal to 
biomaterial. Here, the chapter drew from Bennett’s vital materiality framework in order to open 
up the invasive surgical space in such a way that rebalanced non-human animal presences and 
reconsider the opportunities for valuable interspecies encounters still occurring during these 
procedures and practices. These conceptual approaches were applied to demonstrate how 
contemporary literary strategies can negotiate investigative methods in which human temporal 
and autonomous control are absolute. Investigative value in such a literary critical approach lies 
in its offering a more multi-dimensional interpretation to importantly reconsider potentially 

















 This thesis has argued that contemporary literary representations of the non-human animal 
in empirical scientific settings can effectively contribute toward post-humanist reconsiderations 
of scientific empiricism and its systems employed to produce knowledge on non-human animal 
life. Through its critical analytical approach, the thesis has shown ways in which contemporary 
fictional strategies can negotiate and navigate operational epistemological logics, functioning 
differently from one scientific situation to another, in order to highlight conceptual oppositions 
in methodological practice and reconsider the role of the non-human animal more broadly. In 
addition, it has also demonstrated how fictional reimaginings of the human and non-human 
animal encounter within the scientific setting offer a far greater multidimensional interpretation 
of the potentialities that arise during interspecies interaction, restoring elements of non-human 
animal agency otherwise denied by predeterminations regarding their situational circumstance. 
Deliberations have continuously taken the non-human animal seriously, considering them as 
contributory and participatory to equally the production of scientific knowledges and human and 
non-human encounters that empirical science engenders. The thesis has maintained that 
contemporary fictional interpretations of the empirical scientific space can effectively and 
legitimately contribute to considerations pertaining to the multitude of culturally similar, yet 
methodologically dissimilar, scientific situations that host innumerable and valuable human and 
non-human animal encounters, informing posthumanist interspecies relations.  
 
 Analyses have been facilitated in part due to the nature of the contemporary texts chosen 
to demonstrate the capacity of fictional strategies to represent and reconsider non-human 
animals as valuable contributors to knowledge production and interspecies encounters within the 
empirical setting. The thesis has sought to demonstrate the fertile ground in contemporary fiction 
directly engaging with non-human animal presences in not only the broader empirical sciences, 
but the complex sub-variations of scientific settings and reconsider their experiential existences. 
It emphasizes valuable literary contributions to recent posthumanist re-visitations to and 
reconsiderations of scientific empiricism as a predominantly humanist concept which produces 
specific kinds of knowledge regarding non-human life. As such, fictional instances explore the 
limitations of empirical science to accurately represent non-human animal life, highlighting key 
conceptual oppositions and paradoxes apparent within working methodologies to contemplate 
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the potential for other forms of knowing or rebalancing systems for interspecies productions of 
knowledge. 
 
 Chapter One began with an analysis of how William Boyd’s Brazzaville Beach fictionally 
represents field-based scientific practices as a critique of its operational epistemological logics 
that ultimately dictate the kinds of knowledges produced on non-human animal life. Boyd’s novel 
was examined against Donna Haraway’s conceptualisation of the empirical sciences as social 
construction susceptible to cultural and social change. The chapter introduced the logics of 
temporality that featured throughout the thesis, accentuating the ways in which scientific 
empiricism operates in specific demarcations of time. Boyd’s literary strategies were then 
evidenced to encourage a reconsideration of field-based practices and the operational systems of 
knowledge production implementing non-human animals. Specifically, the chapter focused on 
formations of scientific paradigms, interpretive flexibility, the issues of ownership, and the 
tensions that arise between old and new knowledges concerning on non-human animal life. The 
productive potentialities of this chapter’s critical analyses demonstrated the ways contemporary 
authors can effectively navigate, present, and accentuate working epistemological logics of the 
setting to consider the experience of both the non-human animal and human researcher and the 
interspecies encounters engendered there. 
 
 Chapter Two focused on the fictional reconstructions of the laboratory space, elaborating 
on preliminary understandings of empirical practices introduced in the previous chapter. The 
chapter read contemporary reimaginings of the modern laboratory featured in Colin McAdam’s 
A Beautiful Truth and Karen Joy Fowler’s We Are All Completely Beside Ourselves, with both texts 
including fictional representations of the laboratory, based around the cognitive behavioural 
studies and biomedical experimentations conducted on chimpanzees. The chapter then examined 
the ways in which fictional strategies bypass epistemological logics that allows the laboratory to 
operate as a hermetically sealed off and autonomous space. Implementing theoretical 
approaches of science sociologist Bruno Latour, the chapter focused specifically on the broader, 
more general epistemological logics at work within the laboratory, predominantly those that 
influence the non-human animal experiential existence. Empirical features included systems of 
autonomy, issues of temporality, and installations of visibility and invisibility, among others. The 
chapter provided an overview of the laboratory situation and its epistemological logics, 
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anticipating the ensuing examinations of other, more specific sub-divisions of laboratory practices 
throughout the next two chapters. 
 
 Chapter Three analysed how three fictional short-stories explored the conceptual 
oppositions apparent within experimental comparative developmental studies; Lydia Millet’s 
‘Love in Infant Monkeys’, Karen Joy Fowler’s ‘Us’, and Ursula Le Guin’s ‘Mazes’. All three texts 
offered alternative literary strategies by which to effectively portray the sheer variety and 
multitude of non-human animals employed in short-term psychological experimentations, 
demonstrating alternate literary strategies by which to navigate and represent an empirical 
situation reliant on multisubject investigations. The chapter outlined inherent challenges facing 
contemporary authors, including issues of autonomy, methodological systems of separation, and 
different, more stringent, manifestations of scientific temporal logic. Supportive theoretical 
approaches of Vinciane Despret were also employed, particularly those regarding the effect of 
the experimental situation on interspecies encounters, as well as introducing the potential value 
of anecdotal evidence and how non-human animals respond to other questions, subliminal to 
those that scientific investigators believe they are asking. The chapter highlighted contemporary 
strategies that are able to rebalance non-human animal agency within scientific systems of 
autonomy and bodily separation, working against operational constructs that threaten to quieten 
or completely silence non-human animal presences. Reading these three fictional examples 
through such a critical literary approach demonstrated how contemporary authors can open up 
this laboratory scenario and offer new potentialities pertaining to interspecies encounters 
occurring during and around scientific investigations there.  
 
 Lastly, Chapter Four focused in on representations of non-human animals implicated within 
the laboratory setting employing invasive surgical practices as the fundamental system of 
knowledge production. The chapter analysed the ways in which in Torti’s Cages and Goodman’s 
Intuition fictionally signify scientific justification of pain, discomfort, and the killing of non-human 
animals. Considerations incorporated Bennett’s vital materiality framework into readings of the 
fictional material to frame invasive surgical practice in such a way that rebalanced non-human 
animal presences and reconsider opportunities for valuable interspecies encounters still occurring 
during procedures and practices that exalt materiality. These conceptual approaches were 
applied to demonstrate how contemporary literary strategies can negotiate investigative 
methods in which human modes of temporal control and autonomy are organised in their most 
213 
 
stringent forms. Analyses turned to the ways in which contemporary literary strategies can re-
autonomize and reanimate non-human animal presences following the point of inanimation and 
killing, stages representative of processes that render the non-human animal into biomaterial. 
Potential investigative value of such a literary critical approach lies in representations of a more 
multi-dimensional human and non-human animal encounter, and reconsider the affective 
moments still occurrent in this scientific situation.  
 
 Taken together, these four chapters have allowed the broader thesis as a whole to look 
across different scientific settings and attend to the specificities of each empirical situation, 
thereby contributing to the store of literary animal studies accounts regarding the empirical 
sciences and human and non-human animal relation in fiction by adding complexity and 
comparative understanding, demonstrated by the investigations laid out in each chapter. Rather 
than survey many instances in contemporary literary fiction to achieve its goals, the thesis has 
focused on important texts in detail because of the depth and focus of their interest in alternative 
scientific settings. The chapters have showcased different literary strategies by which to navigate 
the subtle nuances and variances between epistemological logics and empirical methodologies, 
opening up the scientific setting to consider the non-human animal experiential situation in 
addition to the human and non-human animal encounters and interactions that occur there. This 
thesis hopes to demonstrate the great potential in contemporary literary fiction to accurately 
represent non-human animals caught within systems of knowledge production throughout the 
empirical sciences. These fictional narratives should be taken seriously in terms of their ability to 
contribute to posthumanist re-evaluations and reconsiderations of the empirical sciences as the 
definitive mode of producing knowledge on non-human animal life. Most importantly, they 
encourage other modes of interspecies affection, alternative ways of knowing that are equally 
and legitimately as valuable as those made through empirical practice and actually, when it comes 
to evaluating our current treatments of and determining our future relationships with non-human 
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